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ABSTRACT 
The post-communist condition has been theorised mainly through the prism of 
concepts developed under different socio-historical circumstances, namely in the 
Western world,, with the consequence that local social actors are not given a voice in 
the matter of conceptualisations of social change. 
This research explores the production of the social and refashioning of identities post- 
1989 in Romania using mainly interviews and other fon-ris of fieldwork, and organises 
the analysis around concepts of place, within a discursive understanding of the social. 
One of the main points argued is that the locations of the West and Eastern Europe are 
positioned in a hierarchical relationship through a backwardness discourse, which 
deeply affects the production of the social in post-communist Romania. The shape of 
social change after the fall of communism has been largely decided by the societal 
project of 'catching up with the West', and supported through power relations that 
implicate both the West and the 'local' (Romanian social actors). 
Processes of production of the social are discussed both in the form of the 'return to 
Europe' project, and in the form of social actors' struggle to fill with meaning the 
signifiers of societal discourses. Through processes of struggle, hegemonic 
articulations emerge, and are antagonised by resistance discourses. The main traits of 
the dominant discourse structuring the social presently in Romania are a materialistic, 
individualistic stance. 
These dominant articulations assign people to subject positions, therefore shaping 
their identities. The main criterion for allocation to subject positions is material status, 
and it is against this powerful positioning that individual social actors try to negotiate 
their identity. 
Techniques of identity-work are captured in relation to a different dimension of 
space/place: place of residence. Three contrasting study areas are chosen for 
ethnographic research, and the articulations respondents perform explored. Both types 
of place of residence (detached house and blocks of flats neighbourhood) provide 
resources that are discursively used for valonsing constructions of place and of the 
profile of the local resident, although in different ways. 
Place of residence has the potential to offer alternative subject positions that can be 
used to mitigate the dominant positioning through the criterion of material status. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Rationale 
At a general level, this research deals with the post-communist transition. This focus was 
prompted not necessarily by the urge to discover the truth about an exotic, hitherto 
largely unknown Other, but rather by the drive to understand how truth is actively 
produced within the process of discovering the 'real essence' of this Other. From this 
latter perspective, the study of the post-communist transition is central for the 
understandings of who we are now, considering its impact on the organising dichotomies 
posited as fundamental for our 'grids of historical decipherment': West/rest; West/East, 
capitalism/socialism, liberal democracy/socialism, modemity/pre-modemity and 
consequently on our more metaphysical understandings of the nature of history, truth, 
good, the subject, equality, freedom. All those are partly thought about, more precisely 
are constructed, through the relation between the West and the East, a relation that forms 
and reforms the identities of both elements of the relation. It is around this object and 
subject-forming relation therefore, on how it affects the form of social change in the East 
and on how it affects the identity and knowledge production of the West, that the 
analytical and explanatory elements of the research revolve. 
I initially attempted to approach those aspects of the post-communist 
transformation through the main theories in the field. The literature review I undertook 
made me realise that there are specific patterns in the ways the great majority of the 
studies dealing with the issue of the post-communist 'condition' are undertaken. 
To start with, the studies I am referring to read the contemporary West-East 
relationship as a clearly defined relation of power, since one part is codified as the winner 
of modem history, the other as the loser. The 'communist collapse' prompted a 
redefinition and repositioning of the West, a re-imagining of its identity as end-result of 
the evolution of history. Hence, the recurrent interpretations of this 'collapse' as the 'end 
of history' that many of those studies proffer (the classic statement is Fukuyama 1992) or 
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- in a less millenarian tone - as the 'death of socialism" or as the living proof of 
convergence or globalisation 2 theories. 
What all those understandings allow is a positioning of the particular socio- 
political arrangements of the West - or more precisely of the ways in which they are 
imagined by social sciences especially in their realist-scientistic and neo-liberal capitalist 
guise - as not only preferable but natural: the only available alternative for those willing 
to live a free and prosperous life. There is nothing left but a total acceptance of the logic 
of the market and western political arrangements. The way the post-communist transition 
is approached is a direct consequence of this positioning: the 70 years of socialist 
experiment are discarded en bloc as a historical aberration and those societies that went 
through it are portrayed as dismorphic and in need re-education by the hand of the 
6winners'. 
Since the only possible alternative to become modem, prosperous and civilised is 
liberal capitalism, those societies cannot be represented but as in need to 'catch up with 
the West 3 '. This is a classical move in Western theorising4, one that permits the 
signification of the Other as placed somewhere in the West's historical past, as primitive; 
in this case it results in a discourse of backwardness that will act as a grid of intelligibility 
for most analyses of Eastern Europe. And since the future is established and it is the 
West, it is the West that possesses the expertise on how to get there: the locals are sickly 
The impact for political thinking in the West was significant, since the collapse of communism was easily 
articulated with the lack of viability and desirability of socialist or even social democratic arrangements, 
facilitating a neo-liberal hegemony. One of the results of this alleged discrediting of left politics was the 
development of new models of political formation, such as the third way, a non -adversarial, 'win-win 
politics' based on dialogue and non-conflictual social paradigms exemplified in the work of Giddens and 
Beck under the theme of reflexive modernisation (for a more detailed discussion, see Laclau and Mouffe 
2001, especially the Preface). 
2 Globalisation theories - emitted by both the left and the right - construct it as the inexorable spread of 
liberal capitalism. Irrespective of their tone (triumphalist or imminent doom), such theories confirm and 
legitimise neo-liberalism as the only possible option. 
' Ironically, this slogan was used by the Soviet communists to spur the economic efforts of their citizens, 
boost their morale and intimidate the opponent. That shows to what extent the struggle for world 
supremacy was since the beginning conducted on the West's terms. 
4 It must be made explicit that, even if inspired by a Western worldview, the theories and studies I am 
describing in this Introduction are not produced exclusively in the West. A plethora of similar productions 
emerge from Romania itself- this reflects both the impossibility to escape a relation with the West when 
describing any identity in the contemporary world and the firrnly pro-Western stance of the local 
intelligentsia. it is to studies originating from both locations that I refer throughout. 
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5 children in need of education and therapy . Hence, an array of studies that 
focus on the 
proper treatment that would restore their ailing health, with marketisation and 
privatisation at the principal cure, backed up by democracy and civil society. 
I shall insist on the mythical images of both the East and the West those studies 
construct and use to reform and rule both types of societies throughout my text. For the 
time being I will simply assert that most of them are sweeping theories that adopt a God's 
eye view of the societies they 'study' to discover the most appropriate measures to hasten 
their complete transformation into liberal capitalist nations. If they are interested at all in 
the people whose lives they decide upon, it is a very particular image of the post- 
communist person that they sketch, mostly to explain why s/he exhibits anomalous 
behaviours that slow down, distort or thwart the neatly elaborated expert plans to re-build 
their countries. The ill-will or incapacity to comply with the therapy can only be 
explained in this paradigm by the lasting damage the years of monstrous communist rule 
inflicted on those people's selves. Their essential, liberal-individualist core has been 
contaminated, their competitive, striving, autonomous and democratic natural impulses 
have been repressed of annihilated: theories explaining the failure of the therapy because 
of the 'bad patient' are thus abundant (social capital is one of the better known 
examples). 
One vital aspect those theories ignore are the poverty, unemployment and 
polarisation those therapies themselves engender. This time of opportunities and freedom 
for the East seem rather one of destabilisation, deprivation and confusion, of insecurity, 
humiliation and resentment. Nevertheless, it is not on those aspects that the main 
analytical focus of the research lies. Rather, in my opinion, all those studies miss another 
essential dimension: the way the social is re-emerging through discursive struggles whose 
heterogeneity and complexity cannot be captured by approaches focused on such 
totalising concepts as 'democracy', 'the economy' or 'State/civil society'. 
The main research interest became the production of the social, its mechanisms 
and background (framed in discursive terms); this thesis considers that one of the most 
important issues after the fall of communism refers to changes in the structures of 
' The medical language portraying the East as ill, contaminated, collapsed, in need of therapy, as well as a 
paternalistic educational language - phrased in ten-ns of (re)fonning, teaching, tutoring, guiding, surveying 
- are rife in the type of studies 
I am scrutinising here. 
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meaning that used to anchor the identity of the local social actors. In brief, I am 
attempting to turn those theories of the Eastern-European 'transition' on their head and 
present the world from the perspective of the 'backward patient'. This attempt started 
from the understanding that once again, all that was solid melted into thin air for those 
people: their worlds and their selves have to be actively reformed and renegotiated. 
Therefore, only an understanding of the processes through which the actors attempt to 
make sense of (or 'make' tout court) their world could permit a glimpse of what those 
societies are or transforming into. Hence, the research attempts to capture in a snapshot 
the shifting terrain they have to negotiate, the permanently wavering contours of reality 
they have to attempt to stabilise, the complexity of the games of signification they are 
engagedin. 
I have approached social change by looking at the discourses that effect it and 
combined this with a focus on social actors' understandings and practices as participants 
in discourses. In other words, I have engaged with identity-formation as a central 
mechanism of the formation of the social and examined both the ways in which 
discourses create subject positions and fashion subjectivities and by investigating how 
social actors negotiate their discursive positioning. 
This is mainly a study about places, about the largely invisible but continuous and 
meticulous effort of construction (and the acerbic struggles over meaning) that confer 
places their stability, solidity, permanence and thus allows them to constitute the 
foundation of our understandings of the world. In other words, about how the fixed points 
around which we construct our worlds - places and spaces - are themselves constructed. 
About how the discourses that cause the West and the East to emerge as discrete 
geographical, social and symbolic spaces intersect the discourses that cause individuals to 
imbibe with sense and materiality - to 'place' and 'emplace' - themselves and their 
world. The social actors are performing this identity-work through every practice they 
engage in (in fonns as different as accounts or narratives in informal settings, and choices 
over what car to buy); therefore a way of capturing it was to focus on a setting in relation 
to which identity-work is carried out - in the case of this analysis, place of residence was 
used as a relevant setting and an angle of analysis of identity negotiation. 
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It is hoped that at the end of this exploration not only a different image of what is 
social reality' in a post-communist society will emerge, but the accounts of the 'patients' 
might contribute to making more controversial the paradigms of their 'doctors'. Those 
recalcitrant patients will show themselves able to contest categories that are considered 
fundamental to the extent that they are never questioned by the therapeutic theories and 
policies - precisely the meanings of the good and the good society, sociality, the 
individual, freedom, democracy, capitalism, market - showing a reflexivity obscured by 
the majority of the studies focusing on their deficient character. By giving a voice to 
those usually silenced in the studies that describe them, by picturing a different image of 
a post-communist society - although an essentially partial and transitory one -I do not 
aim nor hope to dislocate the dominant neo-liberal discourses; I nevertheless do hope I 
can contribute to making their taken-for-granted nature less evident, to assist 
"in wearing away certain evidences and commonplaces [ ... ] to bring it about 
that certain phrases can no longer be spoken so lightly, certain acts no longer, or 
at least no longer so unhesitantly performed; to contribute to changing certain 
things in people's ways of perceiving and doing things; to participate in this 
difficult displacement of forms of sensibility and thresholds of tolerance" 
(Foucault 1991, p83) 
Overview of the chapters 
This thesis is structured in three parts. 
Part one presents the main approaches to theorising post-communism, including 
theories of stratification, as the landscape in which my research is located, and proposes a 
different angle of analysis that gives discourse a central place (chapter 1). Also, in part 
one the main theoretical concepts used throughout the thesis will be discussed. Chapter 2 
deals with theories of discourse and of agency in a discursive understanding of the social, 
while chapter 3 looks the contributions of social scientists to theories of place/space and 
the use of space/place to conceptualise, explain or describe the social. Chapter 4 
describes the methodology of this research and raises some ethical issues. 
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Part two of the thesis examines the production of the social in and across spaces. 
Chapter 5 proposes an explanation of the events around the fall of communism in 
Romania and the ensuing state of affairs that draws on the discursive nature of the social, 
and introduces notions of social dislocation and suture. The symbolic positioning of 
Eastern Europe and West is detailed in chapter 6, and its implications on the shape of 
social change (especially the suture of the dislocation) in Eastern Europe are spelled out. 
Chapter 7 uses interview material to illuminate a different dimension of production of the 
social - namely 'from below', meaning through the articulatory practices that social 
actors constantly perform. These articulations have taken at societal level the form of 
dominant and resisting discourses, which are presented in chapter 8. 
Part three of the thesis turns to the specific use of place of residence by local 
social actors in their efforts to negotiate their position across discursive structures - in the 
context of strong criteria for social hierarchies (strong subject positions they are allocated 
to by the dominant discourses presented in chapter 8). Chapter 9 looks at an old detached 
house Bucharest neighbourhood, while chapter 10 focuses on two study neighbourhoods 
in two block areas. The analysis tries to capture the nature of identity work, the 
techniques and discursive resources used. 
Part four introduces a discussion that unites some of the issues that different 
preceding chapters have raised (chapter 11), and a last chapter of conclusions brings 
together the findings of this research and highlights their relevance, but also the 
limitations of the claims made throughout the thesis. 
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CHAPTER1 
EXPLORING THE POST-COMMUNIST CONDITION 
Introduction 
The fall of communism in Eastern Europe has prompted widespread debates across the 
social sciences. It was met with an initial fascination that Zizek captured as follows: 
"Why is the west so fascinated by the recent events in Eastern Europe? The 
answer seems obvious: what fascinates the Western gaze is the re-invention of 
democracy. It is as if democracy, which in the West shows increasing signs of 
decay and crisis, lost in bureaucratic routine and publicity-style election 
campaigns, is being rediscovered in Eastern Europe in all its freshness and 
novelty. The function of this fascination is thus purely ideological: in Eastern 
Europe the West looks for its own lost origins, for the authentic experience of 
'democratic invention"' (Zizek 1990, p50). 
This remark about the interest the West took in the developments in Eastern Europe can 
be extended to include, along with the emergence of liberal democracy, the re-birth of 
capitalism - re-instauration of the free market and property rights, and a reconfiguration 
of 'classes' or other forms of social stratification. Post-communist Eastern Europe 
represented a laboratory of social change: by studying the production of democracy and 
capitalism in Eastern Europe, more general insights could be gained, that would shed 
light on processes taking place in the West. 
The initial interest and expectations Zizek describes were followed by frustration 
and disappointment with the post-communist 'transition': instead of the expected 
'democratic invention', local developments often took the shape of national chauvinism 
and ethnic populism; as for 'capitalism', in Eastern Europe it took 'messy' shapes in 
relation to Western forms of capitalisms, due to specific arrangements of the past being 
carried to a certain extend into the present. 
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Nevertheless, in academic circles the post-communist condition has been at the 
core of renewed theoretical debates on a variety of topics, and a target for policies and 
intervention. The section below reviews some of the ways in which these debates have 
theorised aspects of post-communism, and highlights their shortcomings. 
I will then introduce a discussion on forms of stratification in the communist and 
post-communist societies in order to locate my approach to these issues (which guided 
some of the research questions), but also as a useful background for issues raised later in 
the thesis. 
The last part of the chapter will propose an alternative angle of analysis of the 
post-communist condition, which will be developed throughout this thesis. 
Theorising the post-communist condition: dominant approaches and their 
shortcomings 
This section does not attempt an extended overview of the field of post-communist 
studies, but it surnmarises some of the trends in the field, in order to convey a sense of 
how issues are generally framed, what questions animate research, and what types of 
conceptualisations are employed. 
An important aspect of studies related to the post-communist condition refers to 
the fact that most of the knowledge produced about Eastern Europe comes from Western 
scholars and institutions (or Eastern European writers living and working in the West). 
There is not much independent work coming from Eastern Europe: local scholars tend to 
produce studies commissioned by international agencies, and to follow the concepts and 
strategies of research that are on the agenda of funding bodies (throughout the East funds 
for education and research have fallen after 1990 to bottom levels). 
This goes against some initial expectations regarding a creative outburst among 
Eastern European social scientists. As Ule (2004, p160) states, "[t]he evaluation of 
sociology in (post)transition countries from the standpoint of 'western' sociology is based 
on the assumption that, after years of ideological constraint, East European social 
scientists are finally able to work and create freely ... Thus sociologists are now expected 
to finally come into their own ... to -produce new theoretical conce-pts to make uD 
for the 
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deficiencies of the past"; creating original concepts and analyses proved though to be 
more difficult than expected. This is partly due to the circumstances under which 'local' 
producers of knowledge (i. e. social scientists) work: harsh economic conditions, lack of 
funding and very low wages for those employed by university and research institutions. 
Almost all the funding comes from 'outside' through the programmes of Western 
institutions, agencies and governments. 
The case of feminist research detailed by Smejkalova (2004) is illustrative for a 
more general situation of hierarchical relationships between scholars and research centres 
(involving funding issues) in the West and Eastern Europe. Smejkalova (2004, pl7l) 
points to the early 1990s when "western feminist scholars rushed to the region of Eastern 
Europe under the flag of 'global sisterhood'... in order to 'work on communist 
women'... Some of them also tend to treat (and hire) their eastern colleagues as more or 
less second-rate assistants to their own academic projects". In short, "an assumption came 
onto being according to which the 'West' was the producer of 'theory' and the 'East' was 
supposed to provide the empirical data" (Smejkalova 2004, p 17 1). 
Generally, the relationship between the Western and Eastern European scholars 
has not been one of free exchange of ideas; Western scholars (together with international 
funding agencies, investors, experts, consultants) have turned their gaze to the 
fashionable field of Eastern Europe and started producing knowledge about the area - 
which was (understandably) done with the theoretical tools developed in the tradition of 
Western thought, often accompanied by a lack of knowledge of what the communist 
period entailed as a project of re-fashioning society and subjectivities within it. 
Under these conditions of scarce funding, and as many local scholars depend for 
their income and lifestyle on participation in externally-funded programmes of research 
and policy, a competitive and backstabbing atmosphere rather than a cooperative one has 
developed in many Eastern European academic and research settings. Foreign contacts 
are jealously guarded and not shared - they constitute a form of social capital (as 
Bourdieu 1984,1986 has defined it) that can be turned into economic capital. 
This state of affairs also introduces a bias in ternis of what kind of research is 
likely to be carried out: quantitative research, surveys, policy-oriented studies are much 
more likely to interest funding bodies. LocalIV-Droduced research tends to apply concepts 
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developed by various theories produced in the West, that often does not capture the 
nature of some local issues. In Romania, fashionable topics include studies of civil 
society (or rather the lack of), and various aspects of 'reform', 'transition' (the examining 
and monitoring of the adoption of Western models of social, political and economic 
organisation, usually accompanied by exposure of their 'incomplete' and deficient 
implementation and the causes for this situation)'. 
This research does not focus solely on the economic and financial conditions that 
determine knowledge formation, but rather insists on the hegemonic processes through 
which the understandings of the world, the grids of historical decipherment originating in 
the West colonise the local worldviews by making the local actors accept them as 
'normal', 'good' and 'true'. As Said put it (in the context of the Orientalist project), this 
colonising of knowledge is not a one-way process, and it necessitates the involvement or 
participation of 'local' social actors, under unequal power relations and unequal access to 
resources: 
"The Orient was Orientalized not only because it was discovered to be 
c Oriental'... but also because it could be - that is, submitted to being - made 
Oriental.... Orientalism depends for its strategy on this flexible positional 
superiority, which puts the Westerner in- a whole series of possible relationships 
with the Orient without ever losing him the relative upper hand ... [he] was in, or 
thought about, the Orient because he could be there, or could think about it, with 
very little resistance on the Orient's part" (Said 2003, p7-8, emphasis in original). 
To sum up, the post-communist condition has been theorised largely outside 
Eastern Europe, in an intellectual environment dominated by political science (or political 
sociology) and economics. Ethnographic studies have been produced as well, but they 
tend to be less publicised and take up less space within the general discussion related to 
post-communism 2. According to Bunce (1999), "the recent collapse of regime and state 
in the eastern half of Europe speaks nearly by definition to a broad range of the literature 
in comparative politics - including, for example, the work on nations, nationalism, and 
' As exemplified by the articles published in leading Romanian journals such as Sfera Politicii and 
Dilema, 
and by the debates which animate the meetings of the GDS (the Group for Social 
Dialogue, an 
interdisciplinary forum for debating aspects of the communist and post-communist societies, including the 
2 For examples of ethnographic work, see Kideckel (1993), Verdery (1996) 
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secession; on revolution; on the role of institutions in politics; and on transitions from 
dictatorship to democracy". 
The end of communism has given an impetus to debate on the nature of 
capitalism; attempts to grasp and theorise Eastern European countries' tra ectory towards 
capitalism, resulted in concepts such as 'predatory capitalism' (Kotz 2001), 'chaotic 
capitalism' (Lane 1999), 'wild capitalism', capitalism 'Russian-style' (Gustafson 1999) 
being used. A large amount of the literature approached change in Eastern Europe 
through the process of adoption of the free market (marketisation, privatisation, etc. ), 
institutions and property relations 3, and the prominent role of the free market in 
regulating other social aspects; within these approaches, 'society' is studied through the 
lens of its contribution to or hampering of the functioning of the market 4. 
Another tenet of the discussion of post-communism has been concerned with 
notions of democracy and functioning of political institutions, and the relation state- 
society 5, with concepts such as civil society, social atomisation and social capital taking 
front seat. Post-communism has also revived debates on modernity 6, theories of 
nationalism 7 and of globalisation - especially 'end of history'-type accounts. The 
communist experiment of social equality has stirred discussions on forms of stratification 
and paths of transmission of social advantage into the new socio-economic order 
(employing mostly Marxian or/and Weberian notions of class 8). 
In conclusion, much of the research on Eastern Europe employs almost 
exclusively lines of thought central to the Western intellectual tradition and is actually 
centred on the West, in the sense that it attempts to clarify concepts that are relevant for 
the Western experience, and the East has the status of a testing ground for various 
theories produced in the West. Moreover, the Eastern European experience is assessed 
from the normative standpoint of the West: this is "a way of looking at the world... a way 
of dividing up the world that puts an omnipotent subject at the center and constructs 
3 See for example Cox and Mason (1999) 
4 Studies produced by and for the World Bank and IMF are mainly investigating the conditions necessary 
for the reproduction of the features characteristic of capitalism in its neoliberal and globalised form, 
according to Gowan (1995,1996) 
5 E. g. Poznanski (1992) 
6 See Bonnett (2004), Outhwaite and Ray (2005) and Ray (1997) 
7 v-- - fl 001 '%, -A 
(1001 N 
X %J1 ý- I- -ý ýý ýý .)-.. - ". -r'- \, ý -- ý, / 
8 E. g. Lane (1996) 
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marginal Others as sets of negative qualities" (Hartsock 1990, p 16 1). This is illustrated 
in the way a wealth of studies approached the phenomena in Eastern Europe: initially, 
there was the expectation that these societies will unproblematically switch to democracy 
and free market, and when local developments did not take the expected shape, and the 
'transition' proved to be a thorny one, representations of 'lack' and 'deficiency' were 
produced to account for it, testifying a lack of understanding and of willingness to engage 
with the local context. 
Bruner (2002) details the case of contemporary Russia and how "the 
oversimplified discursive equation of free markets and democracy (p167) is an approach 
that fails to grasp local specific developments, or to address relevant social issues such as 
the criminalisation of the business elite and the impoverishment of the population. 
Eyal et al (1997, p69) point to the problem that many studies of post-communism 
are guilty of - namely the "assumption that privatization in East Central Europe should 
be analyzed with tools derived from the analysis of the rise of capitalism in the West". 
Research guided by a focus on identifying the features of social change through the 
blueprint provided by the experience of Western capitalism will, according to these 
authors, ask the wrong questions and miss important developments characteristic to the 
post-communist countries and absent from earlier Western contexts. Also, by taking 
Western capitalism as the norm, characterisation of post-communist societies are 
produced in negative terms: "these societies have been defined by what they are not: they 
are not 'proper' capitalist societies because they do not have a recognizable capitalist 
class; post-communist institutions cannot work, or they have the 'wrong' property rights 
and therefore will not be able to reproduce themselves" (Eyal et al 1997, p70). 
More generally, a teleological approach dominates early research on post- 
communism, which frames all local developments in ternis of 'return to capitalism' 9-a 
stand that impedes an examination of these societies on their own terms. Baudrillard 
(1994, p39) wams against "the naYve vision of a frozen history suddenly awakening and 
automatically heading once again, like a turtle, for the sea (for democracy). Things are 
much more complicated than that" - his description fits an initial simplistic approach to 
411 6" uýl 
Civil Society and Liberal Economy in the Post-Communist World 
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post-communism as continuing a path that communism had interrupted, with Eastern 
European countries expected now to resume the 'natural' progression towards capitalism 
and democracy as espoused by Western countries, as if fifty to seventy years of 
communism could be erased by the fall of Eastern European regimes. 
This is an example of the way dominant theoretical approaches tend to overlook 
certain domains of experience and practice located in various (non-western) sites, which 
so become subjugated knowledges. But it is not only Western-produced knowledge that 
marginalises local understandings. Romanian analysts represent the voice of the 
intellectual elites, and therefore authoritatively impose as 'objective' or 'true' a certain 
image of the social, that silences and marginalises other constructs of the present and of 
the past, coming especially from non-intellectual milieus. I am here in agreement with 
Verdery (1991, p17), who states: "[flollowing Bauman's lead, I treat 'intellectuals' as 
sometime occupants of a site that is privileged in forming or transmitting discourses, in 
constituting thereby the means through which society is 'thought' by its members, and 
informing human subjectivities". Romanian intellectuals have been active in portraying 
the communist past in a certain form, from a privileged, authority position. 
Representations created by the intellectual elite, for example, render difficult the 
understanding of such orientations as nostalgia for the past and rejection of the present 
arrangements that are present among Romanian citizens. Those who put forward such 
points of view are usually portrayed as conservative, un-reformable, irrational and 
unintelligible' 0. As Fuller (2000, p588) has noticed in respect to Eastern European 
intellectuals, "they assume the right to speak for everyone in the region". 
Additionally, Eastern European (including Romanian) social scientists are happy 
to apply dominant concepts produced in the context of the exploration of Western 
capitalist societies to the local situation; the fashion of using the Eastern European 
I context to 'test' Western conceptual models is a widespread one 
To sum up, the Eastern European experience cannot be grasped adequately by 
studies that use concepts developed from different contexts and that reflect particular 
circumstances (but claiming universal applicability), and that are not sensitive to the 
10 nf (1004) ic ýlliiet'r5it; xf. - nf tilic 
" For a clear example, see Aligica (2003) 
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ways in which'social phenomena arise as the result of relations (which involve both the 
West and the 'local', i. e. Eastern Europe). This approach is bound to overlook practices 
and miscast the nature of local events, and to evaluate them through supposedly neutral, 
universal concepts that are actually a normative lens. The contribution of Eastem 
European intellectuals to reinforcing this approach should not be underestimated. 
Eastern Europe has the potential - through the knowledges, contestations, 
divergent practices employed in social life and the different forms of intelligibility they 
articulate - to have impact on the production of knowledge both in the West, and in non- 
westem contexts, potential which is not encouraged by the dominant approaches 
mentioned above. 
Approaches to ineguality and stratification in the communist and post-communist 
contexts 
This section on debates on the nature of stratification under communism and in the post- 
communist period serves a few purposes. Firstly, the broad topic of stratification is an 
intellectual field in which my research interests are located: this thesis is tackling aspects 
of the 'reconfiguration' of the social in post-communist Romania, and stratification 
processes (the shape new divisions in the social realm take) are part of this 
reconfiguration. Secondly, aspects of the debate presented below can illustrate the point 
made in the previous section regarding the use of concepts assumed to have a universal 
applicability and the difficulties this approach engenders. Thirdly, by presenting 
arguments on and analyses of communist and post-communist aspects of stratification, I 
provide a background against which some of the assertions made in the analysis chapters, 
and also positions or representations contained in the interviews with Romanian 
respondents, can be better grasped and assessed. Finally, this section, allows for a clearer 
exposition of the angle of analysis employed in this thesis, in terms of how it compares 
with other approaches to stratification. 
14 
Communism and social equality 
The nature of social stratification during communism is a matter of debate: did 
communist societies have forms of stratification comparable or similar to the West, or 
12,? 
were there specific traits that render the case of these societies unique . 
Some authors look at the particularities of communist regimes that have no 
equivalent in Western societies, and that are due to the program of social reform and 
social engineering that communist states have set in place 13 -c equality by design'. Efforts 
to alter the stratification regime and to influence social mobility patterns include 
nationalisation (confiscation) of properties and business, together with collectivisation of 
agriculture, which meant that the previous owners of property and land and their families 
were deprived of an important source of income and status and had to rely on state 
employment only; political criteria for job allocation 14 _ party members had priority for 
important positions and in the 1950s the 'social origin' had a strong influence on the 
career chances (manual worker and peasant backgrounds favoured compared to 
'unhealthy social origin', meaning not only rich bourgeois and land-owner background, 
but also petty bourgeoisie and well-off peasants), but this tended to fade in the 1960s; 
finally, reforms in the field of education, with the expansion of the educational system 
and wide access can be seen as part of this effort of social engineering of social equality. 
The effect of this effort to flatten social differences is often portrayed through 
images of social homogeneity. According to the 'homogeneity paradigm', communist 
societies "are understood to be composed of an amorphous and largely undifferentiated 
mass" and "a minuscule political elite who thoroughly monopolize all forms of power" 
(Fuller 2000, p585) -a dominant mode of representation among Eastern European 
scholars. Fuller (2000) highlights the fact that it actually represents the point of view of 
Eastern European intellectuals that work with the assumption that their understandings 
adequately grasp the experiences, opinions and interests of the whole population. Fuller 
asserts that the homogeneity paradigm glosses over a deep rift in communist societies 
between intellectuals and workers (with the former enjoying more privileges and being 
12 See Lane (1996)fOTa discussion of mainstream approaches. 
13 A;,, 
14 Political criteria extended to admission into higher education, with quotas for certain social backgrounds. 
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deeply involved with the communist ruling and management structures), a fundamental 
line of division that analyses of communism should not obscure. This view 15 is in line 
with the famous thesis formulated by Szelenyi (1982) that identifies a 'new dominating 
class' in communist countries - the intelligentsia (and which has been received with 
hostility by the said Eastern European intellectuals). 
In a similar vein, many authors tend to emphasise the similarities in regimes of 
stratification and social mobility between communist and Western countries. "While 
some have argued that in the early days of communism, those with bourgeois 
backgrounds were actively discriminated against, there is a substantial body of thought, 
accompanied by many empirical studies, that suggest that the 'distortions' of the Stalinist 
period were just that - short-lived deviations from a system of status attainment and 
social mobility that did not differ fundamentally from that of Westem countries" (Hanley 
16 and Treiman, 2004) 
This is based on the assumption that high socioeconomic status is correlated with 
educational attainment, and that social mobility is determined by the intergenerational 
transmission of cultural capital: social skills - habitus, and knowledge, as detailed in 
Bourdieu's work (1984). Although education was free during communism, and policies 
were set in place to increase educational opportunities for working class and peasant 
children 17 , in an effort to level educational achievement, the way the educational system 
was functioning put at advantage children from 'intellectual' backgrounds (cultural 
" Fuller reviews literature on Eastern Europe and concludes that "the relationship between the two classes 
is frequently described as estranged, formal, and uneasy at best and as tense, deeply antagonistic, and 
sharply contradictory at worst" (2000, p602); moreover, "they did not... share a joint oppositional history 
under socialism" (2000, p603). 
16 For example, Parkin (1971), Lane (1982) are proposing this reading of social arrangements under 
communism. 
" Much has been made of the discrimination and restrictions that the offspring of wealthy families have 
suffered in the field of higher education during communism. It is a persistent theme in the landscape of 
Romania - and throughout Eastern Europe, 
both in scholarly work and everyday discourse. This situation 
though was generally restricted to the 1950s, and does not have the width that is often attributed (an 
intellectual genocide'). The prominence of this account might be explained by the powerful, privileged 
position of intellectuals as producers of knowledge. Much less is for example made of the death of 
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systematic persecution and infringement of human rights. 
16 
reproduction theory): children from intellectual backgrounds were over-represented in 
higher education 18 . 
Therefore, communist societies were not the classless societies that the 
Communist Party doctrine was boasting, but contained significant systematic Inequalities 
and forms of reproduction of social advantage or disadvantage. On the other hand, the 
efforts of the state to reshuffle the older stratification criteria and bases for social 
advantage cannot be neglected19 - they had important effects at the level of 
representations, the ways people thought about themselves and about 'society' (which 
will be discussed in chapter 5). 
Most studies on stratification and inequality during communism focus on 
identifying societal trends and formulate general theories that fail to capture the 
experiential, lived dimension of inequality, as well as specific everyday circumstances 
that 'interfere' with the generic models proposed. 
The study of Ledeneva (1998) provides insights into the more complex nature of 
social ties and implicitly social hierarchies, by introducing the concept of blat. Her 
analysis captures aspects of the lived everyday that mainstream theories of stratification 
(in the dominant field of political science) do not account for, in the context of extended 
shortages, in Russia - but the analysis is relevant for any Eastern European shortage- 
ridden society. 
The concept of blat covers very diverse practices. "Blat was an exchange of 
'favours of access' in conditions of shortages and a state system of privileges... It served 
the needs of personal consumption and reorganised the official distribution of material 
welfare. Blat exchange was often mediated and covered by the rhetoric of friendship or 
acquaintance: 'sharing', 'helping out', 'friendly support', 'mutual care', etc. Intertwined 
with personal networks, blat provided access to public resources through personal 
channels" (ibid., p37). Therefore, "blat is a distinctive form of non-monetary exchange, a 
kind of barter based on personal relationship. It worked where money did not. In the 
" For similar findings, see Kesler's (2003) study that shows inequalities in educational attainment at elite 
secondary level in respect to social origins (the service class vs manual workers) in the former GDR 
19 The impact of the communist regime policies in Romania in terms of socioeconomic status, standards of 
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similar to those documented In Russia or Cuba. 
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planned economy, money did not function as the main element in economic transactions, 
things were sorted out by mutual help, by barter" (p34). 
One of the main features of the blat consists in the importance of personal 
relationships for its functioning - it is different from informal economic practices ('grey', 
informal economy, bribery, fiddling) because it is based in ties of reciprocity within 
personal networks, rather that profit-oriented activities and market-type exchanges. 
"There was no clear-cut quantification of reciprocity within such networks, there was a 
more intuitive sense of mutual obligations supported by eagerness to belong to the system 
and fear of being excluded from it" (p 115) 
Blat was a widespread practice that covered all areas of life: through blat scarce 
goods such as food, soap, clothing, etc. were obtained; through blat long queues were 
jumped and products obtained through the back door, as a 'friendly connection' with the 
shop assistant meant that he/she would put aside goods for 'special friends and 
acquaintances'; through blat one had access to special treatment by the medical 
profession: being recommended to a doctor meant that one would get more attention, 
better care, adequate medication; also one could jump the years-long waiting lists for 
flats, cars, domestic appliances through blat, or avoid punishment for trespassing the law. 
"Blat is a 'survival kit' reducing uncertainty in conditions of shortage, exigency and 
perpetual emergency, in which formal criteria and formal rights are insufficient to 
operate" (p78). 
Ledeneva discriminates between two types of ties implied by blat practices - 
horizontal and vertical ties: the horizontal ones were composed of people of the same 
status (sometimes sharing workplace or leisure activities, similar values and lifestyles), 
the vertical ones by people of different social strata interested in each other's connections 
and linked by kin, personal contacts or intermediaries. While within the horizontal 
networks routine 'help' was present, the vertical ties were accessed rather intermittently 
for special favours, and had a more instrumental character. 
An important consequence of blat practices, in which the whole of the population 
was enmeshed, was the impact on forms of social stratification and on occupational 
prestige. 
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Through being skilled at blat r6lations, one could have access to scarce resources; 
as these skills had no systematic connection with one's educational background, 
occupation or one's material situation, it meant that people could negotiate to a certain 
extent the social meaning of class or occupation. Being in a more comfortable position, 
able to get things done for one's family and friends was down to personal skills - one did 
not always have to reciprocate for favours in the same terms, often it was enough to be 
polite, friendly, and to make rather symbolic gestures towards the 'donor' of the favour, 
like small presents for birthdays, New Year cards, etc. Also, because of the wide-ranging 
character of scarcity, that affected every aspect of life, most occupational positions had 
something to offer in the blat system, in terms of resources, favours or simply 
information. 
Therefore it was a very plausible situation that a clerk would be better connected 
and have a better life-style (e. g. more food, a better flat, better healthcare due to 
personalised connections to doctors and pharmacists) than, say, an engineer, although the 
wage of the engineer and his occupational prestige would be higher and therefore in 
theory he would have a higher position in the social hierarchy. The social positions of 
both the clerk and the engineer were redefined by the actual resources they commanded; 
the social prestige of the occupation was balanced in everyday life by the actual living 
conditions of the person. 
The all- encompassing phenomenon of blat made it difficult to think of clear-cut 
social positions and hierarchies, as it blurred lines of stratification. It had an equalising 
effect, and at the same time it produced inequalities, between the well-connected and the 
ones that did not manage to master the techniques and skills of the blat to the same 
extent, or refused to engage in such practices for anything than serious emergencies. But 
these inequalities tended to be randomly distributed across the population, and not tied to 
certain group characteristics, making it difficult to talk about a systematic basis for 
inequality. 
Of course, this statement excludes the highest echelon of Party members who had 
systematic preferential treatment, but they were seen as a category apart that did not need 
blat in the same way as the rest of the population to improve their situation - although 
they could be accessed by contacts, kin and friends for special favours. 
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Apart from the role it played in processes of material redistribution that rendered 
the boundaries between occupational groups (in terms of wage differentials, consumption 
patterns) less clear, blat changed the meaning of the social prestige of occupations; it 
added a dimension of power, as occupations were appraised in terms of access to scarce 
resources - therefore a shop assistant or a factory guard, or service technicians able to fix 
household appliances could be very 'powerful' positions; a certain hierarchy of 'utility' 
in terms of access to information, resources and privileges cut across other (pre-existing) 
dimensions of social prestige and financial rewards usually associated with occupations. 
"Everybody had to find a way to enter into blat connections and thus either 
compensate for their relatively low occupational status or construct a symbolic value for 
their profession" (p133). In this way secretaries, shop assistants, factory workers, clerks, 
small bureaucrats, etc. were able to raise the social desirability of their position and gain 
individual and collective power through daily contacts in which their services were 
required as favours by diverse other social groups. "Certain individuals could make 
themselves as powerful as those who held high formal positions just by developing 
refined skills of negotiating and acquiring an ability to form a large social network that 
could serve as a form of wealth or as a resource-base itself' (p 113). 
Finally, blat practices had implications on forms of sociality, as they required 
constant social contact and active investment in interpersonal relationships. 
The phenomenon of blat can be connected to Bourdieu's notion of social capital. 
Bourdieu (1986, p249) defines the social capital of a social agent as "the size of the 
network of connections he can effectively mobilize and on the volume of the 
capital ... possessed in 
his own right by each of those to whom he is connected". 
Both concepts of blat and social capital presented above are useful in grasping 
dimensions of inequality in communist societies that were based in everyday practices 
and experiences. 
Post-communism and new forms of social inequality 
The fall of communism and subsequent changes have prompted research on the new 




the 'transition' 20? Who is the new dominant class, in terms of property and business 
ownership or access to privileged command positions? How is it different from the 
Western bourgeoisie or managerial class? These questions are prominent in the landscape 
of sociological inquiry on post-communism. 
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, Nee's theory of market transition 
published in the American Sociological Review in 1989 and the replies to it dominated 
the research agenda. Nee (1989) suggested that the main beneficiaries of the transition to 
market would be enterprising or entrepreneurial individuals. What are the determinants of 
socioeconomic attainment in the transition period? A wealth of studies tried to show who 
the ones benefiting the transition to market mechanisms actually are. 
Staniszkis (1991), Stark (1990,1992) put forward the path dependency or 
political capitalism thesis: post-communist societies build with the ruins of socialism as 
opposed to a tabula rasa situation, resulting in a "new economic system constructed from 
elements of the old, imported ideas, and indigenous innovations" (Eyal et al 1997, p68). 
The conditions present before the fall of communism will heavily influence the form 
6capitalism' will take in these countries; they cannot expect to converge towards the same 
social arrangements and norms as in Western Europe. Political capital is seen as a special 
form of social capital consisting of party membership; the new propertied bourgeoisie 
will come from the ranks of the former nomenklatura. The process started under 
communism: party cadres in privileged positions that they used to establish contacts (e. g. 
in export economic activities); this knowledge and power allowed them after 1989 to be 
the main beneficiaries of privatisation. This thesis tends to be applied to Poland 
(Staniszkis 199 1) and Hungary (Stark 1990). 
Another thesis refers to post-socialist managerialism (Eyal et al 1997,1998) - 
based on a study of Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland. The ones with human and 
cultural capital (dissidents, intellectuals, technocrats and managers) rather than political 
capital will be in power positions in the post-communist period (the top officials in the 
former Party structure will be in the public eye, scrutinised by ex-dissidents). The authors 
draw on Bourdieu's concepts of different types of capital: "the new power elite of post- 
communism resembles the most closely what Bourdieu. has called 'the dominated fraction 
Crow and Rees (1999), Roberts et a] (2002), Bryant and Mokrzycki (1994) 
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of the dominant class' in Western capitalism: it exercises power principally on the basis 
of knowledge, expertise and the capacity to manipulate symbols, in short, 'cultural 
capital'... We show that the incumbents of economic command positions are those who 
were already in managerial positions prior to the fall of communism" (Eyal et al 1997, 
p6 1). 
Finally, Szelenyi (1988) proposes the 'capitalism from below' model. The 
experience accumulated in the secondary economy can be used in the post-communist 
context (the socialist entrepreneurs in the legal secondary economy or private sector and 
also the ones in the illegal black market or grey economy - speculators - had the cultural 
capital as expertise, experience, an understanding of the principles and practical 
functioning of the market, contacts, etc. ). The second economy was a subversive force 
within the planned economy that challenged and eroded the power of the Communist 
Party (Rona-Tas 1995) - this was though characteristic of certain countries, like Hungary 
and Poland, that had a well-developed private sector, which was almost inexistent in 
Romania, where the secondary economy was severely curtailed. 
These analyses of the 'winners' of the post-communist society look at 
entrepreneurship (ownership of property or business, employers, self-employed) as a sign 
of socioeconomic privilege or achievement. The diversity of theories and pathways to 
achievement proposed by social scientists reflect the diversity of the situation during 
communism and after (policies of privatisation, etc. ) in Eastern European countries. 
Hanley (2000) though questions the indicator used to assess 'success': self 
employment is not necessarily a sign of achievement but just a survival strategy under 
conditions of poverty and loss of previous (preferable) employment. Stoica (2004) further 
questions the usefulness of entrepreneurship (self-employment and being an employer) as 
sign of socioeconomic success in the new market economies. He points to forms of 
entrepreneurship that do not fit into the ideal-typical models of the West (part-time 
entrepreneurship characteristic of some Eastern European societies). According to Stoica 
(2004, p252)ý 
"in East Central Europe, some part-time entrepreneurs - taking advantage of 
widespread corruption, the lack of the rule of law, and poor enforcement of 
exioinp, nile. -; - Iceen their main ioh, -; in the state sector to -, ln'hon off state A 
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resources to use them in their private business. Accounts in the Romanian press 
suggest that state officials have massively adopted this entrepreneurial strategy, in 
this case, we are dealing with the phenomenon of "predatory state bureaucracy", 
which has negative consequences for the development of domestic entrepreneurial 
classes and economic growth" (Stoica 2004, p252). 
Part-time entrepreneurship is also a strategy for ordinary people, who combine a few 
jobs, of which one is a state job - still considered the safest option (a safety net in case the 
private business goes wrong). 
Stoica (2004) predicts the Romanian case to fall within the political capitalism 
model rather than capitalism from below or managerialism because of the mass character 
of the Romanian communist party -a very high number of members, and the fact that 
most responsibility positions necessitated being a party member (professionals). So a 
numerous contingent of fori-ner cadres can still use their good connections (or social 
capital: "social networks, with access to resources and privileged information about 
economic opportunities and niches" Stoica 2004, p264). The author also details what 
networks and resources are used or necessary for what type of projects. For a small 
business for example, ideas and family support, a small capital, and hard work are 
sufficient. For a medium one, money is necessary, but connections become more 
important. As for a large business, connections are most important, as they can provide 
access to money, in the form of preferential bank loans, state contracts, etc. This 
connection between political functions and business is a widespread feature of Romanian 
society. 
This section has outlined issues that have been at the core of an ongoing 
sociological debate. These studies of post-communism use (implicitly or explicitly) 
notions of individual economic status in order to evaluate success and failure, to separate 
the winners and the losers - it could be argued that this criterion oversimplifies more 
complex lines of division. The approaches above rely heavily on statistical exploration 
from which models of the social are built, and pays less attention to the ways social status 
and social divisions are negotiated in the sites of everyday interaction in these societies, 
an issue I will turn to in the next section. 
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The aims of the research 
The-research at the core of this thesis explores aspects of the post-communist condition5 
and the preceding sections have briefly looked at the theoretical environment in this field. 
This section locates my approach within this environment and introduces the broad 
questions that have animated the research. 
I am employing a discursive understanding of the social (that sees the objects, 
concepts, phenomena constituting the social as discursively produced, and underpinned 
by power relations, as discussed in chapter 2) in order to examine how discourses are 
deployed in the local cultural context, at the level of social practices, how they are 
involved in the production of the social and in the creation (and negotiation) of identities. 
The general issues that have guided the research and analysis and that engage 
with the theoretical debate presented above on the nature of post-communism are: the 
restructuring of the social in the form of dominant and resisting articulations (the new 
discourses, including practices and institutions, that are implicated in the production of 
the social in contemporary Romania, and their conditions of possibility), and the 
implications of this restructuring for the identities of local social actors. 
It has been asserted that most research on post-communism tries to fit a complex 
local situation into concepts produced in a different socio-historical context (or 'tests' 
these concepts on Eastern European ground). Rather than starting to analyse the social 
through the lens of predominant concepts or theoretical models (or theoretically under- 
developed questionnaires), the focus of this research is on local practices of meaning- 
making and localised understandings, as part of the processes through which the social is 
produced, more precisely on the ways social actors engage with their social world and 
their position within it (brought about by the new discursive structure, the new 
institutions and social arrangements). 
The research targets the processes through which 'the social' is created (in post- 
communist Romania), how meaning is produced and fought over (since these meanings 
produce social realities for the actors involved), by following both more general issues of 
knowledge production, and the interests and concerns of the respondents, what they 
perceive as relevant in terms of aspects of social cbange. 
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As the post-communist landscape is marked by new social divisions, new social 
hierarchies and new subject positions, the issue of identity becomes acute, and the 
research focuses on both the discursive production of these hierarchies and positions (as 
part of the production of the social), and on identity-work social actors perform in 
relation to the way they are positioned -a different angle on the issue of stratification 
compared to the ones outlined in the precedent section. 
The research will link the production of the social in Romania to processes of 
knowledge production and regimes of representation that involve the West as a 
privileged, dominant voice, and will indicate how the identities of both Eastern Europe 
(and Romania) and the West are shaped through this relationship. 
In order to structure this investigation of the social, concepts of space/place are 
being used; the intertwining of place and knowledge production is tackled at the level of 
the symbolic locations of the West and Eastern Europe (and Romania specifically); the 
processes through which the Romanian social space comes into being (the production of 
the social) are addressed; finally, the level of place of residence is introduced to ground 
issues of identity negotiation social actors are involved in. 
The next two chapters will detail theoretical debates relevant to the issues 
addressed in this thesis, namely concepts of discourse and possibilities for agency 
(chapter 2), and concepts of place in social thought (chapter 3). 
25 
CHAPTER 2 
DISCOURSE, PRODUCTION OF THE SOCIAL AND AGENCY 
This chapter discusses the concept of discourse I shall be using, that draws mainly on the 
work of Michel Foucault, and Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, and insists on the 
productive, constitutive aspect of discourses in respect to the social world and on issues 
of power, subject formation and agency. The discussion will subsequently move towards 
an exploration of the possibilities of agency in the context of a discursively structured 
social reality, looking at feminist uses of Foucault's insights (especially D. Smith and J. 
Butler), de Certeau's notion of tactics, Pecheux's concept of disidentification, and Laclau 
and Mouffe's conceptualisation of agency. 
This analysis will be used to set in place the theoretical framework employed to 
interpret the data, a framework which integrates a focus on discursive structures (or 
articulations) with an emphasis on social actors' everyday practices of reality 
construction (i. e. the articulatory practices they engage in). This approach allows for an 
understanding of discourse as intertwined with power and as secreting social reality that 
still acknowledges spaces of agency in which social actors operate, situated at the 
intersection of discourses that never manage to achieve a closure of meaning. 
Discourse and the formation of social reali 
In his 'archaeological' work (Madness and Civilisation, The Birth of the Clinic, Ae 
Order of Things, The Archaeology of Knowledge) Foucault explores the way knowledge 
is formed according to historically- specific procedures that constitute a system of 
discursive practices. The focus of this inquiry is not on the content of what is said and 
thought, nor necessarily on the changes of theoretical paradigm, but rather on the rules 
that in each society permit the separation of statements into true/false, rational/irrational, 
scienti fic/non- scientific within discourses that in themselves are neither true nor false, 
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rules assumed as fundamental to such an extent that they remain untold. It is therefore 
those rules that govern both what type of statements are accepted in the discourse and 
what are the proper procedures to prove their truth; between them they constitute a 
6 regime' of knowledge, a 'politics of the scientific statement'. The effect of such a system 
of truth-regulation practices is that it makes thinking outside it problematical: it is 
through exclusionary practices applied to what can be thought and said that discursive 
rules and power exertion (i. e. discourses and the formation and reproduction of social 
systems) are connected (Foucault 1980, pl 12). 
In this configuration, a discourse will represent the group of statements regulated 
by the same rules of formation. Hence, discourses refer to the "different ways of 
structuring areas of knowledge and social practice" (Fairclough 1992, p3) in the sense 
that they provide the fundamental frames of reference, the grid of interpretation that 
inject meaning into reality, allow 'objects' and subjects to take shape and thus cause the 
world to emerge as meaningful (Burr 1995, p57). In other words, discourses are processes 
of societal production of meaning, "constitutive processes that produce and sustain 
particular realities" (Gubrium and Holstein 1998, p240). 
Laclau and Mouffe (2001) and Laclau (1990) develop the concepts of discursive 
field and hegemonising discourses in order to provide an even more specific account of 
the production and nature of the social. Central to their understanding of those processes 
is the practice of articulation that designates the fundamental process of discursive 
knowledge formation: the practice of establishing a relation among elements' that 
modifies (creates) their identity, while a discourse (discursive structure) represents the 
2 structured system resulting from the articulatory practice . The field of discursivity 
' Laclau and Mouffe (2001, p105) name 'elements' any differences that are not discursively articulated and 
'moments' the differential positions as they appear articulated within a discourse. The identity of the 
element is not pre-relational but part of the discursive field. What that means is that before articulation, the 
meaning of the element as perceived from within a particular discourse is not decisively fixed within the 
structure of signification of this discourse. 
2 The regularity in dispersion that the discursive formation exhibits and that makes possible its 
understanding as an ensemble of differential positions doesn't imply some underlying external principle but 
is produced within the discourse The discursive notion of dispersion is thus different from the Saussurean 
system, where identities are fixed by the necessary character of all the relations, making articulation 
impossible. This system is precisely the type of closed totality where each moment is subsumed under an 
initial system of repetition. Structuralism thus exhibits the desire for a structure that is always finally 
(Laclau and Mouffe 2001, p 113). 
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consists of floating signifiers (elements), the meaning of which various articulatory 
practices try to fix into discursive structures. But as Laclau and Mouffe insist, since no 
centre that would definitively fix the system of differences that the discourses creates is 
ever possible 3, meaning can only be partially fixed: the discursive field is "never 
completely absorbed by discourse... a field of undecidability which constantly overflows 
and subverts the attempt to fix a stable set of differential positions within a particular 
discourse" (Torfing 1999, p92). It is therefore from the incomplete nature of all 
articulation (that always makes alternative articulations possible and thus threatens every 
discourse with the destabilisation of its system of differences by alternative articulations 
acting from outside it) - that is, from the agonism of the practices of 
articulation/dislocation, that the social emerges. Otherwise phrased, society arises from 
the competing propensities to fix nodal pointS4 and to dislocate them: 
"Society never manages to be identical to itself, as every nodal point is constituted 
within an intertextuality that overflows it. The practice of articulation, therefore, 
consists in the construction of nodal points which partially fix meaning; and the 
partial character of this fixation proceeds from the openness of the social, a result, 
in turn, of the constant overflowing of every discourse by the infinitude of the 
field of discursivity" (Laclau and Mouffe 200 1, p 113). 
Hence, a discourse is "a relational totality of signifying sequences that determine the 
identity of the social elements, but never succeed in totalizing and exhausting the play of 
meaning" (Torfing 1999, p90). 
The other concept Lalcau and Mouffe consider central for explaining the 
production of the social is hegemony (hegemonic articulation), a concept they borrow 
from Gramsci and modify to define an articulation that takes place through a 
confrontation with antagonistic articulatory practices. Hegemony thus refers to the 
processes of construction of a predominant discursive formation, "the expansion of a 
discourse, or set of discourses, into a dominant horizon of social orientation and action by 
' This impossibility is inferred from the Derridian impossibility of a 'transcendental signified' that would 
ever arrest once and for all the chain of signification of the differend. Once this idea is introduced in the 
theory of discourse the play of signification is extended ad infiniturn, making all definitive fixation of 
meaning impossible. 
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means of articulating unfixed elements into partially fixed moments in a context 
crisscrossed by antagonistic forces" (Torfing 1999, pl0l). Any hegemonisation of the 
discursive field entails therefore conflict, power and resistance since a discourse 
46 manages to signify itseýf (that is, to constitute itself as such) only by transforming 
the limits into frontiers, by constituting a chain of equivalence which constructs 
what is beyond the limits as that which it is not. It is only through negativity, 
division and antagonism that a formation can constitute itself as a totalizing 
horizon" (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, p143-144, emphasis in original). 
To sum up, the basic conditions of possibility of any hegemonic articulation are, as 
argued above, the overdetermined nature of the discursive, the surplus of meaning any 
discourse presupposes. Hegemonic articulations thus necessitate both the presence of 
antagonistic forces and the instability of the frontiers which separate them: only the 
presence of a vast area of floating elements and the possibility of their articulation to 
opposite camps form the terrain permitting the definition of a practice as hegemonic 
(Laclau and Mouffe 200 1, p 13 6). 
To suggest the importance of this concept suffice to say that if the social 
represents the never concluded attempt to limit the play of differences, to domesticate 
infinitude, to embrace it within the finitude of an order, then this order no longer can be 
conceptualised as an underlying essence of the social but rather as an attempt to 
hegemonise it (Laclau 1990, p9l). Those understandings of the reality as a result of 
hegemonic processes will thus posit power and antagonistic struggles over meaning at the 
centre of the production of the social. It is thus towards a discussion of power I shall next 
turn. 
Power, knowled2e and the social 
It has been asserted above that reality is produced through diverse discursive practices 
that control processes of meaning-making; and it was suggested that this process of 
reality building is imbued with power, since it presupposes the authoritative exclusion of 
Where nodal points, following Lacan, are privileged signifiers that fix the meaning of a signifying chain, 
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any alternative or antagonistic versions of reality. By wishing to impose a particular 
version of reality as true, discourse formation is always-already a relation of power and 
discourse 'both an instrument and an effect of power'. Like all relations of power then, 
discourses are unstable, a point both for resistance and for the elaboration of opposing 
strategies: "Discourse transmits power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes 
it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it" (Foucault 198 1, pp 50-5 1). 
Foucault's work helps illuminate the restrictions discourses and the workings of 
power impose on individuals' subjectivities as well as the possibilities for resistance and 
agency such a concept of power entails. As opposed to most concepts of power that tend 
to treat it as something possessed by certain actors or institutions, Foucault sees power as 
circulating through a decentred field of social networks and only subsequently taken up 
by larger structures such as class or the state (Best and Kellner 1991, p52). That is 
because, rather then being a 'substance' that can be possessed, power is relational, thus 
visible only when enacted, negotiated in each interaction and never fixed and stable 
(Mills 1997, p 39). 
That does not mean that the exercise of power is simply a relationship between 
partners, individual or collective; it rather represents a way in which certain actions 
modify others (Foucault 1983, p219). In effect, what defines a relationship of power is 
that it is a mode of action which does not act directly and immediately on others but 
instead acts upon their actions: "an action upon an action, on existing actions or on those 
which may arise in the present or the future". To exert power thus consists in guiding the 
possibility of conduct and putting in order the possible outcome, to structure the possible 
field of action of others" (ibid., p220-221). It is in this sense that power is diffuse, 
capillary, productive and ever unstable 5. 
Firstly, power is diffused in society through the everyday practices actors engage 
in, not just through the institutions of the state or the market. Rouse contends that in 
Foucault's understanding, the power nominally deployed through the state apparatus is 
discourse by constructing a knot of definite meanings" (Torfing 1999, p99). 
' In parallel with power being diffused in a field of social relations, there are obvious positions associated 
with increased political or economic power. Although Foucault acknowledges that power can crystallise as 
domination - "the solidification of power relations such that 
they become relatively fixed in asymmetrical 
forms nind the snnri-s (if libi-T-tv And ri-. 6qtnnrP. fhwz hernme limited", 'hpf. -nn-t gh. xii--11 tn-n- m-i-i(-+ n-n 
macropowers such as the state or capital (Best and Kellner 199 1, p7 1). 
30 
complexly mediated and power relations are disseminated through extensive social 
networks, not just transmitted unidirectionally (Rouse 1994, p102). "Power Is 
everywhere, not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere" 
(Foucault 1978, p93). 
Secondly, power cannot be simply understood as the repressive law that says 'no' 
any longer but has to be re-conceptualised as productive: techniques of power and 
knowledge are practices that produce new kinds of human subjects, of knowledge and 
modalities of power. As power is diffused throughout the social field, it constitutes 
individual subjectivities, their bodies and their knowledges, emotions, desires and 
pleasures even while inducing obedience and conformity. Since the seventeenth century, 
individuals have been caught within a complex grid of disciplinary, normalizing, 
panoptic powers that survey, judge, measure and correct - thus create - their every move 
(Best and Kellner 1991, p54). 
Thirdly, power is contingent, and therefore vulnerable. While it is true that power 
is present everywhere and permeates the social fabric and social relations, at the same 
time all power engenders resistance, contestation and struggle. As resistance is always 
possible, since no total fixation is imaginable, an opening is created for agency and for a 
conceptualisation of subjectivity as not just a construct of domination. And as a result of 
power acting upon action and being always open-ended, it supposes an agent. In other 
words, power always being a way of acting upon an acting subject by virtue of her being 
capable of actions, once a relationship of power is established, a whole field of responses, 
reactions, results and possible interventions may open up (Foucault 1983, p220). Power 
and freedom are thus conditional upon each other since freedom must exist for power to 
be exerted, and since without the possibility of recalcitrance, power would be equivalent 
to a physical determination (Foucault 1983, p221). Foucault talks of multiple points of 
resistance on the network of power: 
"Just as the network of power relations ends by forming a dense web that passes 
through apparatuses and institutions, without being exactly localized in them, so 
too the swarm of points of resistance traverses social stratifications and individual 
unities" (Foucault 1978, p96). 
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The subject is still discursively and socially constrained for Foucault and still theorized as 
situated within power relations; but individuals also have the power to "define their own 
identity, to master their bodies and desires, and to forge a practice of freedom through 
techniques of the self ' (Best and Kellner 199 1, p64-65). The next section attempts to 
address these issues by looking at how various theorists have adopted or rejected a 
Foucaultian framework while dealing with issues of agency on the part of social actors. 
Subjects and the possibilitV for a2encv 
The understanding of the subject used here is one that blurs the classical intemal/exterrial 
ontological dichotomies in the explanation of the subject in order to argue for a concept 
of individual subjectivity as formed by complex and pervasive (discursive) operations of 
power that mould its most intimate desires, emotions, behaviours, thoughts. That means 
that even the most fundamental characteristics of the subject are not immanent but are 
'implanted' into the subject by the systems of relations she is always-already enmeshed 
in. It is these operations themselves that create the illusion of a pre-existing interior: a 
self, personality, 'soul'. In other words, there is no subject as origin of social relations, an 
originative, founding totality - just subject positions within a discursive structure. 
Somehow paradoxically, the agency of the subject is similarly created by power 
relations; as mentioned above, being created by discourse does not mean being fully 
determined by discourse, since the impossibility of any discourse to close itself and thus 
fixate the meaning of the objects and subjects it creates in a permanent and unequivocal 
way always leaves room for escaping those determinations. That is, as every subject 
position is a discursive position, it partakes of the open character of every discourse; 
consequently, the various positions cannot be totally fixed in a closed system of 
differences (Laclau. and Mouffe 2001, pl 15): 
"A conception which denies any essentialist approach to social relations, must 
also state the precarious character of every identity and the impossibility of fixing 
the sense of the 'elements' in an ultimate literality" (ibid., p96). 
The opening created by the overdetermination of all subject positions and identities 
is 
what in this context will be addressed as agency: not an essential trait of the subject, that 
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thus necessitates a pre-formed subject, but the possibility to negotiate between different 
systems of meaning-making and thus to form ourselves as subjects 'through the deed', 
without ever being but the result of power 6. That is, although meaning and signification 
are pre-given in discourse, this does not mean that a discourse will have an overriding 
power to determine the values and interpretations on the part of social actors, since the 
relation between discourse and local practices is not strictly causal and within discourse 
there is play and interplay (Smith 1990, p203). For Dorothy Smith, the actors can 
manipulate elements of various discourses and transform them into resources to re- 
negotiate their position. 
Using a similar approach to the 'ontology of the self', Judith Butler describes 
identities as self-representations, "fictions" that are neither fixed nor stable. The subject is 
not a thing, a substantive entity, but rather a process of signification within an open 
system of discursive possibilities. The self is a regulated, but never fully determined, set 
of practices (Sawicki 1994, p299). Butler thus points to the performative aspect of 
identity since it is a social entity that... "has no ontological status apart from the various 
acts which constitute its reality, and if that reality is fabricated as an interior essence, that 
very interiority is a function of a decidedly public and social discourse" (Butler 1990a, 
p336). Her performative theory of the self leaves thus room for the resignification and 
recontextualisation of identities, that is for subversive 'practices of the self ' that can 
destabilise dominant meanings (Butler 1990a, p338), i. e. reformulates agency as 
enactments of variation within regulated, normative, habitual processes of signification 
(Sawicki 1994, p301). 
This understanding of identity as daily practices of negotiation and re-negotiation 
of world representations, power relations and subject positions, that is of the systems of 
differences discourses attempt to stabilize, brings discourse into the fabric of daily 
practices, inserts them "as the normative structure of the everyday" (Smith 1990, p202). 
Smith espouses a socially context-bound view of discourse, which is attentive to what 
individual subjects do within and through discursive structures, other than assuming that 
discourses force us to behave in certain ways asserts that individuals actively work out 
their subject positions and roles in the process of negotiating discursive constraints (Mills 
6 This is in fact the agency that the Foucault tries to capture in bis formulation of the 'care of the self. 
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1997, p86). Discourse is removed from any conceptual isation as an abstract set of textual 
practices to become the grounds on which social relations are organised, the means 
through which social relations between individuals are negotiated (ibid., p9l). 
This is a notion of subjectivity crested through practices of the self, "ways of 
knowing and governing ourselves that are inherited from historical traditions" (Sawicki 
1994, p288), through procedures that prescribe how the individual is to define, maintain 
and develop her/his identity with a view to self-control and self-awareness. This 
understanding of self-technology analysis thus divides the world into subjecting and 
subjectivation, and shows sensitivity to the practices through which the self can summon 
itself and activate itself in order to master its own creation (Andersen 2003, p59). Thus, 
we can understand how in the contemporary landscape the subjects engage in their own 
constitution, acquiescing with or contesting the roles to which they are assigned (Mills 
1997, p45-46), while at the same time never being able to claim full autonomy since their 
agency is but an opening left in the subject-position discourse creates. It encourages us to 
focus on the historical transformations in the practices of self-formation in order to reveal 
their contingency and to free us for new possibilities of self-understanding, new modes of 
experience, new forms of subjectivity, authority, and political identity (Sawicki 1994, 
p288). 
It must nevertheless be emphasised that identity does not involve only dispersed 
positions the subject freely negotiates; since those processes are always games of power, 
games always involving exclusions and inequalities in access to (discursive) resources, 
the field of social practices, and implicitly the meaning of identities, is always partially 
structured by nodal points that themselves structure the possibilities the subject has to 
negotiate its position. That is, to claim that the subject and its identifications are mere 
effects of practices of signification is not to claim that these effects are not real or that 
identity is artificial or arbitrary. Gender and race are the most obvious examples of such 
nodal points 7; another example, namely the nodal point of 'backwardness', will be 
detailed in my discussion of the fortnation of identities in the post-communist Romanian 
discursive field, a field where because of the undecidability of the terrain the subject will 
7 orj-n(jf-. r pre, mle-ornverned ctnw. tpre-c nf lint'k r-Anctrnin 'P"rl Thm, z t f.. --- 
enable identity foTmation (Sawicki 1994, p300). 
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aim to identify with one of the emerging hegemonic projects that seem to offer a 
csolution' to the 'crisis' of the structure (Torfing 1999, p150). 
In this context the role of critique then is to understand the power relations that 
bring into existence, stabilise and reify identities - rather than taking cultural identities as 
unproblematic grounds for claims and political action, and by that to open up possibilities 
of "complex and generative subject-positions as well as coalitional strategies that neither 
presuppose nor fix their constitutive subjects in their place" (Butler 1990a, p339). 
Through the analysis, description, and criticism of existing power/knowledge relations 
we can hope to create new spaces for resistance, to take advantage the "tactical 
polyvalence" of discourses and practices, to developing oppositional strategies and new 
forms of experience (Sawicki 1994, p294). In what follows I shall introduce some 
theories of agency, mainly those of Michel de Certeau and Michel Pecheux, and that can 
add a supplementary analytical focus to such critical attempts, especially in the context of 
my theoretical focus in the minute practices of negotiation and re-negotiation of identity 
that form the daily experiences of a number of Romanians. 
Nei! otiatin2 auncy in everyday life 
The question that remains after accepting that Foucault's theory does not erase agency 
concerns the nature of this agency (and what concrete possibilities for identity- creation it 
entails). The local micropolitics of resistance Foucault is proposing consists of merely 
reactive strategies of resistance and subversion, or can it be extended to more 
constructive processes, emancipatory practices of self-creation? For example, for Wendy 
Brown, "the politics of resistance is more a reaction to power than an effort to wield it" 
and it must be supplemented "with deliberate efforts to create democratic spaces for 
inventing and contesting political visions and norms" (Sawicki 1994, p304). 
Other authors have tried to theorise the nature of this agency as well, producing 
concepts such as disidentification, tactics, translation, rearticulation, etc. Among these 
efforts, Michel de Certeau's notion of tactics developed in The Practice of Everyday Life 
(1984) is one of the most detailed accounts of resistance practices in a discursively 
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ordered social world. The focus of the book is on resistance practices and provides a 
counter-balance to Focault's concept of power and disciplinary techniques: 
"If it is true that the grid of 'discipline I is everywhere becoming clearer and more 
extensive, it is all the more urgent to discover how an entire society resists being 
reduced to it, what popular procedures (also 'miniscule' and quotidian) 
manipulate the mechanisms of discipline and conform to them only in order to 
evade them, and finally, what 'ways of operating' form the counterpart, on the 
consumer5s (or 'dominee's'? ) side, of the mute processes that organize the 
establishment of socioeconomic order" (de Certeau 1984, pXIV). 
The book is an investigation of the ways in which 'users' operate; everyday practices and 
"ways of operating" are not "the obscure background of social activity", they need 
theoretical questions, methods, categories and perspectives to articulate them (pXI). 
Power and discipline are evaded through procedures of everyday "dispersed, tactical, and 
makeshift creativity of groups or individuals already caught in the nets of "discipline". 
Pushed to their ideal limits, these procedures and ruses of consumers compose the 
network of an antidiscipline" (de Certeau 1984, pXIV). According to de Certeau, social 
actors "make (bricolent) innumerable and infinitesimal transformations of and within the 
dominant cultural economy in order to adapt it to their own interests and their own rules", 
a view that emphasises agency as expressed through various tactics. 
"These tactics, through their criteria and procedures, are supposed to make use of 
institutional and symbolic organization in such an autonomous way that if it were 
to take them seriously the scientific representation of society would become lost 
in them, in every sense of the word" (de Certeau 1984, p59). 
In taking these tactics as the focus of analysis, de Certeau places himself in proximity of 
the ethnomethodological tradition - he lists Garfinkel, Sachs and Schegloff as pursuing a 
similar approach to his in uncovering the methods through which the representations of a 
society and its modes of behaviour are put to use by groups or individuals (de Certeau 
19845 pXII). Ethnomethodology emphasises agency because of the focus on "the local 
and artful ways in which setting members assemble and use available interpretive 
resources in formulating their understandings of, and responses to, practical issues" 
(Miller and Fox 2004, p47). 
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The key concept in relation to agency for de Certeau is 'everyday tactics' as a 
specific mode of 'consumption', or 'use'. "To a rationalized, expansionist and at the same 
time centralized, clamorous, and spectacular production corresponds another production, 
called "consumption". The latter is devious, it is dispersed, but it insinuates itself 
everywhere, silently and almost invisibly, because it does not manifest itself through its 
own products, but rather through its ways of using the products imposed by a dominant 
economic order" (de Certeau 1984, pXII-XIII). De Certeau goes on to give the example 
of indigenous Indians facing the Spanish colonisers: "they often made of the rituals, 
representations, and laws imposed on them something quite different from what their 
conquerors had in mind; they subverted them not by rejecting or altering them, but by 
using them in respect to ends and references foreign to the system that they had no choice 
but to accept"... "their use of the dominant social order deflected its power, which they 
lacked the means to challenge; they escaped it without leaving it. " (ibid. 5 pX111). 
While acknowledging the importance of the Foucaultian concept of discourse, de 
Certeau argues that to focus only on the representations circulated and contained in 
discourses is to miss an important aspect: their use by common people, their 
'consumption'; therefore an analysis of 'cultural production' (through discourses) must 
be complemented by looking at "manipulation by users who are not its makers. Only then 
can we gauge the difference or similarity between the production of the image and the 
secondary production hidden in the process of its utilization" (ibid. ). 
The specific practices by which actors or users "reappropriate the space organized 
by techniques of sociocultural production" (pXIV) are detailed under the concept of 
tactics. This 'reappropriation', 'manipulation', 'use' or 'consumption' of the dominant 
socio-cultural order (which is the expression of individual and group agency) is not a 
homogenous process, equally open to everyone. De Certeau points to the fact that not all 
social actors have "the same critical or creative elbow-room", depending on power 
relations, social situations, information and financial resources (pXVII). Apart from this, 
de Certeau's conceptualisation of agency seems to restrict it to subversive work done 
ultimately within the framework (and limits) imposed by dominant discourses, not 
outside it, and in this respect it is entirely compatible with the Foucaultian vision on 
discourses and -power. 
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If for de Certeau agency is manifested through the specific use of a discursively 
structured social order, for Michel Pecheux it is captured through the concept of 
disidentification or counterindetification, which involves resisting subject positions. In 
discussing possibilities of disindentification, Pecheux describes "the discourse of the 'bad 
subject', in which the subject of enunciation 'turns against' the universal subject by 
'taking up a position' which now consists of a separation (distantiation, doubt, 
interrogation, challenge, revolt ... ) with respect to what the 'Universal Subject' ' ives him 9 
to think'... In short, the subject, a 'bad subject', a 'trouble maker', counteridentifies with 
the discursive formation imposed on him... " (Pecheux 1982, p157). "Discourses structure 
both our sense of reality and our notion of our own identity. Pecheux's work is ... very 
useful in that it enables us to consider ways in which subjects can come to a position of 
disidentification, whereby we not only locate and isolate the ways in which we as 
subjects have been constructed and subjected, but also map out for ourselves new terrains 
in which we can construct different and potentially more liberating ways in which we can 
exist. " (Mills 1997, p15). This view drawn on the "conflictual nature of discourse, that is 
always in dialogue and in conflict with other positions" (ibid., p 14), a position open to the 
possibility to modify discourses, to ideas of agency through resistance or rejection and 
choice. 
The possibility to act on discourses, to modify them, is prefigured in Foucault's 
work, for example in "the rule of repeatable materiality, which Foucault describes as the 
process by which statements from one institution can be transcribed in the discourse of 
another. Despite the schemata of use and application that constitute a field of stabilization 
for the statement, any change in the statement's conditions of use and reinvestment, any 
alteration in its field of experience or verification, or indeed any difference in the 
problems to be solved, can lead to the emergence of a new statement: the difference of 
the same" (Bhabha 1994, p22). In this process, social actors have a role, as it is through 
their 'use' of discourses (actors enter discourses when they conceptualise or represent the 
surrounding social order, and when they act) that the latter are employed in new 
circumstances, leading to modifications of the statements that compose them. Change is 
possible, and its nature is described by Bhabha as follows: "the transformational'value of 
-n) SZý 
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various social actors. For Bhabha, agency can be expressed in the form of cultural 
practices at the periphery of dominant discourses, that can amount to open opposition. 
"Forms of popular rebellion and mobilization are often most subversive and transgressive 
when they are created through oppositional cultural practices" (p20). 
From the previous sections it has emerged that a discursive understanding of the 
social is not incompatible with possibilities for agency on the part of social actors - and 
these insights will be used in the analysis chapters in this thesis in an effort to combine 
attention to the discourses implicated in the production of the social, with a focus on 




This chapter traces the sometimes uneasy relationship between space/place and social 
thought, the various dimensions along which space and place have been conceptualised 
and used in sociological studies, and the more recent interest in theorising place/the local 
in the light of postmodernist theory, postcolonial studies, feminist work, and theories of 
globalisation. It dwells of the relation of space/place to issues of social organisation - or 
production of the social and of identity. 
Space and place are concepts difficult to pin down and use uncontroversially. 
They are used across a variety of disciplines and theoretical currents (social theory, 
sociology, geography, anthropology, political science, political economy, cultural studies, 
development studies, post-colonial studies, feminist theory, etc. ) that bring their own 
intellectual traditions, ways of conceptualising and specialised concerns with space/place. 
Traditionally in social theory space is thought of as "the dead, the fixed, the 
undialectical, the immobile", and devalued in favour of time (Foucault 1980, p149. 
Agnew (1989) traces the intellectual devaluation of space in social thought to the 
association of geographical place and community, on the one hand, and to Marxian 
political economy, on the other (both 'the eclipse of community' thesis and the analysis 
of space through the workings of capitalist economy have engendered the theoretical 
invisibility of place). 
Even if poorly theorised, place and space have been at the heart of sociological 
inquiries into modernity and capitalism, crucial in the development of understandings of 
social organisation and order, forms of sociality and social control. More recently place is 
being reasserted as a central concept for grasping the global/local nexus while integrating 
theoretical insights around issues of representation, power and knowledge, an approach 
that allows to acknowledge the importance of global phenomena in shaping localities and 





coding and reworking of external meanings and processes, a site where 'local voice' can 
be articulated and directed towards other 'places' or 'the global', 
Space and place in socioloizical invesdeations 
Agnew and Duncan (1989, p2) identify three approaches in the study of places: the study 
of locales as "settings for everyday routine social interaction", a focus on 'sense of place' 
and identity, and finally space as the site of distribution of social and economic activities 
through the workings of the capitalist market. 'Place' in various guises has been one of 
the earliest concerns of sociological work. The role of place in social thought cannot be 
disentangled from concerns with modernity (including industrialisation and urbanisation) 
and the changing nature of social relations. Savage and Warde (1993) show how the 
study of urban life, often in contrast with rural/traditional forms, represents part of the 
efforts of sociology to investigate 'modernity'. Georg Simmel, the Chicago School, Louis 
Wirth, all tried to capture the experience of modernity through an exploration of the 
urban as the site of this experience: "sociology emerged in the early twentieth century as 
a discipline primarily concerned with the nature of urban life and the analysis of might 
loosely be termed 'urban problems"' (Savage and Warde 1993, p9). Place was an 
important conceptual tool in understanding the nature of social change, and to capture the 
texture and the experiential nature of life in a fast changing urban environment. 
Community studies represent another illustration of the sociological use of place; 
they were usually concerned with social relations in small geographical areas - this 
territorial definition of community has been since partly displaced by various criticisms 
that stress the fact that commonality of feeling or identity are increasingly not bound to a 
specific geographical space. Many community studies have employed theoretical 
assumptions informed by early sociological concepts such as Durkheim's organic- 
mechanical types of solidarity or Toennies' Gerneinschaft and Gesellschaft, Wirth's 
'urbanism as a way of life' and Simmel's work on 'the metropolis'. These assumptions 
did operate a conflation of place with type of social relations, setting in place the rural- 
urban continuum (Gusfield 1975). This vision was tinged with nostalgia for the rural, 
traditional community characterised by strong identity through place. sense of order as 
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opposed to the chaos, anomie, impersonal relationships of the city, resulting in metaphors 
of loss of sense of community. These nostalgic depictions of 'traditional' communities 
(initially rural ones, but increasingly located in the city neighbourhood, e. g. working class 
urban communities) appeared in the socio-economic context of the disruptive processes 
of industrialisation. 
This is echoed by later studies on place, for example in the idea of authenticity 
that authors like Relph (1976) introduced in relation to place and which embodies 
dichotomies such as rural/urban, or premodern era/modem capitalism. The penetration of 
the forces of the market is seen as rendering a place 'inauthentic', displacing rootedness, 
familiarity, belonging. The place is conceptualised by Relph as a basis for retreat from 
the anonymity and harshness of market processes, and for an 'authentic' existence. Tuan 
(1980, p3), on the other hand, characterises the longing for roots and sense of place in 
American culture as "conservative, traditional, and nostalgic", while Featherstone (1996, 
p5 1) states that community studies with their focus on order and attachment are infused 
with "myths of belonging, warmth and togetherness... an integrated organic community" 
which is "emotionally fulfilling, with relations more direct and integrated, an image of 
coherence and order". Studies of locality have conflated bounded space and local social 
relationships, usually close-knit ones, kinship ties, length of residence, and a common 
'culture'. 'Community studies', including urban studies, have been subjected to serious 
attacks. Dennis (1968) mounts a powerful critique on 'the popularity of the 
neighbourhood community idea' and Stacey (1969) exposes 'the myth of community 
studies' and argues for discarding the disputed concept of community as a study method 
altogether. Nevertheless, Bell and Newby (1971) argue for the relevance of 'community 
studies' in understanding issues of social organisation and social transformation in their 
socio-cultural complexity. 
One of the most important themes running through studies of locality is that of 
identity and place. The general "assumption is that one's identity and those of one's 
significant others are anchored in a specific locale, a physical space which becomes 
emotionally invested and sedimented with symbolic associations so that it becomes a 
place. " (Featherstone 1996, p5l). The issue of place and identity is often approached 
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identity are forged through face-to-face relations in a small geographical space; daily 
contacts generate a common culture, norms, values, ways of doing things, enacted 
through everyday practices. 
Issues of place attachment and subsequent grounding of identity in places are at 
the disciplinary intersection of human geography, sociology, anthropology and 
psychology, drawing on dispersed theoretical insights such as phenomenology, symbolic 
interactionism, various positivist philosophies, etc. which betray the lack of consensus as 
to what these concepts cover 
Other studies have for purpose an investigation of the way people use symbols 
and images of the city to impose order and meaning on their environments, or the 
conditions of production and distribution of such imagery. For example, Pons's work 
(1975) on urban imagery advocates a focus on "the social, economic, political and 
historical contexts within which image-makers, image-purveyors, image-users and 
image-breakers operate" (Francis 1983, p135). Authors like Suttles (1972) focus on the 
way symbols and representations are locally constructed, negotiated and modified against 
a specific background of social relations, norms and values, in a way that integrates 
meanings, societal political and economic issues, and 'place', or 'community'. Similarly, 
Francis (1983, p135) calls for a study of "symbols and images, developed and used by 
different individuals in different contexts ... whose existence and character depend on 
their relationship to both local and wider social, economic, political and historical 
processes 
With the gradual demise of community studies, urban sociology was marked by a 
change in relation to the conceptualisation of place. "Rather than examining how social 
actions were rooted in specific places, social practices were related with the operations of 
common, national, class (and later, gender and race) systems"(Savage and Warde 1993, 
p24). This type of studies used place as a context, a frame to examine issues of class and 
stratification, general social institutions and societal trends, combined with a move 
For an illustration, see a volume edited by Altman and Low (1992): under the generic label of 
4environment and human behaviour', authors explore the various dimensions of place attachment, its 
theoretical foundations, and propose conceptualizations such as community attachment, community 
sentiment, sense of place, varieties of people-place. The main points the collection raises are the centrality 
of affect, emotion, feeling in the concept of place attachment, building on earlier work by Proshansky et al 
(1983) on place and identity. 
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towards surveys, national samples and statistical analysis rather than analysis of local 
environments. Local case studies (of neighbourhood or 'local community') - deemed too 
idiosyncratic and impossible to replicate - were replaced by surveys. This approach "is 
seriously lacking when it comes to understanding how people use, understand and 
interpret the social and spatial environment of which they are part" (Dickens 1990, pl). 
Similarly, for Gieryn (2000) the census tract widely used in sociological studies on 
poverty, violence, residential segregation to "distinguish one neighborhood from another 
in terms of its economic or demographic features" renders place "a stand-in for clusters 
of variables located in spaces chosen for their analytic utility but generally denuded 
of... actors' own narrations ... perceptions and understandings of the place" (2000, p466). 
The Marxian approach to place 
A distinct approach in conceptualising space and place is represented by Marxist and 
neo-Marxist scholarship (Castells, Harvey, Lefebvre, Massey, Logan and Molotch, 
Gottdiener, etc. ). Places are produced through the workings of capital, differences 
between spaces/places are explained through the various ways operations of capital are 
realised spatially. These authors have made a crucial contribution to the theoretical status 
of concepts regarding space and to the related epistemological debate in social theory and 
urban sociology. Generally they have oriented their attention to material spatial practices 
(the uneven development of capitalism, spatial divisions of labour, the social production 
of space, means by which spaces are appropriated, regulated, controlled). 
Castells (1977) provides an analysis of the contradictions of capitalist societies 
and the role of cities as centres of collective consumption, and locus of potential urban 
social movements. Harvey's (1982,1985,1989) Marxist analysis of the urban focuses on 
capitalist production and the social production of space. Harvey highlights the process of 
capitalist hegemony over space through technologies of space-time compression, in a 
society over-run by free market theologies. In his later work he adopted the "Lefebvrian 
matrix" (Harvey 1989,1993) "as a way to think through how places are constructed and 
experienced as material artefacts; how they are represented in discourse; and how they 
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are used in turn as representations, as 'symbolic places', in contemporary culture" 
(Harvey 1993, p17). "Particular representations... emerge from specific material spatial 
practices and from certain forms of domination and control of space, yet they can become 
material forces in their own right, a sort of spatial habitus to appropriate Bourdieu's 
language" (Watts 1992, p 118). 
Lefebvre (1991) attempts a neo-Marxist analysis showing how space is 
constructed by capitalist forces. He provides a complex depiction of space, seen as 
having three dialectically related elements: the experienced, the perceived and the 
imagined, fusing representation, experience of place, discourse and spatial practice. The 
importance of symbolic differences between places in the context of a capitalist global 
market is detailed. 
Massey (1994) offers a nuanced picture of space and place by introducing the 
dimension of gender in order to provide a critique of standard concepts of place. She 
conceptualises space as social relations (including class and gender relations) 'stretched 
out'. The spatial, constructed out of a multiplicity of social relations, is central to the 
understanding of society: "within this dynamic simultaneity which is space, phenomena 
may be placed in relationship with one another in such a way that new social effects are 
provoked. The spatial organization of society, in other words, is integral to the production 
of the social, and not merely its result. It is fully implicated in both history and politics" 
(Massey 1994, p4). 
But many of the authors above try to combine a Marxist analysis of space as 
constituted by material practices of production, consumption and capital flows with an 
analysis of representations of place (e. g. construction of myths and symbolic landscapes) 
and the use actors make of them in everyday life. For example Harvey (1993, p 16) argues 
against a disjunction between "how communities and places are represented and 
imagined on the one hand and how they are actually constituted through material social 
practices on the other"; Massey acknowledges the meaning and symbolism integral to 
social relations that constitute places, and how social relations of space are experienced 
and interpreted by social actors, while Lefebvre (1991) integrates discourse, 
representation and symbolic realms. According to Harvey (1993, p23), "The strength of 
the Lefebvrian construction ... is precisely that it refuses to see materiality, rel)resentation 
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and imagination as separate worlds and that it denies the particular privileging of any one 
realm over the other, while simultaneously insisting that it is only in the social practices 
of daily life that the ultimate significance of all forms of activity is registered. It permits, 
therefore, an examination of the processes of place construction in which the material 
grounding still retains its force and salience. " 
Some authors still feel that the political economy approach advocated by 
Marxists should not replace local, ethnographic studies, which would amount to "denying 
the importance of the relations between the localized processes of social and cultural 
organization and the supra-local processes of class formation, class conflict, and the 
activities of the state" (Francis 1983, pl. 21). This potential separation between political 
economy studies and more cultural, meaning focused, ethnographic research is rejected 
by Agnew and Duncan (1989), who argue that rather than seeing these approaches as 
incompatible, they should be seen as interrelated and complementary dimensions. "Local 
social worlds (locale) cannot be completely understood apart from the macro-order of 
location and the territorial identity of sense of place" (Agnew and Duncan 1989, p2). 
In conclusion, for many authors it is obvious that space and social theory cannot 
be separated (Foucault 1980, Soja 1989, Gregory and Urry 1985, Agnew and Duncan 
1989, Watts 1992). Place has always been used (although often under-theorised) as a tool 
or site for grasping the economic, social and cultural phenomena of liberal capitalism and 
modernity, linked with issues of industrialisation and urbanism, community, ideas of 
social order and social change. As a result, for Watts (1992,118) "a growing concern 
with context and a belated recognition that local socialisation is'central to the constitution 
of society has meant that societies must now be seen as constituted in time and space". 
Social structures cannot be separated from spatial structures (Gregory and Urry 1985); 
moreover, "Social structures are geographies - overlapping, partially integrated and 
messy geographies - and they have to be not just perceived but theorised and even 
represented as such" (Thrift 1989, p263). 
In this context, it is useful to integrate feminist insights on the way 'place' is used 
in mainstream sociology5 as social theory is packed with gendered meanings of place. 
The frequently employed background assumption of place as the passive, immobile 
receptacle or backdrop of social processes and change (the -passive, ahistorical place vs 
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the dynamic history or time) can be read in the tradition of gendered dichotomies that 
pervade mainstream social thought. Furthermore, feminist critique has been directed at 
the association of place with nostalgic home-base, site of repair, relaxation and warmth 
which pervades much sociological work. According to Massey (1994, p 11) this reading is 
bound up with reactionary politics and "a particular cultural reading of something called 
woman". Additionally, the very concept of place used by mainstream studies, its bounded 
character and identity are attacked: "the need for the security of boundaries, the 
requirement for such a defensive and counterpositional definition of identity, is culturally 
masculine" (Massey 1994, p7). Community studies are also a point of contention: while 
most authors predicate attainment of identity and personal fulfilment on the traditional 
type of community rather than in the impersonal, chaotic city, feminist writers have 
pointed to the potentially oppressive and exclusionary character of such close-knit, place- 
bound communities. 
More recent developments across the social sciences have seen the re-emergence 
of space/place, the theoretical understanding of which is placed in the context of 
'globalisation' and postmodernism. 
Space/place, modernity and postmodernity 
Theoretical discussions around globalisation and modemity/postmodemity seem to 
frequently feed upon each other; they employ spatial concepts in order to theorise the 
nature of the changes affecting different spatial scales (both 'the globe' and concrete 
'places'). Globalisation or global restructuring (the term preferred by Marchand and 
Runyan 2000) refers usually to a series of processes driven by the capitalist expansion, 
with economic, social, political and cultural implications. This evolution is associated 
with a post-modem or late modem phase of social organisation. 
The postmodern condition is described by Bauman in the following terms: 
"Individual life-projects find no stable ground on which to cast anchor, and 
individual identity-building efforts cannot rectify the consequences of 
'disembedding' and arrest the floating and drifting self.... The image of the world 
generated by life concern,; is, now devoid of tbe crenuine or assumed vzoliditv and 
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continuity which used to be the trademark of modem 'structures'. The dominant 
sentiment is the feeling of uncertainty - about the future shape of the world, about 
the right way of living in it, and about the criteria by which to judge the rights and 
wrongs of one's way of living. " (Bauman 1997, p50). 
Giddens (1984,1991) explores issues of modernity and globalisation, and gives 
space/place a central role in the understanding of the changes characterising what he 
terms late or high modemity. The late modem phase we are witnessing represents a threat 
to our ontological security because space is not fixed or permanent anymore. Time-space 
paths, routinisation of daily practices are themes used to explain the nature of social 
change and our experience of it: "individuals have been dislodged from their familiar or 
'traditional' patterns of behaviour (their 'routines'), and also their beliefs and certainties 
about the world, by the need to adapt to the rapid changes taking place in their economic 
life or their social and cultural environment" (Taylor et al 1996, p7). High modernity is 
also characterised by a separation of spa ce from place: space and place do not coincide 
anymore because of the possibility of relationships with distant or absent others, and not 
just face-to-face relations. According to Giddens, "locales are thoroughly penetrated by 
and shaped in terms of social influences quite distant from them" (19 84, p 18). 
On a different note, Dirlik identifies some elements of a postmodern 
consciousness (directed against Enlightenment metanarratives, denial of difference, 
suppression of localised consciousness) in the form of heterogeneity, culture as everyday 
negotiation, local knowledge against universal scientific rationality, political movements 
as politics of difference or politics of location "that serve as enabling conditions for a 
contemporary localism, but also produce it. " (Dirlik 1996, p27). 
Under the influence of the discourse of modernity, the relationship between the 
global and the local has often been conceptualised as a dichotomy, as in "the modemist 
binary of the universal (global) sublating the particular (local)" (Wilson and Dissanayake, 
1996, p6). Such an abstract formulation of the dichotomy global/local, as James Clifford 
has observed, "either favors some version of 'globalism' self-defined as progressive, 
modem, and historically dynamic or favors a localism 'rooted'. -- in place, tradition, 
culture, or ethnicity conceived in an absolutist mode" (quoted in Wilson and 
Dissanayake, 1996.. p6), reminiscent of the nostalgia for an idealised local community 
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present in so many studies of modernisation, urban sociology and community studies and 
reactivated in contemporary academic and media discourses in the context of the 
impersonal forces of globalisation. 
For Nandy, globalisation is linked to modernity, understood as "ideologies of 
progress, normality and hyper-masculinity... theories of cumulative growth of science 
and technology" (Nandy 1983, pX) - that the West has the power to impose. We are 
faced in the present with an attack on non-modem cultures that threatens their survival, 
with "the ... prospect of a fully homogenized, technologically controlled, absolutely 
hierarchized world, defined by polarities like the modem and the primitive, the secular 
and the non-secular, the scientific and the unscientific ... the developed and the 
underdeveloped" (Nandy 1983, pX). 
The modem dichotomies between universal and particular are often translated into 
global-local dichotomies; modernity represents "a historical consciousness that identifies 
civilization and progress with political, social, and cultural homogenization and justifies 
the suppression of the local in the name of the general and universal. Modernist teleology 
has gone the farthest of all in stamping upon the local its derogatory image: as enclaves 
of backwardness left out of progress, as the realm of rural stagnation against the 
dynamism of the urban, industrial civilization of capitalism, as the realm of particularistic 
culture against universal scientific rationality" (Dirlik 1996, p23). 
This modernist positioning of 'global' and 'local' (with the latter being 
marginalized in the ideologies of modemity) is being challenged by postmodem, 
poststructuralist (including postcolonial and feminist) theories, with their focus on local 
narratives and "reassertion of the local against the universalistic claims of modernism" 
(Dirlik 1996, p25). Issues of global/local and politics of identity have gained prominence 
not only in the context of postmodern theorising, but also in the light of social 
movements (ecological, women's, ethnic movements) - therefore the local needs to be 
conceptualised in its multi-layered connotations, as spatiality but also as local needs of 
social groups. The revival of the global/local interactions is heralded by the work across 
the social sciences of authors like Friedman, Featherstone, Robertson, Wallerstein, 
Hannerz, Appadurai, King, Jameson, Gupta and Ferguson. 
49 
Postmodern theory, post-colonial studies, feminist writings, and social 
movements have allowed for a recovery of 'the local'. 
"It is the struggle for historical and political presence of groups suppressed or 
marginalized by modernization ... that has dynamized this postmodern 
consciousness and has produced the contemporary notion of the local, which must 
be distinguished from 'traditional' localism.... This is the local as it has been 
worked over by modernity. It finds expression presently in the so-called 'politics 
of difference', that presupposes local differences (literally, or metaphorically, 
with reference to social groups) both as a point of departure and as a goal of 
liberation" (Dirlik 1996, p35). 
Featherstone tries to connect the twin processes of globalisation and postmodemism by 
asserting that "the changes that are taking place as a result of the current phase of 
intensified globalization can be understood as reactions which seek to rediscover 
particularity, localism, and difference, all of which generate a sense of the limits of the 
culturally unifying, ordering, and integrating projects associated with Westem modernity. 
Hence in one sense it can be argued that globalization produces postmodemism. " 
(Featherstone 1996, p60). 
Space/place and globalisation 
Although there is no unified theoretical perspective on globalisation, most accounts in the 
social sciences today do make some reference to the changed nature of various processes 
(economic, technologic, informational, with social and cultural consequences) that can 
only be grasped in their 'global' moves. Fulcher (2000, p525) tries to capture the 
overlapping among various definitions and understandings of globalisation in a very 
broad manner, as "the development of relatively distanceless relationships that extend 
beyond the national units and involve a growing consciousness of the world as a whole". 
Common themes of the globalisation literature are: the changed nature of flows of capital 
commodities and information, a speed-up of global flows and communications and the 
fall of spatial barriers due to advances in transport and technology, together with a 
ccom-Dression' or 'shrinking' of distances and stretching of relationships (economic, 
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social, etc. ) across spaces and the weakening of national borders; the idea of 
interconnectedness on a global scale, accompanied by a global awareness of this 
interdependence; some focus on the cultural dimension of globalisation, be it cultural 
homogenisation ('the global village') or processes of resistance, pointing to "a new 
world-space of cultural production and national representation which is simultaneously 
becoming more globalized (unified around dynamics of capitalogic moving across 
borders) and more localized (fragmented into contestatory enclaves of difference, 
coalition and resistance) in everyday texture and composition" (Wilson and Dissanayake, 
1996, pl). 
Theories of globalisation 2 have 'place' at their core. The global/local nexus is 
conceptualised in various way. For Held et al (1999, pl), globalisation "reflects a 
widespread perception that the world is rapidly being moulded into a shared social space 
by economic and technological forces and that developments in one region of the world 
can have profound consequences for the life chances of individuals and communities on 
the other side of the globe". According to Featherstone(1996, p46) "this is one of the 
problems in attempting to formulate a theory of globalisation, that the theories often 
adopt a totalizing logic and assume some master process of global integration which it is 
assumed is making the world more unified and homogenous". Insofar as the impact of 
globalisation is assessed, ideas of integration and homogenisation are in sharp dissonance 
with notions of uneven impact, polarisation or segregation and cut across the economic, 
political and socio-cultural dimensions. Authors like Bourdieu (1990) and Bauman 
(1998) point to the process of globalisation as better described by polarisation, an uneven 
differentiation: "what appears as globalization for some means localization for 
others .... Some of us 
become fully and truly 'global'; some are fixed in their 'locality' -a 
predicament neither pleasurable nor enduring in the world in which the 'globals' set the 
' According to a large group of authors, capitalism and technology are the impetus behind globallsation. 
Divergences arise when evaluating these processes: for some, "the emergence of a global single market and 
the principle of global competition" are "the harbingers of human progress" (Held et a] 1999, p3), while for 
others they represent "the triumph of an oppressive global capitalism" (Held et a] 1999, p4). For these 
authors the essence of globalisation is a cluster of economic phenomena within the framework of the 
capitalist form of orgamsation that have acquired a 'global' dimension (key terms such as 'global capital', 
'global markets', 'financial flows' point to this); these processes are seen as having various effects on 
places, including the physical transformation of landscapes (which raises ecological issues), migration of 
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tone and compose the rules of the life-game" (Bauman 1998, p2). Nandy (1983) as well 
takes a critical position on what he sees as a process of polarisation where divisions are 
set in place, with political implications. Many reflections on globalisation indeed point to 
a new form of social stratification made possible by the transnational flows and markets, 
with the emergence of a mobile transnational class or elite united by its privileged 
position and commitment to a neoliberal economic view, and a marginalised population 
on whom a new consumerist ideology is imposed, and that has little control over the 
processes affecting its livelihoods. 
Lash and Urry (1994) talk of 'disorganised capitalism', where the capitalist 
organisation becomes speedy, mobile and migrates across various labour and consumer 
markets in order to prosper; in this context places are variously affected: cities cease to be 
the centres of particular kinds of production, and new circuits of capital spread across a 
wide range of sites. Places are restructured not only by the mobility of capital, but also by 
what they call "the new mobile middle class" and its consumerist interest in various 
aspects of a locality (schools, facilities, crime rates, etc. ) that provide the impetus behind 
relocations in search for a better quality of life. Harvey (1989) explores the impact of 
'global capitalism' on the local and detects a new phase of capitalist development 
(flexible production and accumulation, disorganised capitalism, global capitalism), 
characterised by "further deterritorialization, abstraction and concentration of capital. In a 
fundamental sense, global capital represents an unprecedented penetration of local 
society globally by the economy and culture of capital" (Dirlik 1996, p28). 
Bauman sheds a bleak light on the process of globalisation (and its other side, 
localisation), in which decision-making on the part of the business becomes detached 
from territorial constraints5 hence the owners of capital are free from local obligations 
and responsibilities towards communities whose livelihood depends on the jobs they 
generate. The wealthy and powerful welcome the possibility of "free floating, locally 
unbound capital" (Bauman 1998, p9) as they are free to pursue the effectiveness of the 
investment and to incite places to compete for capital. Globalisation so understood 
divides, segregates5 excludes5 and these processes are spatially translated. "Being local in 
a globalized world is a sign of social deprivation and degradation. " (Bauman 1998, p2). 
Spaces is also used by the new elites to isolate themselves. by carving safeDrivateSDaces I 
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and shrinking the public ones - "translated as 'safety' of persons, of their homes and their 
playgrounds. Deterritorialization of power therefore goes hand in hand with the ever 
stricter structuration of the territory" (Bauman 1998, p20). Attention is drawn to the 
power of global processes to shape places on a variety of dimensions, which is not 
matched by possibilities of resistance or choice; regional resistances and oppositional 
movements "are easily dominated by the power of capital to co-ordinate accumulation 
across universal fragmented space. Place-bound politics ... is doomed to failure" (Harvey 
1993, p24). 
One of the most important impacts of globalisation is addressed in connection 
with a special type of 'space', that of the modem nation state, a territorial and political 
entity 'undermined' according to some commentators by transnational pressures and 
decision-making. Directly related to the issue of transnational flows and global markets is 
the political dimension of globalisation: a questioning of the role and nature of the nation- 
state in this (for some) fundamentally changed environment. National governments "have 
to manage increasingly in a context in which the constraints of global financial and 
competitive disciplines make social democratic models of social protection untenable and 
spell the demise of associated welfare state policies" (Held et al 1999, p4). Institutions for 
global or regional governance (the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO) are challenging the 
authority and legitimacy of national governments, that are increasingly losing control 
over their economies and borders. The financial integration and transnational 
organisation are at the core of global economic integration, a process that "constrains 
governments to open their economies to market forces and adopt neo-liberal policies 
which weaken the state" (Fulcher 2000, p530). The increasing scope for the jurisdiction 
of international or transnational institutions versus the sovereign power of the nation-state 
is another element fuelling the debate around the position of the latter. In a globalised era, 
the nation-state is declining in relevance (Albrow 1996) or at least the concept of state 
and associated ideas of sovereignty, governance and power are in need of a radical 
reworking. 'Global society', 'global democracy', 'cosmopolitan governance' (Held et 
al. 1999) and 'the global political community', are just a few concepts that testify such 
efforts of conceptualising the political dimension of globalisation and the changing role 
of tile oate in relation to other inoitutions, and nhe-nomena- An additional crroun of A 1-1 A 
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arguments indicates the weakening of the control of national borders (faced with flows of 
migrants and information or communication) and of the national territory (due to ethnic 
and religious groups claims that can lead to movements for autonomy) that the modem 
state is witnessing. 
As with the interpretation given to the economic changes subsumed under 
'globalisation', the changing role of the national state is at the core of heated debates. 
Fulcher (2000) for example makes a case for the continuing relevance and even 
strengthening of the nation-state throughout the history of globalisation, and indicates 
that the neo-liberal policies many states adopt are actually imposed by "national 
governments, with their particular national interests and ideologies, and the international 
organizations that represent them. These are represented by the strongest economies, 
above all the United States, and are therefore agencies of the most powerful nation- 
states" (Fulcher 2000, p530). What some theorists see as convergence of economic and 
welfare policies due to the impersonal, objective pressures of 'globalisation' processes, 
others interpret as pressures on the Third World from organisations like the WTO (and 
the reinforcement of free trade), the IMF and the World Bank (that make loans 
conditional upon the adoption of neoliberal policies) (Fulcher 2000). In the process, and 
under the cover of 'globalisation', the interests and ideologies of clearly identifiable 
nation-states are pursued at the expense of others - globalisation, in other words, is 
driven from concrete places, rather than being a disembodied, dis-emplaced process. 
Massey makes a similar argument when she challenges "the characteristic 
counterposition of space and place", because global space is "concrete, grounded, real" 
(2004, p7) just as much as the 'place' of daily life is. Drawing on Latour (1993), she 
emphasises "the groundedness, the emplacement ... of so-called 'global' phenomena" 
(Massey 2004, p8). Massey (ibid. ) gives the example of a concrete place, the City of 
London, as the site of global finance, asking "Could it be global without being local? ". 
Capitalism itself, far from being a disembodied, abstract process, consists actually of 
cultural practices that vary among places, and it is, like 'globalisation', made up of 
relations and practices "utterly everyday and grounded at the same time as they may, 
when linked together, go around the world" (Massey 2004, p8). 
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Apart from the economic and political issues discussed so far, but closely related, 
is the cultural dimension of globalisation. One of the main lines of analysis in relation to 
processes of globalisation looks at processes of cultural production and appropriation and 
their underpinnings (economic phenomena, flows of information across borders, etc. ). 
Featherstone also looks at the common assumption that globalisation wipes out local 
identities, meanings and traditions (shared by authors that use a Gramscian concept of 
cultural hegemony) and argues that local knowledges do not disappear, there is no 
homogenisation of content: "theories of cultural imperialism and media imperialism that 
assume local cultures are necessarily battered out of existence through the proliferation of 
consumer goods, advertising, and media programmes stemming from the West... share 
with theories of mass culture a strong view of the manipulability of mass audiences by a 
monolithic system and an assumption of the negative cultural effects of the media as self- 
evident" (Featherstone 1996, p62). 
While a multitude of studies in the cultural field try to emphasise the local 
processes of resistance to globalising pressures, some feel that this is a fashionable accent 
on the "creativity and skilfulness of active audiences and consumers" (Featherstone 1996, 
p63), or that the "ongoing process of disruption and manipulation by global discourses 
and technologies is all too uncritically being rearticulated as ... in-between spaces of 
negotiated language, borderland being, and bicultural ambivalence" (Wilson and 
Dissanayake 1996, p2). 
A different position argues for moving away from a simplistic acknowledgement 
of either resistance or manipulation of the 'locals', and for a different reading of 
globalisation-related phenomena, as "various forms of hybridization and creolization 
emerge in which the meaning of externally originating goods, information, and images 
are reworked, syncretized, and blended with existing cultural traditions and forms of life" 
(Featherstone 1996, p63). This is a position that advocates an integration of the global 
and local that does not wipe out the capacity of the local to generate social meaning - 
necessarily of a hybrid fonn. 
The connection between global and local in globalisation and postmodern theories 
is a conceptualised in complex and contradictory ways, with a few scenarios emerging. 
T'hese concentualiqations Ihave important implications in terms of place-based identity. AA4 
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One of the most frequent conceptualisations of the global/local connection in 
globalisation theories sees the local as annihilated or rendered meaningless by the global 
(e. g. Bauman 1998); metaphors of penetration and ravaging abound in many of the 
studies that look at the effects of 'globalisation' in different sites/communities. Feminist 
authors such as Gibson-Graham (1996) and Marchand and Runyan (2000) point to the 
fact that these descriptions follow a rape script in presenting the brutal aggression of 
capitalism/Slobalisation towards the passive, victimised 'local' or place. A variant of this 
scenario is the 'homogenisation' thesis that sees places as losing their distinctiveness and 
meaningfulness to homogenising pressures of capital and media or Western cultural 
production. A possible outcome of this development is the nostalgic return to localism, in 
an effort to retrieve meanings, relations and ways of being that have been displaced. 
In this scenario, places become robbed of their capacity to generate meaning and 
identity at the hands of globalised capital and unequal power relationships. The relation 
between globalisation and the local is sometimes described as disorienting for local actors 
because of the lack of capacity of places to generate social meaning, to ground 
experience and attachment (Dickens 1990, Giddens 1984,1991). "Our experiences and 
means of orientation are seen as divorced from the physical locations in which we live 
and work. The fate of our residence and work seems to be in the hands of agencies in 
parts of the world foreign to us. Localism and a sense of place give way to the anonymity 
of "no place spaces" or simulated environments in which we are unable to feel totally at 
home" (Featherstone 1996, p46). In other words, globalisation means that "the locality is 
no longer the prime referent of our experiences" (Featherstone 1996, p63). Massey is 
challenging this type of account of globalisation, on the ground that it reflects a specific 
position, which is not that of marginalised groups. She asks "who is it who is so troubled 
by time-space compression and a newly experienced fracturing of identity? Who is really 
that is hankering after a notion of place as settled, as resting place? Who is it that is 
worrying about the breakdown of barriers supposedly containing an identity? " (Massey 
1994, p122); the answer is not those 'on the margins' of that old, settled, mythologised 
coherence (ibid., p123). 
According to Featherstone (1996, p47), "increasing levels of cultural complexity, 
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desire to return home, becomes an important theme". Similarly, Taylor et al (1996, p 11) 
argue: "There is no doubt that the advance of 'mass media' and global economic 
competition has undermined the process through which a strong and immediate sense of 
local identification is adopted by individuals, but it would be a very sweeping 
generalisation that denied the continuing desire for such a local identity". Massey draws 
attention to the fact that lamenting over the loss of identity (or of the power of places to 
ground identity) and the theme of disorientation common in globalisation theories are 
actually implying the loss of stability, boundedness and authenticity of places - an 
essentialist position, to which she opposes the image of place as shifting and created 
through interconnectedness. 
A second scenario allows for a more 'active' role of the local, because it sees it as 
continuously recoding, translating the global. A product of this encounter can be the 
hybrid or creolised identity. Communities outside the Western center "deploy the cultural 
hybridity of their borderline conditions to 'translate', and therefore reinscribe, the social 
imaginary of both metropolis and modernity. " (Bhabha 1994, p6). This type of account is 
not without its critics. Friedman (1997) looks in the global context of cultural 
globalisation at the new forms of identification contained in the discourse of cultural 
transmigration, hybridisation, multiculturalism, creolisation, trans- ethni city, 
transnationality, hyphenated identities - which according to him emanates from a 
cosmopolitan cultural intellectual elite. 
A third scenario sees places or the local as site of resistance and political 
mobilisation in the context of an attack of global capitalism and mass media. 
Globalisation therefore can be seen as catalysing efforts of recovery of local cultural 
originality. This reassertion of the local is not an unequivocal process, as it can be the 
ground for emancipatory movements and politics of difference, or can amount to 
conservative forms of localism. "Globalization, paradoxically, has led to a strengthening 
of local ties, allegiances, and identity politics within different nation-state formations" 
(Wilson and Dissanayake, 1996, p5). There is recognition of the fact that the blending, 
recoding and hybridised identity described above are not unavoidable outcomes. "The 
conditions under which such a hybridisation might occur as a social fact are very far from 
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opposition to the immediate social environment dictates against such ecumenism, and 
these tendencies are generated and reinforced by the real fragmentation of the global 
system" (Friedman 1997, p76). 
One of the most important issues at stake in conceptualising the nature of the local 
its relation to identity. The 'politics of identity' is a frequent theme of recent 
interdisciplinary approaches to place and the local. It is linked with possibilities of 
emancipation and 'voice' (Appadurai 1988), politics of difference (Gupta and Ferguson 
1992), and political mobilisation of social movements such as gay and lesbian, native or 
ethnic. But the other side of the issue is that both place and identity tend to be constructed 
by drawing boundaries and establishing differences (see Cohen 1985 on the importance 
of symbolic boundaries for the construction of communities) - which can lead to 
exclusionary, discriminatory and oppressive practices. While some authors argue for the 
possibility of a hybrid, cosmopolitan, de-territorialised and global identity, others dismiss 
this vision as being a possibility confined to just a few privileged 'cosmopolitans'. 
The thorny issue of identification and belonging in relation to place in the light of 
the dual nature of the 'local' as both site of liberation, emancipation, 'voice', political 
mobilisation, on the one hand, and of oppression, parochialism, reactionary and 
conservative politics, identity through difference obtained by degrading other 
places/identities, on the other hand, is a recurrent one in writings on the new role of place 
in a globalised era. Some authors caution against a version of localism that "is willing to 
overlook past oppressions out of a preoccupation with capitalist or Eurocentric 
oppression and that in the name of the recovery of spirituality affirins past religiosities 
that were themselves excuses for class and patriarchal inequalities" (Dirlik 1996, p37). 
As Dickens (1990, p14) puts it, "locales are also a context of tension and potential 
conflict as individuals and social groups each try to assert their personal and social 
identities". 
There are voices that defend the possibility of a conceptualisation. of the local 
detached from normatively and politically charged notions of authenticity, by 
acknowledging the inevitability of hybridisation: "the local need not embody a regressive 
politics of global delinkage, bounded particularity, and claims of ontological pastness, 
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hybrid, compromised, and unprotected everyday identity already is. The local is reshaped 
by the global, there is no 'authentic' local untouched by global processes" (Hall quoted in 
Wilson and Dissanayake, 1996 p5). This integrating tendency is embraced by diverse 
scholars who try to overcome the conceptual opposition of the global and the local. For 
both Massey and Harvey understanding of the local is impossible without connecting it to 
the global. For Harvey (1993, p 15) "what goes on in a place cannot be understood outside 
of the space relations that support that place any more than the space relations can be 
understood independently of what goes on in particular places". Massey (1994, p5) 
asserts that "the particular mix of social relations which are thus part of what defines the 
uniqueness of any place is by no means all included in that place itself', as it comprises 
relations that stretch beyond the place: "the global as part of what constitutes the local, 
the outside as part of the inside"- with the implication of a challenge to the possibility of 
claims to internal histories or timeless identities. 
A discursive approach to place/space 
This thesis employs a discursive approach to place/space. Discourses constitute places by 
first constructing them as meaningful entities: a place becomes a place as discourses 
carve out its identity (e. g. in relation to other places, by establishing boundaries, 
similarities and differences) and fixing (a fluid and unstable fixing) the content of this 
identity. But discourses also structure the place through their multiple workings within 
the respective place. They are not only involved in the material production of places, but 
they also order local understandings and ways of doing things, penetrating the layers of 
everyday life; they shape modes of thought and forms of politics - it can be argued that 
they produce 'the social' in all its dimensions. 
Discourses act within and between places: they structure both places, and the 
relations between these places. Places are hierarchically organised through discourses in 
the context of power relations; the issue of unequal power of symbolic representation and 
hierarchisation of places is central to social theory inspired by post-colonial insights. By 
putting together place as site of production of discourse and the notion of places as 
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representational practices emerge. Discourses originating in a certain place construct 
other places in the symbolic realm, and in the material one as well, by codifying and 
naturalising ways of thinking and acting towards places. This offers a basis for 
legitimising a variety of practices that further transform places. 
Also, local subjectivities that shaped by the same processes that construct 'place'. 
The fact that places are often sites of enunciation within asymmetrical relations of power 
crucially affect the constitution of subject positions in a given place. Places offer identity 
positions through the variety of discourses that inhabit and structure them; some of these 
constitutive discourses can originate in other places and, according to the prevalent 
dispersion of power relations, carry particular consequences and put particular limits on 
processes of identity formation in a given 'place'. Personal and group identity is linked to 
the 'identity' of the place broadly understood as the dominant/hegemonic fixing of 
meanings that articulatory practices perform. 
The analysis chapters are developing these insights by dwelling on the production 
of a social space (the Romanian social space) inextricable from the identity of the 
respective place - which in its turn is fixed in relation to another location - the West. 
Further, place of residence as locus of identity is explored in the form of the study areas 




The analysis in this thesis is based on fieldwork in Bucharest, Romania. The first phase 
of the fieldwork consisted of a pilot study (April-May 2002); following this, the research 
was redirected in order to capture more adequately the issues raised by this initial 
exploration, and three areas were chosen for in-depth investigation. Two more fieldwork 
periods followed (September 2002, and April-July 2003), and they comprised in-depth 
interviews (in total 78 interviews were performed), combined with observation and 
participant observation through involvement in a series of local practices, informal chats 
and socialising. This was supplemented by a survey of the media and public debates (TV, 
newspapers and opinion journals). 
The study areas were chosen in order capture aspects of identity-work in relation 
to place: they present contrasting features from the point of view of the built 
environment, social make-up and location in the historical landscape of Bucharest - 
features that can potentially be used, or rather articulated, in social actors' symbolic 
constructions. 
Interviews consisted of discussions that focused initially on perceptions around 
the place of residence and neighbourly relationships, and opened up to include life issues 
that respondents saw relevant. Everyday concerns were connected in the respondents' 
accounts with understandings of social change and of one's position in the new social 
order: identity issues were at the fore of people's preoccupations. Interviews took usually 
the form of long narratives around the intertwined topics of the shape and meaning of 
social change, and identity. The interviewee's agenda was a strong determinant of the 
direction of the interview. 
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Short historical background 
Bucharest is the capital of Romania, the political and administrative centre. The 
institutions of the presidency, the Parliament, and central government are located here, 
together with the main political parties, main bank offices, financial and cultural 
institutions, etc. The capital has a population of over 2 million inhabitants (2037278 in 
July 1996 1, which represents over 10% of the country's population). 
The town was re-shaped to a large extent during the communist regime. After 
1945, policies were aimed at the reconstructing and developing Bucharest. In the fifty 
years of communist rule, many industrial units were built, including the industrial 
platforms at the periphery of the town, and new accommodation units as well in the form 
of hundreds of thousands of flats in blocks. 
The rise of the 'blocks' neighbourhoods is a phenomenon linked with the 
intensive industrialisation process that Romania underwent from the 1950s. The 
industrialisation had a political, ideological element, as the new communist regime was 
trying to make a clear break with the largely agricultural past, perceived as 
backwardness, and to put forward the idea of progress through the efforts of the working 
class 2. The discrepancy between the official propaganda extolling the virtues of the 
working class as the engine of 'progress', transformation, 'modernisation', and the actual 
size of the working class compared to the predominantly peasant population meant that 
the creation of a true working class was a primary concern for the regime. 
The 'industrialization' of the country meant that hundreds of thousands of people 
from the countryside were offered jobs in the new industries, especially the 'heavy 
industry', a priority at that time for the planned centralised economy of the communist 
regime. While in some cases this migration was accompanied by the building of entirely 
new towns around a massive industrial plant (some of these industrial conglomerates 
would employ over 60.000 workers 3), in the case of the capital, Bucharest, it meant 
According to the Romanian National Office for Statistics 
For a similar argument in the case of Poland, see Misztal and MisztaI (1984) 3 The so-called 
'factory towns', that sprung up throughout communist countries, where, as MIsztal and 
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building at a very fast rate massive neighbourhoods composed of blocks of flats outside 
the old, historical centre. 
Within the span of two decades the population of the town had trebledl with the 
cnewcomers' living in 'blocks' (Bucharest Townhall websitef InI993, three years after 
the fall of the communist regime, 12.7% of the economically active population of 
Romania was concentrated in Bucharest. This construction policy has tried to keep up 
with the influx of population in Bucharest (that lasted throughout the 60s and the 70s); 
between 1945 and 1964,80641 apartments were built, and this number increased to 
446100 apartments between 1965 and 1984. New neighbourhoods appeared on the map 
of Bucharest, including Drumul Taberei (63000 flats) and Titan (90000 flatS)5, from 
which two study areas were respectively selected (Bucharest Townhall website). 
"Despite the egalitarian ideology, state socialist east European housing was 
inequitably distributed", with the "best quality and most subsidised housing ... was 
allocated to bureaucrats and the white-collar workers of the intelligentsia" (Pichler- 
Milanovich 1996, p 119-120). 
In the late 70s and 80s, a crestructuring' or 'demolition' policy was initiated, 
consisting of demolishing of the older, historical part of the town, and of the older 
neighbourhoods made up of detached houses, and replacing them with new 'blocks' - 
combined with a displacement of the population. 
This 'relocation' of an important part of the population from the detached houses 
to 'blocks' was generally perceived as a traumatic event by those concerned, as the 
population to be relocated had no saying in whether their house should be demolished or 
not, and the process itself was on rather short notice. The relocation policy was seen in 
dissident circles as a serious abuse perpetrated by an authoritarian regime along with 
other unpopular measures and at a time of serious shortage. The forced alteration of the 
urban landscape was perceived by many as a premeditated act of humiliation and 
harassment, a brutal attempt at re-writing history, as it touched not only the older 
neighbourhoods, but many historical monuments (from old royal buildings to monasteries 
industrial sector after 1989, or simply the closing down of inefficient units, meant that these towns were 
affected by mass unemployment and a withdrawal of the aforementioned services. 
4 The industrial manufacturing and assembly sector in Bucharest was employing 39.700 workers in 1950; 
in 196.5 the number rose to over Y/ Uuu ýBucharest i ownhaii website) 
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and churches) as well. This was interpreted by dissident voiceS6 as an attempt to erase the 
symbols of the past in order to replace them with monuments glorifying the communist 
present, and above all the person of the president. This clashed with the official 
propaganda that presented the demolition policy as a beautifying and modemising project 
concerning Bucharest, and which portrayed blocks as efficient an d modem units of 
living. 
An important development of the post-communist era consists of increased 
residential mobility. During communism, many flats were allocated by state institutions 
and the residents had the status of tenants of the state; therefore they could not sell the 
flat. Also, the legislation in place limited the number of flats a family could possess to 
one. This situation was translated in low residential mobility: among my respondents, 
many had lived in the same flat since the day it was allocated to them - usually the 
1960s. 
New legislation was passed by the post-communist government, allowing state 
tenants to buy their flats and the lifting of restrictions on property purchasing after the fall 
of communism was accompanied by a massive expansion of the property market. As 
mentioned, during the communist regime a large part of the housing stock was owned by 
the state, with the residents paying rent to the state (a rather symbolic amount), and the 
costs of electricity, water and heating were subsidised, hence relatively low. During the 
early 1990s, almost all state-owned flats were bought by their current residents under the 
new legislation that granted very advantageous buying conditions (low prices and the 
possibility to pay over a few years), therefore at present most flats are privately owned. 
The inequalities in the distribution of flats during communism were perpetuated in the 
post-communist period of privatisation of housing, meaning that the best-quality flats, in 
the best locations became the property of a higher income, higher education stratum of 
the population (Pichler-Milanovich 1996). 
One of the major problems of the past years is the increase in the prices of fuel 
and services generally. Combined with the inefficient distribution of heating and water 
5 The 1992 census registered a total of 109194 blocks in Bucharest, with 76075 1 flats and 1803635 rooms. 
6 See the campaign fought by Radio Free Europe in the 1980s to publicise the moves of the communist 
regime in Romania, and the ensuing reSDonses of the West (mainIV DTOtests regarding the demollsbinLy of 
churcbes). 
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(due to loss in the system of distribution), this means that many families are faced with 
very high bills. When the family cannot pay the bill, there is the possibility of a deferral 
(their share will be covered from the common block fund), and the family is in debt. If 
the debt spirals (a few consecutive months), the family might find it impossible to cover 
it, in which case the block association has the right to sue them in order to recover the 
due amount. Often this leads to the flat of the family in debt being sold so as to repay the 
debt. 
The organisation of the block 
Blocks are organised as formal associations. They have a formal block committee, a 
president, and an administrator - the latter is a paid position. The block administrator is 
elected by the committee of residents and is responsible for the running of the block. 
He/she collects the fixed amount every family has to pay for the 'block fund', destined to 
cover the costs of repairs and improvements regarding the block (fixing the roof, 
plumbing, fixing the pavement in front of the block, painting the staircase, etc. ). The 
administrator also receives the bill that service suppliers (centralised heating and hot 
water 7 for all blocks, and cold water in certain cases) issue for the whole block and 
calculates the contribution of each family (taking into account number of family 
members, number of days the flat was empty, etc. ) and collects the due amount from each 
family - which often involves paying visits repeatedly to families that are not paying on 
time and using various persuasion techniques. It is the responsibility of the block 
administrator to contact the local authorities for various services that are provided for free 
(but the lack of funds means that many local authorities are unable to perform them), 
such as painting the parking spaces, fixing the ornamental fences between blocks, fixing 
the public lighting, or providing seeds to be planted in the green spaces. 
Various formal meetings require the residents to gather in order to take decisions 
regarding the fate of the block. During these meetings residents decide how the money 
7 The centralised heating system consists of hot water distributed from a few plants in Bucharest through a 
network of pipes to all blocks, where it is pumped into individual radiators; according to the law, the 
temperature at the point of the radiator cannot go below a certain ! eý, O, bi! t in practice distribiitors ýave 
problems in providing this temperature, to the discontent of block users. 
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(the block fund) should be spent: repairing a leaking roof, or replacing a segment of rusty 
plumbing, or fixing the lift. 
The section above has briefly introduced some elements that help locate the 
concerns and articulations respondents perform - as detailed in the analysis chapters. An 
additional element that needs mentioning is the fact that new block neighbourhoods were 
built at the periphery of the old Bucharest - which can be placed in the context of 
prevalent representations of the centre-periphery contrast. Stan (2001) points to the 
negative meanings routinely associated with the periphery of Romanian towns: poverty, 
insalubrious, unsafe environment, high crime; in contrast, the town centre is where the 
cultural, social and economic aspects of life are concentrated, and it legitimately 
represents the town in the symbolic realm. 
The meaning of living in a 'block' or in a 'house' (an apartment in a block of flats 
in a periphery area, or a detached house with a garden in a central 'old' neighbourhood) 
can be located into a historical and symbolic background, with implications for the 
possibilities for the construction of individual and group identities. 
The study areas: description 
The areas the research focused on are one detached houses neighbourhood and 
two 'block' neighbourhoods. Bucharest has a mix of these types of accommodation, with 
the older 'houses' neighbourhoods generally occupying the central part of the town, and 
the newer 'block' neighbourhoods built starting with the early 1960s towards the 
periphery of Bucharest. The 'block' neighbourhoods occupy the largest part of Bucharest 
and are densely populated. Some have a better reputation than others, and areas within 
each of them rank differently according to their perceived qualities and desirability 
among residents. 
Cotroceni (C) 
The detached house neighbourhood is called Cotroceni (C), and has a good reputation 
wit1iin the town. It was built in the 1930s and the initial population was represented 
by 
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medical doctors and their families; overall, bourgeois families inhabited the area. In the 
more recent times, including after 1990, a large part of the residents were professionals; 
C also has a large retired population. 
The two 'block' neighbourhoods investigated are within the Drumul Taberei (DT) 
and Titan (T) areas; they are relatively new, built between the mid-1960s and the 1980s. 
They comprise exclusively blocks of flats, or 'blocks', the term used by the population, 
that at first glance seem quite similar, 4 to 10 floors high. Some of these 'blocks' are 
connected, resulting in rows of terraced 'blocks' of up to 20 staircases. The study 
neighbourhoods have different reputations: the one in DT is more central, with more 
expensive flats than the one in T. A mix of professions is represented among residents, 
but overall in the DT study area there are more professionals than in the T area. 
Titan (T) 
The oldest construction wave represents the birth of the area: the first blocks were four 
story blocks made of bricks as opposed to the newer 10 story blocks, built in between the 
older ones, using pre-fabricated units. The study area is an 'old' block neighbourhood, 
among the first ones in the town, being built in the 'first wave' of the 1960s. The 1970s 
and 1980s saw the 'cramming' process, where new, taller blocks were built in between 
the older ones, increasing the density of the population; also, the city continued to 
expand, meaning that the study area became 'central' compared to the newer 
neighbourhoods raised beyond it. The construction of the underground meant fast links to 
both the peripheral industrial platforms (where many working places are located) and the 
city centre (where the shopping areas and main administrative institutions are to be 
found). 
Initially, the neighbourhood housed mainly skilled workers, engineers, personnel 
employed in the massive adjacent industrial platform, consisting of several factories and 
research units, and also Bucharest families that were on a waiting list for state-owned 
housing (those living in crowded conditions were on the list, such as younger families in 
multigenerational households - priority was given according to the number of children, 
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town that had been demolished. The newer blocks were a response to the continuing 
housing shortage and were built very fast, with less attention paid to details like interior 
and exterior finish, insulation, allocated green spaces, etc. 
Drumul Taberei (DT) 
DT is again an 'old' block area, built starting with the 1960s. It has clear boundaries and 
the shape of a horseshoe. The neigbbourhoods within DT were named (informally) after 
the bus stops along the public transport lines that go across DT, following the horseshoe 
or loop trajectory. The study area is a 'central' neighbourhood, in the sense that it is 
placed at the beginning of DT and closer to the centre of the town. The residents tend to 
have a better material situation than in the T study area, as testified by the number of 
expensive cars owned by residents. Many of the flats in the area were allocated to 
military cadres 8, with the higher positions (such as army generals) located closer to the 
centre town, and the inferior ranks closer to the periphery. Therefore families of 
employees of the Armed forces are still strongly represented in the area. Apart from this 
category of residents, professionals and blue collar workers co-habit within block units. 
Samplinjj 
Respondents were contacted through friends and acquaintances, in a snowballing process. 
The final sample on which the analysis is based consists of 21 respondents in C, 29 in the 
DT study area and 22 in the T study area. Also, some of the pilot interviews included 
respondents that did not belong to the study areas, but nevertheless their accounts (a total 
of 6 respondents) were included in the analysis of processes of production of the social 
through processes of articulation, including the struggle over meaning9. Interviews were 
conducted at the interviewees' homes, but also in pubs, parks and the workplace. They 
were tape recorded and then transcribed. 
8 The local stadium is home to the Steaua Bucharest football team, which under the communist regime used 
to be known as the Army team. 
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The sampling aimed covering a variety of characteristics such as age groups, 
gender, occupation and material statuslo. Respondents were contacted through friends, 
relatives and acquaintances, in a form of snowball sampling. 
The sample does not contain very poor or extremely rich respondents, due to 
access and ethical issues. The 'new rich' stratum is very difficult to investigate by an 
outsider, while the most vulnerable members of society are usually most 'open' or 
exposed to being researched and exoticised for Western audiences, which raises ethical 
issues. Therefore most chosen respondents have an average material situation, that allows 
them a 'decent' lifestyle according to local definitions, or at least they 'cope' financially, 
and some are successful professionals with high incomes. 
Considerations regarding fieldwork and reflexivity issues 
Poststructuralist, postcolonial and feminist writings have unveiled the concept of 
scientifically neutral research as untenable, and have deconstructed the observer-ob served 
relationship, pointing to the fact that the researcher cannot be a neutral agent, and her 
identity cannot be separated from the research process; moreover, the data and analysis 
bear the mark of this relationship between 'the researched' and an embodied, gendered 
and racialised researcher (Haraway 1991, Turner 2000, Letherby 2002). Mumby (1993, 
p4) points to the necessity to "acknowledge the extent to which, as theorists and 
researchers, we are never neutral, dispassionate observers of behaviour but are always 
heavily implicated in the construction of the narratives ... that provide insights to the 
social reality that we inhabit". 
Qualitative research has often been framed as "a colonizing discourse of the 
'Other"', which "both separates and merges personal identities with our inventions of 
Others" (Fine 1994, p70). In discussing qualitative research with focus on race, Ladner 
(197 1, pVII) captures the power relations between the researcher and the researched: "It 
has been argued that the relationship between the researcher and his subject, by 
' The respondents are designated in the analysis chapters by their residential area (C, DT, T, P for pilot 
interviews that are not Encluded in the final study areas) and a number, followed by gender and age. For 
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definition, resembles that of the oppressor and the oppressed, because it is the oppressor 
who defines the problem, the nature of the research, and, to some extent, the quality of 
interaction between him and his subjects". 
Porter and Catt (1993) detail the issue of the authorial standpoint of the 
researcher, and its difficult relation to the multitude of voices that the study captures. 
Speaking about and for others while trying to allow other voices to be heard is a delicate 
endeavour. An inevitable process of othering occurs in qualitative research, as any 
research involves some form of representation on the part of the researcher in relation to 
the researched. Nevertheless, there are different forms of dealing with this responsibility, 
with different consequences in a political and ethical realm, which Fine (1994, p74) 
spells out: 
"When we write essays about subjugated Others as if they were a homogenous 
mass ... , free-floating and severed from contexts of oppression, and as if we were 
neutral transmitters of voices and stories, we tilt toward a narrative strategy that 
reproduces Othering on, despite, or even 'for'. When we construct texts 
collaboratively, self-consciously examining our relation with/for/despite those 
who have been contained as Others, we move against, we enable resistance to, 
Othering". 
The act of research needs to be located in a landscape of power relations and knowledge 
production. As Punch (1994, p84) puts it, "politics suffuses all social scientific 
research ... By politics I mean everything 
from the micropolitics of personal relations to 
the cultures and resources of research units and universities, the powers and policies of 
government research departments, and ultimately even the hand ... of the central state 
itself '. 
The interviewing process during fieldwork reflected the issues raised above, 
concerning differentials of power between the interviewer and respondents, the impact of 
the embodied and gendered personality of the interviewer, and the difficulties in avoiding 
forrns of othering. 
Contacting and interviewing respondents was a process in which relations of 
power were played out in various ways. The authority of the researcher was established 
rr; -n ry 
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disadvantage of gender as a less prestigious identity feature and which did not conform to 
the expected stereotype of the 'researcher' as male". 
Respondents insisted usually on a reciprocal exchange, and used their position (I 
needed their cooperation) as a tool to set the terms of the interaction. Many respondents 
felt more comfortable with a 'friendly chat' rather than the idea of an 'interview' (which 
is a foreign concept among most Romanians, more familiar with surveys as a form of 
sociological investigation). This meant that a certain rapport had to be established, in 
order for the interview to take place and for respondents to be comfortable with 
disclosing personal circumstances and thoughts. This type of rapport was facilitated by 
the fact that respondents were contacted through friends and acquaintances -a first level 
of trust was established fairly fast. 
What I call throughout the thesis 'the respondents' accounts' are actually 
produced in a negotiated relationship between researcher and respondent, a process that 
fosters forms of mutual deceit and manipulation - insofar as all interviewing involves 
12 impression management . In order to establish a more ethical relationship (although 
ethical issues in qualitative research are a thorny topic 13), 1 offered a lot of information 
about myself, my personal circumstances, opinions and aspirations, as this seemed a 
more balanced exchange, and many respondents subtly or overtly insisted on it. Also, an 
aspect that built a level of reciprocity in the interviewing process referred to the fact that 
respondents were allowed to talk for as Ionia as they wanted, and to bring in stories and 
comments that were not directly related to the questions asked; this strategy actually 
proved to be very useful, as it provided a lot of material for analysis: all stories were 
related to issues of identity and positioning, contained appraisals of the social reality and 
put across a wealth of articulations. 
I have felt during the phases of this research the weight of Punch's (1994, p85) 
affirmation that "fieldwork is definitely not a soft option, but, rather, it represents a 
demanding craft that involves both coping with multiple negotiations and continually 
" For a similar experience see Ladino (2002): she looks at the interviewee's response to a researcher that 
did not conforrn to their expectations of what a researcher should be like (white westerner in her case) and 
details how she was pushed into adopting an identity that local respondents saw fit. Also, see Oakley 
(198 1) on the implications of her being a woman and feminist on methodological issues. 12 For a di scussi on, see Punch (1994) 
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dealing with ethical dilemmas" 14 . Some interviews lasted over 3 hours, and some were 
conducted over a few meetings. 
The research has made me aware of the impossibility of the transparent researcher 
that can be written out of the text and the importance (both methodologically and 
analytically) of the researcher as a person, of her identity, in the research process. The 
production of data was dependent of the interaction between interviewer and respondent: 
this process took place in the context of an interaction as exchange, mutual appraisal, 
involving a delicate balance of trust, sympathy and rejection. 
13 See Truman (2003) for an analysis of the incongruities between fon-nal ethical regulation of research, and 
the experiences Of research participants. 
14 Punch (1994, p85) details the "stress, the deep personal involvement, the role conflicts the physical and 
mental effort, the drudgery and discomfort" that fieldwork often entails, 
listing a number of cases of field 
research where dhese issues WeUt: PUU111111CUL. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE PRODUCTION OF THE SOCIAL: DISLOCATION AND SUTURE IN 
POST-COMMUNIST SOCIETIES 
Conceptualisin2 the dimensions of 'change' and social dislocation 
The issue of social change after 1989 in Eastern Europe provided social scientists with 
endless material for analysis and commentary. How to best conceptualise what happened 
after the disintegration of communism (as well as inquiry into the causes of this rather 
unexpected collapse) is still part of a heated debate in the expanding field of post- 
communist studies. One of the questions raised concerns the magnitude and nature of the 
rupture. These societies have witnessed obvious economic and political changes, together 
with cultural, normative transformations. The texture of everyday life has been 
substantially modified, and for many people the social landscape has turned into 
something profoundly unfamiliar and disorienting. 
In the early 1990s, after many years of isolation (this is especially true in the case 
of Romania, one of the most closed-off countries in Eastern Europe) the media 
broadcasted images and the shops introduced products many people were not familiar 
with. As a result, many people felt inadequate and uncomfortable with their surroundings: 
the routines of everyday life, that were grounded amongst others in a certain consumption 
landscape, were deeply altered; skills that had helped citizens get by became obsolete. 
An "entire scaffolding of normal routines, trusted assumptions and certainties has 
collapsed, whose intrinsically equivocal nature nevertheless provided a basis for 
stabilised everyday habits" (Thomas in Segert and Zierke 2000, p24 1). A continuous 
struggle for the routinisation of everyday life in order to manage and reduce anxiety 
ensued in post-communist societies, and it was still visible during my fieldwork in 
Bucharest: many respondents expressed the belief that events are happening sometimes 
trNn fqqt tn nllmv fnr mi-diiim qintj Inncy-fi-m nlnn-z nntj 
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routines, with resulting high anxiety and feelings of being overwhelmed by the quick 
(and often unpredictable) succession of events, and not being able to cope or keep up. 
Accounts from fieldwork distinguish between a past (before 1989) and a present 
characterised by distinct 'time modes". ; Fhe new era is seen as having a different 
structure and texture of time. While the past temporal order had a flat, predictable quality, 
the present one is fast and unpredictable. Because of this acceleration and different 
texture of time, the structure of daily life is deeply modified. A constant theme in 
interviews is the need for time to catch up with things, to be on top of the events, to keep 
informed about changes in the legislation (e. g. property, employment laws and new 
'rights') and more generally about the job market, the financial market, the political 
arena. An adjustment to this new speed is indispensable for social success; being in tune 
with the pace of changes allows social actors to take strategic decisions for their future 
wellbeing. 
It is not only the texture of 'time' that has changed, but aspects of language as 
well: ways of talking about oneself and the social have become outdated. Tellingly, the 
populations of Eastern Europe had to adopt a whole new vocabulary in order to make 
sense of the new developments. The vocabulary of the market and economic transition, 
coupled with that of democratic reform and institutions (introduced by governmental 
institutions and international organisations and analysts) has penetrated most areas of 
social life. The general feeling was that Romanians had to learn a new language in order 
to understand the transformation of their societies and the realities of their lives (literally 
so in the case of more technical terms pertaining to market institutions, finance, or 
banking that had no correspondent in Romanian, and therefore English is used). Cultural 
changes are partly effected through language; "many of these social changes do not just 
involve language, but are constituted to a certain extent by changes in language 
practices ... attempts to engineer the 
direction of change increasingly include attempts to 
change language practices" (Fairclough 1992, p6). 
Alternatively, one can point to the fact that the post-communist period was 
marked by important elements of continuity: for example, the idea that social and 
ror a discussion or the cimerent temporai orgunisauuns 'Alill-ULACIISIlig btilLt; SOUldlibill dJIU UapiLdllblil, acu 
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material status have been completely reworked after 1989 is a debatable one (much of the 
literature focuses on the transmission of advantage from the communist period, as 
discussed in chapter one). The comment 'it's the same people in power, nothing has 
changed at the top' appears frequently in my interviews. Also, "[o]ne should not 
overlook ... the extent to which institutional and cultural aspects of the former systems 
survived the transformation and continue to shape present-day social practices", as 
Outhwaite and Ray (2005, p 18) state. 
Nevertheless, what happened after 1989 has been described mainly in terms of a 
socioeconomic breakdown. The accompanying collective breakdown of orientation, the 
dispersion of meaning as dominant discourses lost their power to define and order social 
reality, are though equally important dimensions of change. The general disappointment 
(of Western institutions and local elites) around the slow take up of Eastern European 
societies in relation to transition and reform, the perceived 'messiness' of local forms of 
democracy and market economy betray a schematic and teleological view of change as 
implementation of the 'right' forms of socio-political and economic organization and 
crucially underestimate the impact of this loss of meaning and the discursive struggle to 
re-structure the social in which local social actors are caught. 
It is pertinent to examine how new discursive structures have displaced the ones 
set in place during the communist rule, engendering a society-wide reworking of 
meanings and practices. New discourses are producing the social in Romania, by 
assigning dominant meanings and valuative connotations to the social and by setting in 
motion practices that take on various forms, from official governmental policies and 
creation of institutions, to everyday behaviour of individuals. Through the framework of 
these discursive formations with a reality-defining power, social actors make sense of 
societal changes, think and act, therefore participating in the production of the social. 
All these changes have taken place over only a few years, a short time if one 
looks at the effort necessary for the withdrawing and subsequent reinvesting of meaning 
in the 'objects' that constitute social life -a transformation of categories of knowing and 
fixing of meaning in new configurations. "The 'necessity' and 'objectivity' of the social 
would depend on the establishment of a stable hegemony, with periods of 'organic crisis' 
0--arterized ns those. in wbich the basic begemonic articulations weaken and an 
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increasing number of social elements assume the character of floating signifiers", in the 
words of Laclau (1990, p28). 
A discursive approach (as detailed in chapter 2) helps explain the 'disorienting' 
features of everyday life, a common theme in post-communist societies that have found 
themselves at the intersection of competing discourses and possibilities for reality- 
making, and the salience of identity in these societies, the massive identity-work that is 
required here. 2 There has been a dismantling of a system of discourses and practices or 
routines that placed people in certain relationships and defined their identity. New 
discourses offer new subject positions, while old subject positions have disappeared. 
I will explore the idea of social change as change in discursive systems by 
drawing on the concepts of discursive field, articulatory practices and hegemonising 
discourses, as developed by Laclau and Mouffe (2001) and Laclau (1990). The field of 
discursivity, as detailed in chapter 2, consists of floating signifiers or 'elements', the 
meaning of which various articulatory practices try to fix into discursive structures - but 
only a partial fixation of meaning is possible, due to the surplus of meaning 
characterising the field of discursivity. It is in this field of discursivity that multiple 
competing discourses are articulated; the social takes shape through articulations in a 
discursive space. When a (partial) fixation is obtained in competition with other attempts 
to fix meaning differently, a hegemonic articulation emerges. This fixation is 
permanently threatened with disruption; "Discursive systems of social relations are 
subject to change due to the impact of social conflict and political struggles" (Torfing 
1999, p89). 
Through my study I try to capture aspects of the production of the 'Romanian' 
social space following a generalized dislocation of existing discourses and the 
consecutive loss of their structuring and reality-defining power. In the case of Romanian 
society, a system of signification collapsed after 1989. As indicated by Torfing (ibid., 
p148), "dislocation refers to the emergence of an event, or a set of events, that cannot be 
2 This can be seen as a much more acute version of the erosion of stable identities associated with the 
postmodern condition and the shift to reflexive life-projects in the Western world - as illustrated in the 
w C, 17k C, "G c-. -. 3(1 -9,1.1911,11, 
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represented, symbolized, or in other ways domesticated by the discursive structure - 
which therefore is disrupted". 
A discursive approach to social change takes into account the way certain 
discourses organising the social space during the communist period have gradually lost 
their power to define reality, to fix the meaning of social identities, concepts and objects. 
Many of them were rigidly structured discourses that did not manage to domesticate or 
integrate a growing array of events, despite the efforts of the communist elite to articulate 
a hegemonic system of discourses - these efforts were strongly antagonised and 
ultimately destabilised by other formations (local dissident discourses, discourses 
associated with the capitalist order and proposing different ways of understanding the 
social, through concepts such as free market, consumption, individualism, freedom of 
speech, etc. ). 
This gradual withering of some of the discourses producing the social under the 
communist rule made it possible for a growing questioning of the existent social order, as 
alternative meanings crept in, in the form of antagonistic articulations. The disintegration 
of a range of discourses was precipitated after December 1989 by the fall of a multitude 
of institutions (that had anchored discourses associated with the communist formation by 
enforcing certain conceptualisations, practices and routines - e. g. party structures, state 
institutions), meaning that the identities, objects and concepts forming 'the social' 
became just elements or floating signifiers in the field of the social in need of a 
widespread re-articulation. 
The old system of articulations 
This section introduces a short overview of the discourses associated with the communist 
order so as to subsequently highlight the processes of reattribution of meaning in the 
post-communist representational landscape. Until December 1989, the discursive field of 
the Romanian society was dominated by a multitude of articulations and nodal points that 
could be grouped under the signifier 'communist discourse' and by the various resistance 
discourses it engendered. Between them, those created the system of differences that the 
actor, -q iitilised for making sense of -, ocial reality in the gense that their agoni-oic framings, 
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of the relevant social phenomena, of human nature, of principles of societal organisation 
and the place of individuals and collectivities within society established a 'grid of 
intelligibility' of the social and moral order for the communist citizens. 
The norms and values - of good and bad, of the just society, of appropriate and 
Just' social hierarchies (or rather social equality), the relationship between state and 
citizens, allocation of resources, of rewards and status among citizens - codified within 
the communist discourse - were inextricably connected to a plethora of practices, applied 
and reinforced in daily life. That is, the fundamental representations of the communist 
discourse, based on interpretations of Marxist-Leninist teachings and emanating from 
sources connected to the Communist Party, were supported by State institutions, taught 
and implemented in school and during 'patriotic' activities outside school, in the 
workplace, through the media, and reinforced through various mechanisms of social 
control. 
The main traits of the communist discourses articulated an egalitarian vision of 
society (composed not of hierarchical classes, but of three social groups: the workers, the 
peasants and the intellectuals, all working together to bring their specific and 
indispensable contribution to the maintenance and progress of society, within the 
parameters and goals set by the Party), with an egalitarian distribution of resources and 
with shared societal goals, where collective interests were more important than personal 
gain. Notions of public property, collective welfare and central planning and control were 
also central to the communist discourse. The individual was conceptualised as embedded 
in networks of social relationships, interdependence and obligations towards the 
collective, and the notion of duty and responsibility towards others and the state featured 
prominently; this discourse set a certain relationship between the citizen and the state: 
while the citizen had the duty to work in order to fulfil the plans of the centralised state 
economy and to follow the guidelines issued by the Party concerning most areas of her 
life, the state had the duty to provide for the citizen 
3. 
Apart from this sweeping conceptualisation of the individual within the social 
order that created a general base for concepts of the self or subjectivities, more specific 
' On the issue of a 'social contract' under the Ceausescu regime in Romania, see Sampson (1986) 
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discursive strands of the communist discourse in relation to work and occupations, 
gender, family, age, ethnicity did articulate more fleshed-out subject-positions. 
Broadly speaking, the normative representation of the individual that was created 
within the communist discourse saw people as motivated by social concerns and social 
goals rather than individual self-interest, and considering the interests of the collective 
before their own. Competition was present, but mainly in the form of friendly 
competition between productive units or collectives rather than between individuals. This 
was translated in daily life in a variety of practices; for example, in schools classes were 
engaged in a 'competition' to produce the best results (be they grades or fulfilling of 
recycling quotas or 'voluntary' work), with the best pupils in the class tutoring some of 
the weaker pupils during breaks and after hours as part of a collective effort based on 
ideas of solidarity - the purpose of the competition was the motivation of students and 
overall better results for the school, as success was judged at the level of the collective 
rather than in individual terms. 
The material shortages of everyday life during the last couple of decades of the 
communist regime were compensated for in various degrees through blat practices; as 
shown in chapter 1, these practices cut to a certain extent across lines of occupation and 
status, redistributing resources and affecting notions of status and inequality. Therefore 
they have indirectly blurred social hierarchies and promoted an understanding of the 
individual as engaged in social relations of mutual dependence and surviving through the 
use of networks, features that were compatible with the ideas of equality and the position 
of individuals at the core of the communist discourse - possibly contributing to the 
egalitarian ethos and reinforcing the conceptualisation of people as reciprocally attached, 
part of a web of social relations, duties and dependencies. 
This is not to say that there were not strong divisions within Romanian society 
that the communist discourse glossed over or simply denied, not only between the party 
elite and the masses, as often presented, but within these 'masses', for example between 
workers and intellectuals, or along ethnic and gender lines, or between rural-urban 
environments - all serving as a basis for inequality and differentiation (as discussed in 
chapter one). The point I am arguing is that overall a certain image of equality and 
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and was integrated to a certain extent in the way people thought about themselves and the 
surrounding social world (as supported by accounts of the past contained in interviews; 
many reactions to the present situation serve to put in focus this more egalitarian ethos of 
the past). 
In parallel, resistance discourses were forged, contesting the meaning the 
communist discourse had attributed to the social order, and therefore contesting the 
principles and criteria for the ordering of society upheld by the communist discourse. For 
example, intellectuals were disputing the importance of manual work in relation to 
intellectual work 4, families were holding on to and passing down to their children 
'traditional values' that involved strict social boundaries among gToups hierarchically 
ordered, and gender roles. Additionally, some of the definitions of social reality 
contained in the communist discourse were belied by everyday life - e. g. shortages, bad 
quality of life, unsatisfied consumption needs and economic backwardness became the 
accepted reality that diverged from the worldview articulated within the communist 
discourse, which stipulated well-being and prosperity. The discursive landscape of the 
communist Romania was characterised by discursive struggles. 
As George and Wilding (1994, p4) put it, "where the content of ideology is 
incompatible with people's experience, its hold is tentative and superficial. This is shown 
by the example of Eastern Europe". In Romania, the communist definition of reality as 
prosperous and fulfilling was progressively undermined (by opposing notions of the good 
life and prosperity that drew on images of the Western world), and in this way a breach 
was created on which dissident discourses could be grounded - and, some authors argue, 
5 
provided the basis for action that ultimately brought about the demise of the system 
After 1989, with the collapse of communism, the discourses associated with that 
particular form of societal organisation have lost ground. The dislocation of the dominant 
communist discourses that had structured the Romanian society (through concepts, norms 
and practices) for more than 40 years happened almost overnight, a process facilitated by 
the disintegration of the institutional arrangements that had maintained and reinforced it. 
4 See Fuller (2000) for an account of the anti -egalitarian ethos of Eastern European intellectuals. 
' Tismaneanu (1990) details the role of the 'civil society' throughout Eastern Europe in the demise of the 
communist system (equating civil society with dissident intellectuals) and Lane (1996, p137,164) 
drawing 
stratum as a form of'resistance in communist regimes. 
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For individuals and collectivities that meant the disappearing of a system of meaning that 
had formed the lens for understanding their lives, personal trajectories, professional and 
extra-professional activities, and relationships over a long period of time - constituted by 
the dominant communist discourses, but also by resistance discourses formulated in 
reaction to communist ways of conceptualising and organising society. 
Both communist and resistance discourses have lost their foundation: the specific 
resistance discourses were articulated in the specific historical, institutional context of the 
communist era, and were structured specifically in reaction to and as a form of resistance 
to the communist discourse. 
The change in discourses producing the social under communism had a major 
impact on individual and group subjectivities. "To deploy a particular discourse of 
subjectivity is not simply a matter of representing a subject; in practice, it simultaneously 
constitutes the kinds of subjects that are meaningfully embedded in the discourse itself' 
(Gubrium and Holstein 1998, p226). That is, these discourses have constituted the norms 
of intelligibility within which people could work out their own sense of identity. As it 
will be argued below, a change in discourses has produced changes of the meaning of 
these subject-positions (and more generally changes in the understanding of the social). 
Many of the subject positions that were made available within the discourses in 
Romanian communist society had disappeared. For example, the conscientious 
communist worker taking pride in fulfilling the five-year plan, the party cadre politically 
educating the population, the dissident building self-esteem and identity around an idea 
of moral integrity (not giving in to the pressures of the regime to collaborate) are all 
significant past social identities that have lost meaning abruptly. The network of 
discipline the state (including the party and the secret police) imposed on the population, 
and which was a strong mechanism of fashioning subjects in the governing process of the 
communist order, has disintegrated rapidly. With it, constraints which translated as 
everyday routines that ordered a large part of the public and private life have disappeared 
as well, resulting in an initial and short lived feeling of freedom, followed by anxiety and 
struggles to recreate routines and to ground identities. 
In the early 1990s the ground was left open for alternative ways of meaningfully 
organising the -social world in Romania, under circumstances of substantial social 
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dislocation. New discourses had to hegemonise the social space, mainly by providing 
conceptual guidelines and norms for the political and economic re-organization of 
society, but also at a more micro level. A fixation of meaning was needed regarding how 
to envision the individual and her relationship with others and society, including ideas of 
human nature, and social hierarchies and solidarities, sociality and association. A 
reworking of the non-native underpinnings of society was needed as well - new criteria 
for social stratification and social worth (tied with notions of distribution of rewards in 
society) had to emerge as the ones upheld during the communist period faded. 
What now? The role of the mythical space 
As Outhwaite and Ray (2005) put it, it seemed that after 1989 everything was tossed up 
in the air but fell down in familiar patterns of social and economic organization - 
meaning that post-communist countries have largely adopted Western political and 
economic forms. In opposition to theories of 'convergence' as deterministic views of 
social change through 'laws' of social evolution or the natural superiority of the Western 
model, I propose an account of the adoption of capitalism and democracy in Eastern 
Europe that draws on the notion of mythical space (Laclau 1990) and focuses on 
configurations of discourses and operations of power that made possible certain social 
evolutions while precluding others. 
"The 'work' of myth is to suture that dislocated space through the constitution of 
a new space of representation. Thus, the effectiveness of myth is essentially hegemonic: 
it involves forming a new objectivity by means of the rearticulation of the dislocated 
elements" (ibid., p6l). According to Laclau, as a social group suffers dislocations in its 
customary practices, it will propose measures to overcome them; they constitute an ideal 
model, the mythical space of a possible social order. The mythical space has a dual and 
split identity: its own literal content, the proposed new order, and metaphorical 
representation or symbol of fullness. As argued by Laclau, "[t]he discourse of a 'new 
order' is often accepted by several sectors, not because they particularly like its content 
but because it is the discourse of an order, of something that is presented as a credible 
. qltf-rn, qtive, 
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will be accepted: it must be credible, and fit in with basic principles of world 
intelligibility of a group. But the more the system of norms and beliefs that grounds the 
organisation of the group is dislocated, the wider "the areas of social life that must be 
reorganized by a mythical space" (ibid. ). 
This remark is particularly pertinent in the case of Eastern European countries, 
including Romania. As I have argued above, the fall of communism has represented a 
moment of profound and generalised dislocation, a dismantling of life routines and 
principles and normative underpinnings of societal organisation (including the polity and 
economy). A new principle of ordering the social was needed, and the mythical space in 
the form of certain discourses provided it. These discourses can be grouped under the 
label 'need to catch up with the West', or 'return to Europe', and their main signifiers 
were 'capitalism' and 'democracy'. They represented in the early 1990s forms of fullness 
- the exact, literal content was secondary to the promise to suture the dislocation - and 
they managed to bring about and legitimise a new social order. In other words, these 
discourses have managed to hegemonise the social, at least in the period immediately 
after the fall of the old order. They have provided new points of identification, and 
grounded new subjectivities. 
As a "principle of reading of a given situation" (p6l), the mythical space defined 
the state of affairs post-1989 as collapse of an 'evil' system and the need to move away 
from its legacy, and towards a 'good', or 'appropriate' socio-economic order. The project 
of 'catching up with the West' was the first principle of societal reorganisation and 
mobilisation that sutured the generalised social dislocation. Its role in the production of 
the social has not stopped there though: as mentioned, catching up involves adoption of 
'democracy' and 'capitalism' (seen as the very 'essence' of the West), but the exact 
meaning of these signifiers was not fixed. The production of the social proceeded in the 
years following the collapse of communism through the effort and struggle to invest 
signifiers with specific meanings, accompanied by the creation of policies, laws, 
institutions -a whole range of practices inseparable from 'the struggle over meaning'. 
Social actors in Romania (from powerful institutions to ordinary citizens) have 
contributed the production of the social by engaging in articulatory practices involving a 
wide array of signifiers like democracy, freedom, market, social rights, social duties, 
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competition, work, solidarity, meritocracy, human nature, the state, the West, etc. It can 
be argued that competing articulations have been formulated, and that some are more 
powerful than others in deciding the shape of the social. 
An overview of chapters exan-dnint! the production of the social in Romania 
The analysis in part two of this thesis (chapters 6-8) will try to illuminate some of the 
ways the social is produced in contemporary Romania, using concepts of place/space, as 
detailed in chapter 3. 
It has been asserted that a mythical space sutured the social in the aftermath of the 
fall of communism and the disintegration of its discursive regime. The next chapter 
(chapter 6) engages with its conditions of possibility, in the form of a hierarchical 
positioning of places (namely the West and Eastern Europe). This positioning has 
implications on the type of knowledge and representation that are produced in and about 
the locations of the West and of Eastern Europe, and it is effected through a powerful 
discourse of backwardness of the latter in relation to the former. This discourse will be 
detailed throughout chapter 6 and its impact assessed; one of its main effects is on the 
shape of the mythical space which has managed to suture the social dislocation in post- 
communist Romania. 
This first step of production of the social through a mythical space is followed by 
what has been described above as 'the struggle over meaning', the investment of 
signifiers with a more precise content. This process of fixing connotations, as another 
dimension of the production of the social, is the focus of the analysis in chapter 7. 
Are there dominant articulations emerging through this struggle over meaning? 
What do they look like? What criteria for organising society, moral principles, guides for 
being do they put forward? What subject positions do they create? These questions are at 
the core of the analysis on the production of the social in chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 6 
POSITIONING OF EASTERN EUROPE THROUGH THE BACKWARDNESS 
DISCOURSE, AND THE NEW SOCIETAL PROJECT OF CATCHING UP WITH 
THE WEST 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses the issues of discursive production and social change through the 
frame of hierarchically interconnected spaces/places. By this I mean a discursive creation 
of the West and Eastern Europe through the particular positions they are made to occupy 
in a mutually defining relation and the impact this has on the production of the social in 
post-communist Eastern Europe. 
I am aware of the problems associated with employing the term 'the West' which 
could be seen as imposing a homogeneity on a diverse range of entities - the West is a 
very mobile construct and I will not detail here the array on meanings it has embodied; as 
Said (2003, pxii) put it, "neither the term Orient nor the concept of the West has any 
ontological stability; each is made up of human effort, partly affirmation, partly 
identification of the Other... these supreme fictions lend themselves easily to 
manipulation and the organization of collective passion". I am rather looking at more or 
less explicit understandings of 'the West' that the centres of power and knowledge 
production utilise as their intellectual, cultural, political location or grounding. 'Eastern 
Europe' itself is far from being a homogenous entity: the use of terminologies for the 
region (Eastern Europe, Central Europe, Central Eastern Europe, Central and Southern 
Eastern Europe, etc. ) can be linked to attempts to classify the region in normative terms - 
a 'moral' battle; Eastern European states try to distinguish themselves from one another 
through a very active discursive production of difference'. 
See Kulrti N 997) an the 'makiing' of Central Furone as an entity diffeTent ftom Faoem Furn-per qnd 
4closer' to Westem EUTOpe. 
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The discursive construction of 'places' is a process that gives a place its identity 
through boundary- setting, procedures of classification (similarities and differences), and 
attempts to invest the 'space' so delimited with specific meanings that ensure its 
specificity. This process is supplemented by the operations of discourses in the form of 
institutions, practices, values, norins, everyday life, which are mapped onto the 'place'. 
Social agents take this space as the meaningful horizon of their actions, reinforcing the 
progressive imbibing of the place with specific meanings, institutions and 'ways of doing 
things' (or 'culture'). New discourses that keep this construct alive constantly emerge. 
It has been asserted (in chapter 3) that one of the ways discourses shape sites is 
by placing them in particular configurations and fixing the meaning of the relationship 
between them: "Articulatory practices take place not only within given social and 
political spaces, but between them" (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, p140). In the sections 
below I will look at a set of articulations involved in defining the West and Romania (the 
latter being part of a larger construct, namely 'Eastern Europe') and the nature of their 
relationship. The particular identity and positioning of Eastern Europe in relation to the 
West is maintained and reinforced through a 'backwardness' discourse on Eastern Europe 
in which both the West and Eastern Europe participate - although under conditions of 
differential power linked to different resources. Around the nodal point of 
'backwardness' a discursive regime was established, and reinforced by a set of practices, 
including academic writings, policy recommendations, etc. 
This discourse is central to the understanding of the production of the social after 
the fall of communism, as it has anchored, or made easier the articulation of other 
discourses. It is inextricable from the particular form taken by the mythical space that has 
sutured the post-1989 social dislocation (the societal project of 'catching up with the 
West', formulated under the generic term 'transition'). Generally, the relative acceptance 
and legitimisation of the West (or, more precisely, of locally produced representations of 
the West) as the model to follow by a large number of social actors in post-communist 
Romania (a representation created within the backwardness discourse) is connected to the 
specific discursive configurations hegemonising the Romanian social space from 1989 
onwards. 
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The production of knowledge on Eastern Europe in the West: representations under 
the discursive rep_ime of 'backwardness' 
"Foucault's work on the dynamics of discourse and power in the representation of 
social reality, in particular, has been instrumental in unveiling the mechanisms by which 
a certain order of discourses produces permissible modes of being and thinking while 
disqualifying and even making impossible others" (Escobar 1995, p5). This section 
addresses such an order of discourse and the modes of thinking and being it engenders. I 
am going to look at some of the processes through which the identity of 'Romania' (as 
part of Eastern Europe) has been constituted in a field of unequal power relations - e. g. 
economic and political power (entailing differentials in the power of symbolic 
representation, or the capacity to signify) in relation to 'the West'. The construction of 
Romania as a distinct location with a specific socio-cultural identity is the result of 
representations produced in the 'West' and of 'local' efforts of defining and fixing the 
meaning of this construct as an object of discourse. 
I will not provide here a genealogy of the idea of the West 2 and of its role in the 
dynamics of knowledge production and in the creation of the identities of locations (both 
Western and non-Westem) but just acknowledge, along with a wealth of authors, that 
"from the late nineteenth century,... the West, became a central idea, a ubiquitous 
category in the articulation of the modem world" (Bonnett 2004, p25). In the 
contemporary world, it is highly difficult to construct identities outside a West-Other 
relation. 
There is a dominant mode of representation of Eastern Europe in a variety of sites 
of knowledge production that range across Western academic environments, 
governmental institutions, international agencies and the mass media. Very few studies 
on Eastern Europe reflect an understanding of these societies on their own terms. The 
overwhelming majority of writings, reports, and analyses concerning Eastern Europe are 
rooted in a type of understanding and produce representations which I associate with a 
neo-colonial approach. Post-colonial theo has detailed the ways in which the non- 
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3 As exemplified by the work of A. Memmi (1967), E. Said (2003), H. Bhabha (1994), G. 
C. Spivak (1994) 
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western world was thought (and at the same time acted upon) by identifying issues of 
knowledge-production in the West about non-European (colonised) countries that can be 
applied to Eastern Europe (and Romania). Said's Orientalism (2003) and studies done 
within the same vein (for example Mudimbe's (1988) The Invention of Africa) are 
particularly relevant to the case of Eastern Europe. For example, Todorova (1994) has 
applied the tools of post-colonial analysis in her work exposing the 'orientalising' 
approach to the Balkans. One of the points that post-colonial studies emphasise is the 
ways in which non-western cultures have been created and used as Others in the process 
of building the identity of Western Europe. It can be argued that Eastern Europe has been 
and still is such an 'other' in relation to which the identity of the West emerges, through 
the construction and attribution of different traits. 
As mentioned, the dominant mode of representation of Romania as part of Eastern 
Europe can be subsumed under the nodal point of 'backwardness', inseparable from 
parallel and contrasting representations of the West. The system of differences through 
which notions of 'the West' and 'Eastern Europe' have emerged and been filled with 
various attributes or meanings has a long history. Kurti (1997) traces a scholarly 
backwardness discourse in relation to the east of Europe as early as the sixteenth century 
(through Western travellers' diaries), more recently, Chirot's (1989) edited book bears 
the title The Origins of Backwardness in Eastern Europe. Backwardness in this context 
generally implies a historical evolution frame in which Eastern Europe is 'behind' 
Western Europe, and preserves features of social and political organisation that the West 
had-parted with earlier on, together with 'exotic' cultural traits, habits and customs. 
The aspect I will focus on in this analysis is the way the fall of communism has 
allowed for new meanings to be invested attached to the backwardness master-signifier. 
These new meanings and articulations have been invested by a range of social agents in 
concrete strategies and policies, with a strong impact on the shape social change took in 
post-communist Eastern Europe. 
'Backwardness' after 1989 has been permeated with understandings of Eastern 
European countries as not fully capitalist and democratic, and hampered by residual 
economic, political and cultural structures or routines (legacies of the past). As I will 
qhnw the rommunist neriod is seen a,; responsible for not only the absence of 'normal' 2AAI 
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institutions, but also for the creation of a 'culture' and habits that impact on the present 
'reform' of these societies. The backwardness discourse in the post-communist era is 
formulated mostly around a certain portrayal of the communist past as 'abnormal' or 
'wrong', and of the present as 'deficient', while at the same time drawing on 
understandings of Eastern Europe that refer to its pre-communist past (untamed ethnicity 
and nationalism, and lack of political and cultural institutions similar to the ones in the 
West). 
Economic, political and cultural aspects of backwardness; 'communist man' 
I will present a rather brief selection of the massive output from a field of social sciences 
dominated by political science and economics and from political institutions that 
contribute towards this backwardness discourse in the post-communist era (usually with 
the former producing conceptualisations, analyses and recommendations on which the 
latter will be basing policies). To refer more concretely to Romania, most studies 
produced in the West subsume various societal developments under the analysis of 
economic and political activities, which are mapped out and compared against a detailed 
grid of indices that are supposed to operationalise concepts linked to market economy 
and liberal democracy, merging into a dominant discourse that imposes 'true', 'valid' 
definitions of the situation - with strong political implications. 
The general tone of the debate is summarised by the lines: "flawed and 
incomplete transition from authoritarian rule" (Gallagher 1995, p7). The past is often 
portrayed through imagery like 'darkness' and 'deep sleep'. "In the last decade of the 
twentieth century Romania is emerging yet again from darkness" (Patterson 1994, p 1); 'a 
shattered country' is in a process of "picking up the pieces" (ibid., p2l) and 'rebuilding 
the ship at sea'. These constructions treat the communist past (around forty-five years of 
local history) as a historical error to be erased, 'freezing' the country's trajectory- which 
has the effect of placing Romania in the past of Western Europe -a common trope 
through which colonial writings construct the different as 'primitive'. 
This understanding of the past where everything was 'wrong' and which needs to 
be discarded is used to articulate a 'deficit' metaphor to represent the contemporary 
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social reality of the country. For example, sections in Shen's (1997) book Ae 
Restructuring of Romania's Economy: a Paradigm of Flexibility and Adaptability bear 
titles like: "Obstacles to Reform", "Structural Rigidity", "Financial Passivity and 
Dependency", "Functional Aberration", "Plan-induced Inefficiencies", "Institutional 
Deficiencies", "Financial Inadequacy" and "Political and Social Instability". 
This type of diagnosis resonates with most documents produced by the World 
Bank and the IMF, bodies that focus on the economic, market-related institutional 
features. This 'economistic' discourse about Romania sees it as under-developed in 
relation to parameters established in very different 'Western' contexts (an ideal-typical 
West is taken as the norm and end-point of development processes), and in need of 'help' 
in order to 'catch up' through 'reform'. EU institutions as well monitor the reform on 
various levels (economy, the judicial system, human rights situation, etc. - as detailed in 
the Copenhagen criteria for EU accession that candidate countrieý have to fulfil). 
On the political front, the country is depicted as having an imperfect or 
incomplete democracy. Schopflin (200 1, p 110) in examining EU policies towards the 
eastward enlargement states that "the overt goal was the far-reaching reconstruction of 
post-Communist systems into an ideal-typical European democracy"; he goes on to argue 
that "Anglo-Saxon analyses of post-Communism are frequently, persistently, and 
understandably hampered by the analysts' own cultural baggage ... which they elevate to 
immanent yardsticks for the measurement of the success and failure of democracy under 
post-Communism" (ibid., pI 11). 
This is complemented by other 'cultural' analyses of the region that posit Eastern 
Europe as the container of a fundamentally different culture (political mainly, but also 
more generally norms and values) - which allows for metaphors of 'clash of civilisations' 
to emerge. Appadurai (1988) points to some characteristics of the anthropological 
discipline that are relevant in this context (insofar as Eastern European. societies are 
constructed as 'Others'): the tendency to conflate place and culture and assumptions 
about "the boundedness of cultural units and the confinement of the varieties of human 
consciousness within those boundaries" (ibid., p36), with the effect of locking cultures 
and local actors into 'places', and overtones of moral and intellectual incarceration (the 
local neople n,, nri. qnner., -, of their modeq of thoiii: ylht)- A7 -- I- -- I- 4.; ý / 
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This tendency is visible through a variety of considerations that also construct the 
type of person that inhabits post-communist societies. "Society under communism was 
characterized by the dearth of intermediate associations, the almost complete absence of a 
'public realm', a culture of victimization and political helplessness, an intolerance for 
dissenting views, an inability to negotiate and compromise, and the existence of atomized 
individuals and families disconnected from larger society" (Kunioka and Woller 1999, 
p5 8 1) - this is typical of the descriptions of society under communism in political science 
and sociology texts. The type of person created by such a society is seen as characterised 
by alienation, political passivity, distrust, lack of civic skills, lack of forms of community 
apart from family and ethnic and religious groups, cynicism. PaIdain and Svendsen 
(2000, p6) detail the effects of communist policies on local subjects: c4 some totalitarian 
regimes have killed and jailed a sizable fraction of the population, often in the form of 
wavelike purges that took a dramatic momentum of their own. This has created a strong 
atmQsphere of fear and distrust leading into paranoia. Those who live through such 
periods tend to be changed. They have thoroughly learned to trust nobody, to obey 
authority, and take no initiative of their own". Gallagher (1995, p5) writes in the same 
vein: 
"Erich Fromm, the social psychologist, identified various social types who are 
uncomfortable with freedom, illiberal in their attitudes, and happiest with a 
central ly- directed, strong state which lays down how they should think and 
behave. These types exist in all societies, but the stress on conforinity and 
discipline in behaviour and thought patterns that was a feature of communist rule 
perhaps made authoritarian-minded citizens more numerous than elsewhere". 
All the above descriptions put forward the assumption that the political and economic 
arrangements of the past in Eastern Europe have produced a breed of people 
characterised by dependency, lack of initiative and entrepreneurship, apathy, anomie, 
anti-individualism, distrust and incapable of independent, critical, even 'rational' 
thinking. 'Communist man' takes shape as a subject position in the backwardness 
discourse: a deficient type of person, who lacks the traits that its Western counterparts 
possess. These negative qualities are seen as having survived in the present, as inherited 
cmentalities', norms and values of individuals and groups that stand in the way of reform 
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and progress; the fields of social sciences and post-communist studies abound with 
6cultural legacy' theories that reinforce this particular understanding of the people In 
Eastern European countries. 
In parallel with this type of analysis, there are alternative ways of portraying 
Eastern European societies: for example, Rose and collaborators at Strathclyde 
University have produced a wealth of studies (Rose 1999,2000, Rose et al. 1998) that 
highlight the resourcefulness of people in Russia in the context of everyday life survival 
strategies; Ledeneva (1997) has brought into focus the complex system of networking - 
blat - characterising Russian society (and all shortage-ridden Eastern European societies) 
and the levels of trust, co-operation and reciprocity necessary for its functioning. These 
type of studies focus on the inventiveness and strategies necessary for getting-by in these 
societies, as opposed to prevalent images of dependency and apathy, and on notions of 
trust, solidarity and co-operation within networks, in contrast to dominant concepts of 
anomie or social atomisation in relation to Eastern European societies. Nevertheless, this 
alternative image of Eastern Europe is rather marginal in the discourse of the social 
sciences and international agencies. 
Apart from 'communist man' (seen as a product of the communist era that did 
not disappear with the collapse of communýsm and that has problems in adapting to a 
liberal capitalist society), other deep seated and 'older' cultural traits of Eastern 
Europeans are constructed in the social sciences literature, among which ethnic and 
religious passions are prominent. As far as ethnic identity is concerned, Eastern Europe 
has been constantly associated in academic, diplomatic and mass media discourses with 
the rise of new nationalisms, or neo-tribalism, ethnic unrest and intolerance. These 
constructions build on other conceptualisations, such as nationalism theory, that 
categorises national identity in ethnic and civic types, with the civic being 
Western and 
the ethnic Eastern European (Spohn 2003, Gellner 1983). In Western Europe 
"nation was 
defined in legal -historical terms", while Eastern European nationalisms, 
"although often 
using the language of universalism, were exclusionary and often ethnically 
defined, 
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basing state sovereignty not on individual citizenship, but on collective ethnicity" 
(Blokker 2003, p5)4. 
The expected upsurge in ethnic and religious conflicts that was a major concern 
across the social sciences (Holmes 1995) points to modes of imagining Eastern Europe 
compatible with an essentialist view of cultural traits - which are perpetuated through 
decades or even centuries irrespective of other societal and regime changes. Mestrovic 
(1993, p9), drawing on notions such as 'social character' (similar to 'habits of the heart', 
in the Tocquevillian tradition) states that "even if Communism is a modernist doctrine, it 
failed to modernize or change dramatically the medieval mind-set of the people it ruled. 
Almost as Communism fell in 1989, the Communist nations stepped back into history 
and did not make appreciable strides in becoming like the West. Nationalism, 
ethnocentrism, fundamentalism, Balkanization ... returned with a vengeance". Whether 
ethnocentrism and nationalism did take the front seat in Eastern European countries and 
interfere with the implementation of democratic institutions and the free market is a 
debatable issue. It could be argued that, with the exception of ex-Yugoslavia, Eastern 
European countries have witnessed levels of interethnic conflict comparable with the 
ýsocial unrest' manifestations throughout the West (inter-racial clashes, anti-immigrant 
demonstrations and confrontations, the northern Ireland and Basque separatist 
movements). 
Cultural legacy theories: conceptual tools and implications 
All the traits presented above (some constructed as products of the communist era, others 
as having roots in the more distant past, but all part of the backwardness discourse) play 
into the representation of the forms society and social change took post-1989. They flesh 
4 See Hutchinson (2003) for an argument that the 'civic' nations actually rely on ethnic tropes; he 
illustrated this in the case of France, 'the first civic and modem society': the French revolution was 
imbued 
with ethnic understandings (France and its "special mission to Europe, as 
heir of the Roman and 
Carolingian civilisations... War and invasion almýost immediately nationalised the Revolution" p39; 
"even 
the exemplary civic nation then rests on an ethnic substratum" p40). Also, national myths and ethnicity 
issues pervade the discourse of politicians in 'civic' nations, pointing to fundamental cultural values or 
traits that need defending in the face of various threats (see the debates over wearing the 
Muslim veil in 
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out the notion of 'cultural legacy' that is pivotal in the articulation of 'backwardness' in 
the context of the post-communist period. Gilberg (1992) formulates a typical argument 
that relies on notions of cultural legacy: "are the relative slowness and lack of success of 
the Romanian democratization the result of regime policies and views, the debilitating 
heritage of the Ceausescu era, the authoritarian nature of mass attitudes, or all the 
above? ". Similarly, in referring to the destruction of civil society during the communist 
regime, it is argued that "this legacy persists in contemporary political cultures and is 
manifested in learned helplessness, receptivity to paternalism, and a confrontational 
attitude toward conflict" (Gibson 2001, p52). The implications of old 'habits' for the 
present are clearly drawn out by formulations falling under the 'cultural legacy' type of 
reasoning: "nations populated by such individuals... that lack an active civic culture will 
be less able to either democratise or effect economic modernization" (Kunioka and 
Woller 1999, p581). 
I will illustrate one of the ways backwardness and 'lack' or 'deficiency' are 
articulated together-by addressing an important conceptual tool in cultural legacy 
theories, namely 'social capital' as formulated by Putnam (1993,2000), which has 
recently enjoyed a wide popularity among social scientists and policy-makers alike. 
Social capital is dpfined as "features of social organisation, such as trust, norins, and 
networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating co-ordinated actions" 
(Putnam 1993, p 167). 
Putnam addresses indirectly Eastern Europe in the book that introduced the 
concept of social capital to larger audiences: "the formerly Communist societies had 
weak civic traditions before the advent of Communism, and totalitarian rule abused even 
that limited stock of social capital" (Putnam 1993, p183). This is a formulation that 
illustrates the points made above in relation to the backwardness discourse that depicts 
the present as 'lack' and explains it through features of the past (communist and 
procommunist) as cultural legacy - with the implicit reference to Western traits as the 
norm against which this assessment is made. Putnam's analysis links social capital to a 
host of societal outcomes such as the functioning of institutions and of democracy 
generally, but also of the economy - it "bolsters the performance of the polity and 
Fir*nnnmif" (1001 n176) "(-)ni- nf tilt-, mnrp, im-nortint ennveniienre-, of -, tqte, qn(-inlicm in 
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the region was the almost complete destruction of the institutions of civil society and 
other forms of social capital. Falling victim to the centralizing powers of the state were 
farms, businesses, unions, churches, the press, all forms of voluntary organization, the 
family" (Kunioka and Woller 1999, p581). The logical implications are that a lack of 
social capital (characteristic in Eastern European societies) is seen as related to slow 
progress in the democratic and economic fields. 
The concept of social capital has been intensively used by social scientists: high 
levels of social capital have been related to almost everything from levels of crime to 
good health, in what must be one of the most conceptually confused fields within the 
social sciences, as social capital becomes coextensive with 'society' and is often 
measured through the outcomes it is supposed to engender 5. 
Despite this conceptual imprecision and the impossibility of disentangling its 
components, the mechanisms through which it is supposed to influence social outcomes 
and effects, social capital has become a central explanatory tool in relation to Eastern 
Europe and generally the developing world. The World Bank website on social capital 
regarded it as a powerful weapon in the fight against poverty around the world 
(www. worldbank. org/poverty). Programmes were implemented with the purpose to 
strengthen social capital in societies with weak civic traditions (in the case of Romania it 
took the shape of the Social Development Fund). 
Social capital theory has been used both to predict support for democratic 
procedures in Eastern Europe, and to explain post-hoc the degree of success of the 
reform. In the case of Eastern Europe, lack of social capital was one of the explanations 
put forward (by theorists and policy-makers) for the disappointingly slow and difficult 
transition to a market economy and political liberalism, the 'missing link'. As mentioned 
above, the difficult operation of democracy in Eastern Europe is linked to the lack of a 
functional and healthy civic society with intersecting voluntary organisations that could 
'teach' the participants the habits and rules of democracy. These explanations often 
reflect a reductionist understanding of the social: when the unruly developments do not 
fit into the predictory matrix of economic equations, the 'social' is to blame (economic 
laws and calculations are scientific and correct, therefore 'society' must be 'faulty'). 
For a critique of the concept, its uses and the power relations that keep it alive , see 
Fine (2001) 
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Exemplary of this type of thinking is the following quote, in the context of a discussion 
on the plummeting of macroeconomic indicators (GDP) and standards of life in 
'transition countries': "The logical explanation is that something intangible is missing. 
Maybe the 70 to 45 years of socialism destroyed some X, which is hard to rebuild. Often 
it is argued that X is 'initiative', 'business knowledge' or even the 'spirit of capitalism'. 
However, such proposals seem without a theoretical basis. We argue that X is social 
capital" (Paldam and Svendsen 2000, p2, emphasis in original). 
The definition of social capital with its emphasis on voluntary groups also leads to 
the dismissal of other forms of association and trust found in Eastern European societies. 
A different emphasis of the definition would allow the unearthing of features compatible 
with democracy: for example, Gibson (2001) finds in his study that Russians have 
important private social networks characterised by high trust, which are constantly 
overlooked by analyses focused on formal organisations, and which could in theory be 
the precursors of a vibrant civil society. Frequently, the forms of social capital identified 
in post-communist societies, based on the presence of social networks, are seen as being 
of the wrong kind: 'anti-modem' for Rose (1999) or 'negative social capital' for Paldam 
and Svendsen (2000) - which emerges from the 'grey' and 'black' networks found in the 
communist economies, working illegally alongside the official economy. 
To sum up, cultural legacy theories, among which the concept of social capital 
occupies a prominent position, state that mentalities and routines acquired in the past are 
hard to shift and they have a brake effect on any type of social reform (reform of the 
economy, introduction of liberal democracy and rule of law, etc. ). 
Some voices (e. g. Holmes 1995) urge us to look for explanations in relation to the 
slow and often unpredictable change away from 'cultural legacy'. Rather than placing so 
much emphasis on the habits of the past, inherited values and attitudes, one should focus 
on the present and the crisis of govemability: "postcommunist studies should shift its 
investigative agenda away from contemplating cultural traditions toward discovering the 
way these countries are now being governed" (Holmes 1995, p30). Holmes points to the 
difficulties of state agencies to govern effectively, to coordinate the infrastructure (from 
education and health to the judicial, energy and transport) and keep under control illegal 
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activities (prostitution, crime, trafficking, etc. ). This position stands in contrast to the 
typical 'cultural legacy' proposition presented below: 
"Certainly, the experience of two generations of rigid state paternalism has 
created large groups of citizens ill equipped to cope well with the demands of an 
open and competitive society where individuals have far greater responsibility for 
their own lives, where the rules are more complicated and the risks for the 
unenterprising correspondingly greater than they were under communism" 
(Gallagher 1995, p5). 
It can be argued that by comparison to Eastern European post-communist societies, most 
western citizens enjoy relatively safe and predictable life trajectories, in stable societies, 
with variable amounts of safety nets; in post-communist societies on the other hand, the 
'rules of the game' are constantly changing and formal rules or laws are not reinforced, 
and citizens cannot rely on state-provided safety nets. Under these conditions, survival 
skills are sharpened and entrepreneurial practices take on a prominent role. 
Rejecting or challenging a position such as the one expressed in the previous 
quote would entail commentators focusing less on attitudes towards the transition to 
capitalism - as captured by a wealth of surveys - and on identifying inherited mentalities, 
and more on everyday life contexts (for example, the frequent law changes in the 
domains of property, banking, taxation, investment, privatisation, restitution of property, 
that have left the ordinary citizen disoriented and without the possibility of making long- 
terin plans). This approach suggests that it is not the case that apathetic and 
unenterprising individuals refuse to contribute to the successful advancement of 
capitalism, but that Eastern European citizens have operated under circumstances of 
frequent and radical change and uncertainty, without safety nets and a "lack of effective 
and accountable structures of government" (Holmes 1995, p40). 
Reforming Eastern Europe: the consequences of a regime of representation 
The backwardness discourse creates the West as a nonn, a model against which Eastern 
Europe is compared and assessed - reinforcing a hierarchical positioning. This particular 
regime of representation is creating the ground arid limits for imagining the evolution and 
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goals of Eastern European societies, which have taken the form of 'transition' 6 to 
capitalism and democracy; it also makes difficult the articulation of alternative ways of 
thinking about social change. The ubiquitous terms associated with the post-1989 period, 
both in the West and Eastern Europe, were 'transition' 'and 'reform', meaning a 
remoulding of political and economic institutions in a 'Western' forin. 
In the West, throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s an intermeshing of policy 
and academic intellectual production regarding 'societies in transition' supported each 
other and reinforced the backwardness discourse. Policies were based on understandings 
that social scientists had created in relation to Eastern Europe, and experts explored the 
implementation, impact and success of these policies and subsequent societal changes 
during the 'transition' using images and concepts that fit into the 'backwardness' frame. 
A direct implication of the regime of representation created by the backwardness 
discourse in the process of 'transition' is the legitimisation of knowledge and expertise 
claims on the part of Western individuals and agencies. As the aim of the transition was 
discursively fixed as achievement of free market and democracy, after 1989 the West 
took an active stance on the change of Eastern Europe and set out to 'help' the building 
of capitalism and democracy. "As the societies of Eastern Europe emerge from the 
wreckage of forty years of Leninism, they need help in building democratic structures 
and market economies. Their needs are pressing, but the task is enormous and the 
timescale for change is long. What can the West do? " asks Rollo (1990, pl) in a book 
characterised by a patronising, self-righteous tone. Interventions ranged from 'cultural 
exchanges' to more serious attempts at social engineering (structural adjustment 
programmes). Numerous assistance and 'know how transfer' programmes enacted 
understandings of Eastern Europe in terms of the inadequacy of local knowledges and 
practices. Cooperation programmes as well, although based on the notion of partnership, 
were performed from unequal positions. The figure of the Western expert or consultant 
became ubiquitous throughout Eastern Europe. The rush of Western experts towards 
' The term transition is rejected by many social scientists. It implies that change after 1989 had a clearend- 
point -a simplistic, teleological view of social transformation. 
As Verdery (1996) points out in the case of 
Romania, the result of transformation could have taken a variety of shapes that do not overlap with 
Western 
institutions. In the case of the ex-soviet republics, especially Russia, the local socio-economic 
formations 
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Eastern Europe, including Romania, is well documented: it involved a vast array of 
consultancy firms, EU programmes of technical assistance (PHARE and TACIS) and 
'knowledge sharing and partnership building' or 'institutional strengthening' 
(components of the World Bank. Social Development Fund for Romania); the transfer of 
knowledge extended to educational programmes and professional training (e. g. the 
British Council's involvement in training top civil servants through MA programmes in 
the UK, Chevening scholarships, Open Society Foundation programmes, etc. ) with the 
result that a whole local elite has been trained abroad over the past decade. Thunborg 
(1997) details the ideologically-imbued USA strategies and goals in official and non- 
governmental aid programmes for Eastern Europe. 
These activities were and are based on assumptions about the lack of knowledge 
or naivety of Eastern Europeans across a wide range of socio-economic issues (from a 
general lack of understanding of the functioning of the free market, to the lack of a more 
'technical' grasp on issues of how to raise and invest capital, how to organise political 
parties and to conduct election campaigns), and about the expertise and experience of 
Western institutions in the same matters. This is illustrated by Howell's (1994, p4) 
comment on Eastern Europe: "[n]otions of international competitive advantage were not 
understood. Foreign capital and foreign assistance were widely seen as the saving 
combination, although few were really prepared to pay the price of having the 
interference and participation of the fund providers in their internal affairs". Howell (p61 - 
62) also talks about the role of the expert and the resentment towards Western 
consultants, the "concern in eastern Europe for a phenomenon known as 'consultancy 
tourism' where consultants, often from small firms with no long-term interest in the 
countries concerned ... zip 
in and out to undertake studies with little implementation and 
7 often questionable quality" 
The dominant representations of the West and Eastern Europe were acted out 
beyond simple expert advice, recommendations and knowledge 'sharing'. They were the 
foundation on which a sustained programme of policies was designed and carried out, in 
7 Howell (1994) singles out EU consultants and the internal practice of checking their plane tickets in order 




an effort to 'reform' societies and economies. Gowan (1995) points to the general tone of 
the debate which took place in the early 1990s, as communist regimes collapsed 
throughout Eastern Europe (91-hat is to be done? is the paternalistic title of Jeffrey 
Sachs's famous article in The Economist, in January 1990): "It was about how the West 
should seek to reshape the life of the entire East European region" (Gowan 1995, p3-4). 
This assessment resonates with Bhabha's (1990, p75) description of the colonial 
discourse as "a form of governmentality that in marking out a 'subject nation', 
appropriates, directs and dominates its various spheres of activity"; there are similarities 
between the colonial project and the creation of Eastern Europe as a target for social 
engineering and reform. 
In the debate about how to manage the Eastern European issue different positions 
emerged (while alternative models to neoliberal capitalism were never considered): for 
example, the World Bank and the IMF embraced shock therapy models, but there were 
voices that supported a more 'organic' development of liberal democracy and capitalism 
from the existing network of social institutions combined with open debates and 
negotiations (the new political and socio-economic order growing through the 
functioning of the civil society)8. Gowan (1995, p3) states that "Eastern Europe's market 
for policy ideas, suddenly open in 1989, was swiftly captured by an Anglo-American 
product with a liberal brand name", suggesting that the neo-liberal theory and practices of 
'shock therapy' had a dominant position among conceptualisations of the reform. In 
1990, the Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs proposed and publicised measures for dealing 
with the post-communist situation (enthusiastically embraced by North American and 
British policy-makers and most Eastern European elites) consisting of 'shock therapy' as 
opposed to half-measures of reform or gradual change. This neo-liberal approach was in 
line with a specific view on globalisation and economic integration and was appropriated 
by the IMF as its main policy guide. 
Shock therapy (involving the dismantling of previous social and economic 
institutions such as traditional trade agreements between Eastern European countries, 
generalised, fast privatisation, opening of Eastern European markets and direct 
competition with Western economies, adoption of certain financial mechanisms, etc. ) was 
8 As advocated by Dahrendorf (1990) in Reflections on the Revolution in Europe. 
100 
portrayed as an inevitable and desirable course of action dictated by the logic of global 
capital. In the case of Romania, the governments in power in the early 1990s did not 
adopt the shock therapy strategy, delaying the privatisation of state-owned economic 
units and the dismantling of subsidies. As a result, Romania was seen as the bad, 
recalcitrant pupil of reform, while countries like Poland, which implemented earlier the 
recommendations of 'shock therapy', were constantly seen as 'the good pupil'. 
The very ten-n 'therapy' suggests that Eastern European countries were placed in 
the position of a sick patient whose only chance to recover was the acceptance of the 
remedy produced in 'Western' laboratories. This is one of the meanings that the 
'backwardness' signifier acquired when used by Westem institutions and actors. Also it 
illustrates the notion that a general concept or strategy can be applied indiscriminately 
across a variety of very different locations, each with specific circumstances a 
disembedding of the concepts from the context of relations in which they are created - an 
approach that many social scientists find problematic. 
It is difficult to disentangle the discourses on how to reform Eastem Europe, but 
they all coagulate around the main signifiers of democracy, freedom and capitalism as 
free market and privatisation. What is unclear are the goals and priorities, which are the 
means and which are the ends in the equation of transformation: in some versions the 
primacy of economic refon-n is underlined, arguing that the rest will automatically follow, 
as free markets have the capacity to structure the socio-political aspects; in a slightly 
different version, the accent is on democracy and 'freedom' that depend on the 
implementation of the free market; or again, democracy and rule of law are the -first 
priority, the basis on which viable capitalism (including the free market) can be built. 
According to Pridharn et al (1994, pl), "the policies of Westem countries and 
international organisations have not always facilitated the building of democracy in that 
region, and indeed have not always been directed towards that goal". Additionally, there 
was a mismatch of interests of international funding institutions and Eastem European 
populations: the reform supported by the World Bank and the IMF for example was 
directed at improving macroeconomic indicators (such as the GDP), which are divorced 
from microeconomic or social aspects such as general standards of life, and especially 
101 
from the interrelated issues of individual and group identity, self-esteem, violence and 
crime, social solidarity, which were at the centre of local concerns. 
Local contributions to the backwardness discourse and the 'return to Europe' 
The preceding sections have identified a dominant mode of representation of Eastern 
Europe in the West, constructed around the nodal points of backwardness and deficiency, 
and some of its conceptual tools and policy consequences. 
The backwardness discourse that contributes towards the creation of Romania as a 
'place' and type of society (by defining its identity in certain terms) is intersecting with 
the 'local' efforts to fix the meaning of the 'place' and shape its identity. The next section 
details the contribution of local elites to the backwardness discourse, and the analysis will 
then address the outline of the societal restructuring project (a mythical space suturing the 
Romanian social space), in the light of the backwardness construct. 
The Romanian elites have been engaged in a longstanding debate over the identity 
of Romania9, and the terms of this debate have always included 'the West' as referent. 
The vision of what Romanian society should look like has animated contrasting political 
projects that have been articulated under 'Westemising' or 'autochtonist'/'indigenist' 
discourses. In short, the identity of Romania has largely emerged through various 
positionings vis-A-vis the West (meaning mainly, but not only, 'Western Europe'). These 
have been (and are) flexible and strategic definitions (of both the West and Romania), 
changing with the context and with the goals of social actors, and legitimating a variety 
of other political and social projects. 
The Transylvanian Latinist school (18 th Century) tried to create and fix identity 
through the construction of difference, by emphasising the Latin origins of Romania in 
contrast with the surrounding Slavic countries ('an island of Latinity in a Slavic sea'). 
Definitions of Romania and political projects were fonnulated in the fight against foreign 
domination in the I 9th century; they were followed by attempts to 'modernise' the newly 
independent country by the educated elites with access to power positions (the vast 
See the mid-19'h century modernisation debate in Romania and the nationalist project under the 
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majority of whom had been instructed in Western academic institutions in Paris, Vienna 
or Berlin). One such attempt was the liberal model; "The liberal project was underpinned 
by various modes of legitimation, the principal mode being a 'derived' legitimation based 
on the Western societal model" and the implicit superiority of Western societies (Blokker 
2003, p6). This local project used images of the West as rationalism, Enlightenment, 
industrialisation and urbanisation - and posited them as desirable features and the only 
way to modernity and social progress. 
At the same time, an opposition in the name of local authenticity coupled with 
nostalgia for traditional communities was formulated by competing elites producing 
normative models of the social. This alternative political project, inspired by German 
romanticism (some of its main proponents, Eminescu and Maiorescu of the Junimea 
movement, were schooled in Germany), rejected the wholesale import of the Western 
model as incompatible with Romanian national (essential) characteristics, such as a rural 
ethos - in this version, the West cannot be a valid prototype of social organisation. 
Letting those essential features come into their own will lead to different political and 
cultural forms to the ones found in the West, through a 'natural', 'organic' processio. 
These representations and constructions of the Romanian nation and of the West were 
used in power struggles between elites in I 9th and early 20th century Romania, in the 
process of deciding the path of development that the country took (Verdery 1991, Boia 
2004). 
Those oscillations between different uses of the West for local projects of social 
design continued in the communist period. Bonnett (2004) traces the ambivalent 
relationship of Eastern Europe with the West - the early communist modemising project 
of the Bolshevik revolution for example was based on notions of progress, rationality and 
science, secularism, equality and social equity, civilisation - which were also identified 
with the West. Later on a dissociation from the West occurred, as the latter was identified 
with materialism, greed, superficiality and instrumentality. In the case of Romania, in the 
1980s in the official discourse the West became synonymous with poverty and social 
10 It has been suggested that the adoption of the autochtonist model resulted from the acknowledgement on 
the part of the Romanian elites of the hopeless 'backwardness' of the country, hence the choice to drop out 
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injustice or inequality, unemployment, use of drugs, general social and cultural decay and 
greed (series of programmes in the Ceausescu era on national television entitled From the 
World of Capital abounded with grim images of homeless people, strikes and other forms 
of social unrest, drug users, queues for 'the soup of the poor', etc. ). 
The nationalist project took a particular turn during the years of the Ceausescu 
regime, which Verdery (1991) documents, in a detailed analysis. Competing constructions 
of Romanian identity relied on notions of origins (Latin vs Dacia) and this dual origin 
was articulated in divergent discourses about Romania that emphasised (following 
political struggles) its links or belonging to Europe, or its difference from it and roots in 
something 'different' and authentic, or a combination of both European and authentic. 
The cultural producers have been divided between those creating 'history' and 
representations in collaboration with and serving the purposes of the communist regime 
(which leaned towards an autochtonist model) and those resisting these representations 
and defending a 'European' affiliation (they tended to have dissident positions in relation 
to the regime). The intellectual elites were divided between the ones openly admiring and 
promoting the Western European cultural model and the ones participating in the Party 
discourse of nationhood, exulting specific autochthonous traits and rejecting the corrupt 
Western European cultural and moral values and principles of societal organisation. 
The end of the communist regime has revived the process of identity creation 
through positioning in relation to the West (and other symbolic locations) under changed 
circumstances. Ways of framing identity that were repressed during the communist 
period emerged vigorously: Africa and Asia entered the discourse of identity, as an 
'other' Romania must distance itself from". 'Asiatic despotism' for example was a 
reference point for the Romanian political scientist Tismaneanu (1999, p159) in 
opposition to Western democracy. A symbolic distancing from Russia was attempted by 
denouncing its Asiatic traits and its organic essence as non-European; these geographies 
of meaning that established hierarchies of 'places' as moral and 'cultural' locations had 
for purpose a certain positioning of Romania through relations of similarity and 
difference. 
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There is a high degree of convergence between 'Western' representations of 
Romania and the local discourses around Romanian society formulated by dissident 
intellectuals before 1989 and that are dominant after 1989. Rather than seeing the 
backwardness discourse as a foreign construction imposed by powerful actors on a 
passive, confused and victimised local population, the role of the local elites and 
population in supporting, internalising and legitimating it has to be acknowledged, as part 
of the interplay of the local and the West in producing dominant discourses - in the 
context of particular power relations. 
For example, concepts such as social capital (which point to the 'lack' and 
deficiency of Eastern European countries) have been embraced by many Eastern 
European scholars as a valid explanatory tool along which thinking about their societies 
12 
could fruitfully proceed 
Eastern European scholars have produced a wealth of images of deficiency and 
abnonnality of the communist period by making comparisons to a Western model of 
democracy. An example is the way Tismaneanu (1999, p157) describes the struggles for 
power in the Romanian communist party: "Secretive, cliquish, programmatically 
deceptive, the decision-making process in this type of organizations is exactly the 
opposite of the presumably transparent, consensual and impersonally procedural systems 
of democratic politics". At the same time, the post-communist developments are seen as 
continuing to be 'deficient' in relation to the West. Plesu (2004) for example dwells on 
the 'grotesque' nature of the political scene in contemporary Romania, in contrast to the 
refined appearance of the Western politician, on the brutish and Balkanic local habits 
(gregariousness, lack of discipline, etc. ). 
Even the subject positions of the backwardness discourse are consolidated, 
because the local elites have converged with 'Western' theories on the portrayal of the 
6communist man' surviving in the present (e. g. the Polish sociologist Sztompka 1995, or 
the Romanian writer Patapievici 1996) in the form of maladapted and recalcitrant 
workers, true obstacles to the socio-economic reform. 
12 
An example is the conference entitled Social Capital in the Balkans: the Missing Link? organised in 
2002 by the Blue Bird Social Inclusion Group and the Centre for Policy Studies at Babes-Bolyai 
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"And yet we cannot return to Europe as long as our towns are dirty, our 
telephones dysfunctional, our political parties reactionary and parochial, and our 
mentalities sovietised. Europe is a measure, a purpose, a dream" (Jedlicki quoted in Kurti 
1997, p29). This quote sums up the self-characterisation in terms of an unfavourable 
comparison with the West, taken as a norm, which local intellectual elites constantly 
reinforce. 
It is evident that the backwardness discourse is not exclusively produced and 
imposed from Western locations: it is frequently endorsed by the local social actors, who 
bring their active contribution to this particular articulation. 
Production of the social after 1989: 'return to Europe' or 'catchin$! up with the 
West' 
As detailed previously, the fall of communism engendered widespread social dislocation 
in Eastern European countries. Following the conceptualisations of Laclau (1990), social 
dislocation is sutured by a mythical space. This section details the form this mythical 
space took in Romania (similarly to other Eastern European countries) - namely the 
discourse of 'return to Europe' or 'catching up with the West' which has hegemonised 
the social immediately after the fall of the communist regime. 
The emergence of this particular mythical space cannot be separated from the 
context of other powerful representations and discourses, such as the backwardness 
discourse and the local production of national identity that has always proceeded in 
relation to the West. The fixing of meaning in a discursive field is dependent upon 
particular conditions of possibility (themselves of discursive nature). The interweaving of 
discourses and power relations between the spaces of the West and Romania can be seen 
as conditions of possibility, that allow some discourses to emerge and hegemonise the 
social space as operations of a mythical space. 
It is difficult to separate these two discourses - 'catching up with the West' could 
be seen as an implicit meaning or effect within the backwardness discourse formulated in 
the post-communist period in Eastern Europe. Discourses articulate upon each other and 
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discourses, with the effect of reinforcing concepts, objects and subject positions. The 
'catching up with the West' discourse is heavily intertwined with the backwardness 
discourse and integrates concepts and subject positions fixed by the latter. While the 
backwardness discourse focuses on placing the West and Eastern Europe in a hierarchical 
relationship, with a 'deficient' Eastern Europe (in terms of societal institutions and habits, 
mentalities, 'culture' of the local people) lagging behind the West, the 'catching up with 
the West' discourse is its 'natural' extension, and it represents the form in which social 
change (the process of societal reform) is imagined and designed or planned, building of 
the strong normative component of the backwardness discourse (the West as the best 
model of social, political and economic organisation). 
After the fall of communism an authoritative mode of representation of 'the local' 
in relation to the West has emerged throughout Eastern Europe, including Romania. The 
local elites have embraced an ideal-type 'Western model' of social and political 
organisation and adopted the backwardness discourse as a legitimate, accurate description 
of local social reality, accepting its prescriptions as well. While there was some resistance 
to this mode of representation which diminishes local experiences and alternative ways of 
organising social life 13 , the 
dominant narrative that has emerged is that of 'return to 
Europe' or 'taking up our place as a European society' in order to repair the rupture of 
history represented by the communist aggression. It reasserts and builds on a continuity 
with the pre-communist (i. e. capitalist and democratic) era and posits integration into the 
larger 'civilised' Europe as a natural process, which entails leaming the lessons of 
democracy and leaving behind certain mentalities and ways of doing things as largely 
unsuitable for economic and democratic progress. 
"On the diplomatic stage, the language of 'securing' a place within the West has 
become a common rhetorical formula. Any lingering memories of the once 
politically plural implications of Westemisation are not allowed to complicate the 
13 There is evidence of local frustrated reactions at the ways the West is dealing with Eastern 
Europe: a 
marked disappointment with the hesitant EU integration, with the peripheral Or second-class citizens status, 
and fears over national identity and the influence of the powerful Western culture and 
its potential to 
undermine traditional lifestyles. In a study of Polish identity based on surveys and questionnaires, 
Poles 
define themselves as more family-onented, religious, patriotic and helpful to others than 
Westerns 
Europeans (Marody 2003 p 151) and also fear of the social outcomes of being part of the EU common 
maTket. 
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meaning of the 'security' being offered. The process of 'admission' is presented 
as an irrevocable political decision, a final closure not just on communism but on 
any other departure from late capitalism and its allied fon-fls of democracy" 
(Bonnett 2004, p57). 
The 'catching up with the West' discourse emphasises issues of societal reconstruction 
and emerges as the blueprint around which all political projects of the post-communist 
era must coalesce; a variety of social actors and institutions participate in articulatory 
practices that create this discourse, which is predominantly reinforced from positions of 
power. 
The power of this mythical space ('catching up' or 'return to Europe/civilisation') 
in suturing the social, by providing the form of a new social order or social project, is 
testified by the ubiquity of its signifiers in contemporary Romania. 
Politicians describe the goals of their mandate in terms of 'integration' into 
Western structures, and the success of their efforts is evaluated in terms of 'how much 
closer they brought us to the West'. In the earlier post-communist period, the falling 
behind IMF or World Bank standards (which meant postponement of loans) was widely 
commented upon in the media as failure of the government to manage the situation and 
steer the country in the right direction; alternatively, the NATO integration for example 
was seen as a resounding success of the government in power at the respective time; so 
was the removal of tourist visas for the Schengen space in the EU. At present the effort 
put into and the degree of success in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria for EU accession 
is the yardstick according to which much of the activity of the governing institutions is 
assessed. 
These discourses are propagated deeper into the social mass by tools such as 
policies and institutional infrastructure, which are bound to affect everyone on multiple 
levels. The discourse of 'catching up with the west' is reinforced by decisions and 
institutional restructuring, therefore penetrating all areas of both the public and the 
private. For example increases in the price of fuel, electricity and heating are justified in 
terms of 'alignment to European standards'. All sorts of economic initiatives are 
legitimised in this way - from closing down of factories to dismantling of welfare 
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programmes and institutional restructuring and policies; they are presented using some 
version of the vocabulary of alignment. 
But this articulation of the desirable trajectory of economy, polity and society 
with 'becoming more western' is evident beyond governmental documents, speeches, and 
their reflection in the media. The economic elites are as well contributing to it, together 
with the intellectual elite. 
For example, Andrei Plesu, a prominent Romanian thinker (that post-1989 has 
occupied positions such as Minister of External Affairs and Minister of Culture and 
Education), insists on the 'cultural' aspects of catching up with the West, on the 
necessary cultural changes that would permit a 'return to the distinguished European 
family'. (2004). At the same time, a leading political analyst like Stelian Tanase (1996) 
insists on the political and civic aspects and the need to build civil society in a Western 
form in order for local democracy to function. 
They fall on a common trope among the Eastern European intelligentsia - the 
association of the West with anti-communism, and the blaming of policies and practices 
of the communist era for interrupting the natural capitalist development of these countries 
and producing non-civic citizens. Their writings resonate and overlap with the tone of the 
social debate in Romanian intellectual circles. 
Broadly speaking, the 'catching up' discourse is formulated by the local 
technocrats, economists and political scientists in rather formal terms, dominated by 
generic concepts, or legalistic, technical terms. The accent is on the reforin of the 
economy and privatisation, the strengthening of civil society and the rules of democratic 
elections and procedures. 'Society' is subsumed under the vague formulations 'social 
costs' of the reform, or cmentalities', and the population is represented as a mass that will 
be reformed and re-educated through the introduction of democracy and the inarket. 
Conclusion 
To sum up some of the features and consequences of the 'backwardness' and 'transition 
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communist and pre-communist past, and a 'deficient' present as embodied in the 
functioning of democratic and market related institutions; this articulation includes/relies 
on notions of cultural legacy or habits that 'explain' the shortcomings of the present. It 
implicitly or explicitly posits the West as the norm against which society, polity and 
economy are assessed, and as the model Eastern Europe needs to follow; it produces 
prescriptions and legitimises a set of practices, including positions and policies in relation 
to the post-communist 'reform'. 'Backwardness' is firmly articulated with deficiency and 
flaws by reference to Western standards embodied in institutions and societal 
arrangements. 
The communist period is generally considered a 'blip' in the history of Eastern 
European countries, therefore at the end of it these societies find themselves 'behind' the 
West, having lost decades of capitalist, democratic development. The Eastern European 
countries are placed somewhere in the past of the West - therefore legitimising the expert 
knowledge that various Western agencies (the EU, IMF, World Bank, NATO, individual 
Western governments, NGOs, consultancy firms, etc. ) claim over these countries, and the 
implicit task of bringing them into the 'present', which leaves them open to 
administration, monitoring and control by these agencies and their experts. Local actors 
are objects represented by the experts as an undifferentiated mass in need of various types 
of help (assistance) and reformation or social engineering. 
The backwardness and 'catching up' discourses are totalising modes of 
representation, which see knowledge and truth as objective and universal rather than 
power-and value-laden and subject to negotiation in the various sites of everyday life. 
They capture the nature of knowledge production on Eastern Europe, which is driven by 
assumptions of modemisation and progress (hence the emancipatory claims of many 
policies and strategies), convergence and integration in relation to a model which is an 
ideal-typical Western social, economic and political form of organisation. Eastern Europe 
is portrayed as caught in traditions and obsolete social practices, sometimes resisting 
ch ange and progress - the 'local' to be reformed by the 'global' (part of an inevitable 
process of global convergence towards liberal democracy and market economy, where 
the 'global' is equated with Western traits and practices). The backwardness discourse on 
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additional specific meanings by social agents. As Foucault puts it, the virtually limitless 
field of the archive can never be described in its entirety: any particular configuration of 
relations we decide to investigate is only one among many possible as any discursive 
formation enters simultaneously several fields of relations in which it occupies different 
places and functions (Foucault 2002). 
The backwardness discourse presented above is articulated slightly differently 
across theories in the social sciences or by the IMF and World Bank (which articulate it 
with a neo-liberal and globalising logic), or again by EU institutions (which integrate it in 
the strategies concerning the Eastern enlargement). Eastern Europe in the aftermath of the 
collapse of communism largely became a situation to be managed by Western agencies. It 
is difficult to separate between these actors and their projects, interests, actions and 
visions (as constructed in discourses), but the impact of these interventions to manage 
Eastern Europe must be acknowledged. At the intersection of economic theories of 
globalisation, discourses on the nature and role of the EU, the mission of the West in 
promoting and defending capitalism and democracy, on the one hand, and the 
backwardness discourse on Eastern Europe, on the other hand, the latter was created as a 
target for radical restructuring. 
Most importantly, societal production in Eastern Europe emerged through these 
efforts, combined with the local response. Locally, 'catching up with the West' and 
creturn to Europe' are the master-signifiers of the new social order - which make use of 
local (strategic) understandings of the West as a model of cultural, political and economic 
organisation. The meaning of being Western in the 'catching up' discourse is a rather 
vague one. As Laclau (1990,1993) put it, initially the mythical space does not need to 
have very detailed and specific traits, the form or project predominates over the content 
in the first phase of suturing the social. 
The initial discourse of 'catching up' was organised around a few nodal points - 
rather vague signifiers: 'freedom' as a move away from communismý Western-style 
capitalism, democracy (subsequently, more precise meanings will be invested in these 
signifiers). These signifiers had different weight according to the agents of the 
articulation: for some the economic aspect is primordial (the introduction of market 
relations will structure all other aspects of society accordingly), for others the social- 
ill 
political aspect, including 'local culture' (without a democratic polity, the market cannot 
function properly; vital for democracy is the existence of a strong civil society; the civil 
society has to be nurtured against persistent 'habits of the heart' or mentalities inherited 
from the past) - as illustrated in the work of Tanase (1996) and Plesu (2004). 
The 'catching up' discourse forms the ground on which articulations are 
performed in the attempt to hegemonise the social - the other aspect of social production 




PRODUCTION OF THE SOCIAL FROM BELOW: THE STRUGGLE OVER 
MEANING 
Introduction 
The previous chapter described a hegemonic articulation that structures the social in 
Romania by creating concepts and practices: 'catching up with the West' (or its variant 
(return to Europe') through adoption of democracy and capitalism is a strong discourse 
that sets itself up as a unifying societal project. Its endorsement and diffusion by a wide 
array of social agents, coupled with the implementation of policies designed to reform 
society derived from this discourse means that it has a strong impact on the production of 
the social in Romania. 
The nodal points of the 'catching up' discourse - free market and democracy - 
were the main concepts through which the social and social change were (and are still) 
thought and acted upon by the most powerful social agents; they were intensely diffused 
through the mass media - from TV news and innumerable talk-shows bringing together 
politicians, intellectuals, political analysts and financial experts - to daily newspapers. 
The grasp this articulation has on people's thoughts, conceptualisations and 
practices testifies its hegemonic status (it has managed to fix certain meanings in a 
relatively stable configuration). None of my respondents, friends or acquaintances 
seemed to envisage a societal trajectory outside the goal of 'rejoining the West' by the 
adoption of capitalism and democracy. The respondents were able to reflect on these 
transformations and sometimes to mount a powerful critique - while at the same time 
recognising that 'there is no other way'; this again is evidence to the power of the 
dominant discourse to marginalize, or make difficult other ways of imagining and 
thinking about the social - at least not in the form of coherent alternative projects. 
This chapter examines another level of production of the social, by ordinary 
people in the -sites of everyday life. This is a level where less formalised articulations A-I 
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compete to fix meanings. As mentioned in the previous chapter, social dislocation can be 
sutured initially by a discourse where the general form is more important than the specific 
content. To a certain extent, the main signifiers of the 'catching up with the West' are 
empty or vague signifiers, in the sense that the meanings of 'democracy', 'capitalism' or 
'free market' and even 'the West' are not fully fixed - these objects of discourse have a 
range of meanings. Social production is proceeding through struggles to fill the signifiers 
with more definite meanings and to produce finer grained hegemonic articulations, ones 
that can frame the understandings and actions of social actors across all the dimensions of 
their social existence. 
The identity of 'objects' that form the social emerges through these efforts of 
fixation and struggle, of defending a version as true and accurate and rejecting others. 
This chapter highlights the effort to invest the social with meaning through naming, 
describing, establishing similarities and differences, drawing boundaries between 
concepts and objects and placing them in systems of relations with other objects in order 
to fix their identity. 
Through their accounts people produce articulations; their nature is contextual and 
strategic. The data offers access to the process of fixation of the signifiers or elements in 
the field of the discursive through struggle; it is possible to detect across these accounts 
the repeated, stable use of certain meanings in certain configurations - which point to 
processes of articulation in relatively stable forms, i. e. discourses. What follows is an 
analysis of this process of struggle over meaning that is central to the production of the 
social; it expands on the way people integrate the issues and questions on the changed 
nature of the social with going concerns - and on the articulations that are performed and 
through which the identity of concepts and objects is created; for example, the market 
cannot be thought of separately from its role in stratification and poverty and ideas of 
fairness or social justice, of human nature, and the role of the state: all of which are 
articulated in various configurations in most interviews. 
The following analysis will draw on interview material; throughout these accounts 
three frames of reference tend to be employed by people in the process of making sense 
of social change and of filling with meaning the signifiers of the hegemonic discourse 
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(capitalism, freedom, democracy): the past, the Western world and 'place'(as concrete 
sites of everyday life). 
Representations of the present are produced in most interviews through a parallel 
with 'the past' (namely the period before December 1989). Respondents construct 
simultaneously past and present, and it is usually through this contrast that the features of 
social life, or changes, are appraised. Perceptions of the present situation serve to 
reinterpret the past, and at the same time images of the past are the background against 
which the present is assessed in a process of double construction. Accounts of the past are 
strategic constructions, in the sense that they bring into focus the perceived problems and 
changes of today's society. "To confer new meanings onto the past is not necessarily to 
falsify it, but only to situate it within a broader interpretive scheme, one that may have 
been unavailable at the time of experience" (Freeman 200 1, p29 1). This is why images of 
the past would probably have had a different shape in the very early 1990s (characterised 
by a violent rejection of communism and fresh memories of the 'suffering' endured, 
combined with a wave of enthusiasm and naYve optimism concerning the future), 
compared to the mid-1990s (where a rude awakening followed) and the period of the 
fieldwork (2002-2003). From the vantage point of the here and now certain facts and 
events of the past are selected and invested with meaning. They help the 
conceptualisation of the present. 
Comparison with the past is used as a rhetorical technique differently by different 
age groups. It can be present throughput the interview as the main structuring theme of 
the account, or it can be mentioned in relation to punctual topics. For the respondents 
over 35 years old (that were over 22 years old in 1989, the year communism collapsed) a 
significant part - if not most of their lives has been spent under the old regime; therefore 
images of the past are often brought into the conversation as a method of accounting for 
the present. For those belonging to the generation over 50 years old at the time of the 
inter-views, 'the past' tended to be a constant background presence in their accounts, 
sometimes explicit, other times implicit. 'The way things used to be' is a rhetorical 
device that highlights features of the present. A less conspicuous way of bringing in the 
past is by constructions of the type 'better' or 'worse' without explicitly specifying the 
reference frame for tbis assessment, which in fact is the past, a-, revealed by clarifying 
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questions. What is more surprising is the fact that the younger generation tends to use 
images of the past as well when explaining the present. The fact that young respondents 
who were 12 - 14 years old at the time when the c ommunist era ended use representations 
of the past indicates that they are using representations of the past existing within their 
environment, produced mainly by family, friends and neighbours. 
'The past' is split by most accounts into distinct periods under the communist 
regime: an early period (1950s to mid-1960s) characterised by active political repression, 
nationalisation of assets and persecutions; a middle period (late 1960s till late 1970s) 
when political relaxation followed and a satisfactory standard of life was achieved for 
many; and a late period (the 1980s) of progressive worsening, and severe shortages, from 
foodstuffs to electricity. The respondents tend to access one of these different 'periods' in 
order to discuss the present in a strategic, situated manner. People live very much in the 
present, which is a very demanding one, as they need to struggle and face daily reality, to 
plan and be informed about possibilities and fast changes, etc. Nevertheless, most of them 
cannot think about the present without the framework of the past - which is joined 
frequently by another framework - the West. Both explicitly and implicitly, the West as a 
normative point of reference appears in people's accounts, from discussions of what 
being 'civilised' means, to lifestyle and consumption issues and functioning of the free 
market. 
The third frame of reference that accompanies people's accounts is represented by 
the sites of everyday experience: reflection on social change has a marked 'emplaced' 
nature. Discussions of new forms of poverty for example are always illustrated by 
concrete situations in one's neighbourhood - so are cases of rapid material improvement; 
the new work ethic of the present is exemplified through one's work colleagues. The 
place of residence and the workplace are privileged 'places' that anchor experience and 
provide the 'material' for social learning and reflection. 
This chapter follows the ways the main signifiers of social change - as articulated 
in the discourse of 'catching up with the West' by implementing democracy and the free 
market (and a new 'culture' or habits) - are filled with meaning in everyday situations. 
The meaning of democracv 
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Most interviewees produced understandings of democracy divergent from the one found 
in the media, intellectual and political speech (presented in the previous chapter). The 
latter lays a heavy accent on the necessity to revive or rather create a thriving civil society 
as a precondition for a functioning democracy (as well as for the functioning of state 
institutions) - which involves promoting voluntary organisations and all forms of 
association. These representations draw heavily on dominant understandings of 
communism as lack of freedom (political and some civic freedoms) and on the images of 
an atomised society poorly equipped to sustain a strong democracy - the word 'fragile' 
often appears in descriptions of the local situation, both by western experts and by local 
actors. 
Some respondents acknowledge the existence of formal democracy in Romania, 
We have our democracy, plenty of political parties ... (DTIO, f45)1 
Parties, parliament, this is democracy. (DT14, m38) 
Democracy is being civilised, you cannot be a civilised country without 
democracy... if look around, you'll see - the greatest countries have democracies. 
(C4, f65) 
They posit democracy as a normal state of affairs, an appropriate or 'civillsed' form of 
political organisation. The meaning of democracy is fixed as a valuable, desirable feature, 
associated with a 'civilised' society, to be more precise, with the West. 
At the same time, issues that deepen the meaning of 'democracy' are raised; one 
of the main alternative meanings that infiltrate this signifier is corruption (of those in 
positions of power, and transmitted down to 'the last cog in the system', the lowest 
ranking civil servants). The functioning of the political system and negative perceptions 
of politicians and state officials become the ground on which the previous meaning of 
democracy as 'good' is antagonised. 
They all steal, they're in power to get rich. (T4, m34) 
I As described in chapter 4, respondents are identified by the area of residence (in this case Drumul 
Taberei) and a number witýin that area 00 QI! Owgd b'%, O'ender (female) and age Q15 
old). 
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Democracy? Ha ha. It's all about them filling their bellies, what democracy? 
(T 10, f48) 
Democracy in this country is a joke. We vote, so what? We vote the same corrupt 
people that, no matter what party they come from, want nothing but get rich, use 
their position to get government contracts for their private companies, everyone 
knows that. (DT13, f64) 
In this country, being a politician is the surest way to material success: they all 
have businesses, and they use our resources, our money, in their private business. 
Look what happened with banks: they never had to reimburse the loans, and they 
knew it from beginning. While the rest of us, we didn't have the courage to ask 
for loans - they wouldn't have given one to ordinary people anyway. (T 14, m66) 
The way I see it, no matter whom we vote, they have their hands tied: they have 
to do the IMF policies and that's that. (DT22, m3 1) 
The decisions in this country are not in the hands of the ones we vote for. They're 
just some idiots trying to get rich while Europe makes the law. They're 
incompetent even at following it. (C12, m28) 
The quotes above are characteristic of frequent articulations of democracy with 
corruption and incompetence of the political class. Also, the importance of the formal 
procedures that democracy is based on becomes more problematic when the politicians 
elected through these procedures are not actually exercising that much control over the 
governing process (as many respondents put it), therefore raising issues of sovereignty 
and legitimacy, and contesting the importance of formal rules as democracy when 
important decisions are taken elsewhere. 
To sum up, democracy is often articulated with the Romanian political actuality 
(rather than formal meanings as expressed in political arrangements), and in this context 
it becomes associated with corruption, incompetence and heteronomy (external rule). 
Despite some comments of the type 
I don't know, I don't believe they are all crooks. Some are genuinely trying hard 
to do something for this country, to get us out of this situation. But it is not easy, 
you can't see results immediately. I bet there are some good people there, it can't 
be all bad... (DT7, f39)5 
the interviews contour a general lack of respect towards politicians; political and top state 
positions are seen as a platform towards getting rich through connections. These insights 
are corroborated by a weatin of studies in Eastern hurope and Romania ýStoica 2004) that 
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point to the phenomenon of siphoning off state resources by individuals in high state 
positions (resources invested in their private finns). The issue of corruption, well 
documented in the literature on Eastern Europe (e. g. Karklins 2002, Grodeland et al 
1998), is one of the most prominent concerns of ordinary people, recurrently appearing in 
inter-views. 
It is not only the top echelons of the political class that are targeted by people's 
criticism. The local authorities (Bucharest's six sector mayors and their team) are 
generally judged in a way that brings together notions of functioning of democracy that 
include responsibility towards the electorate, accountability and efficiency (or falfilment 
of electoral promises). 
What has the local mayor done? I've sent them letters about the issue of parking 
spaces, about the need to do something with the fallen trees on my street, all sorts. 
No reply, they didn't do anything. Well, in Holland, where my son lives, all these 
things are taken care of by the local authorities. Tell me, why do I pay these 
taxes? (T19, f46) 
I've petitioned the local mayor, because of the lighting in the street: it's too dark, 
and you stand a greater chance to be mugged or raped. They did it the following 
week - because it's a street where big names live. (C6, f52) 
I've only asked for some of the metal fences they discarded after the 
refurbishment of the school, to use it around the block, why waste it? They didn't 
reply, so I just went to the local authorities, got an audience and asked them again. 
They said that if we take them ourselves before they are sent at the scrap yard, 
that's fine, but they can't send a team. So I did it - with a neighbour. (T 15, f64) 
No, of course I'm not happy with it [the children's derelict playground], but I 
never thought about sending petitions. I mean, to whom? They don't care... 
(DT 10, f5 1) 
The political class emerges as interested in their own private businesses and attempts to 
get richer, rather than serving the interests of the population. Is the political class useless 
or genuinely trying to get the country out of poverty under very stressful conditions? The 
general response to this question that respondents raise veers towards the incompetence, 
venality and self-interest of political actors and the ones who govern the country, which 
leads to a genuine questioning of the benefits or desirability of 'democracy' - at least in 
the form it has taken in Romania. 
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I don't see any difference. They say Ceausescu was a criminal because he starved 
us while he was basking in all sorts of goods and nice things. What about our 
distinguished governing class? The country is poor, people really starve, not like 
before, and they are shamelessly exposing their cars, houses, properties, holidays 
abroad, mistresses... (TIO, f48 ) 
Politicians get rich, that's democracy, this is the society we live in. (DT 10, f5 1) 
Changing forms of solidarity are highlighted as respondents voice their concerns 
regarding aspects of social change. From this perspective, democracy as political 
pluralism also means people that were previously part of the same group, are now in 
opposing political parties; rivalries around political convictions has dissolved the old us- 
them lines of solidarity, and has pulled old friends apart. 
No, we're not good friends anymore. He's a social-democrat. (C 11, m60) 
He's gone completely nuts after 1989. He's with Vadim 211 mean, how can he 
debase himself like that, hanging out with the lowest... (P3, m40) 
A new line of division in the place of the old 'us' (the population) and 'them' (the 
communist top cadres) becomes relevant in Romanian society: the one between ordinary 
people versus corrupt politicians and state functionaries. 
Just look at them, how full of themselves they are. Their fat ugly faces are full of 
satisfaction for how well they've done and of contempt for us... (DT 12, m26) 
They are all part of the same game, whether they are with the government or the 
opposition. You'd think they are in competing political parties, but actually they 
are all on the same luxury boat, while we're at shore. They just pretend to play the 
game, the only thing that matters is to be close to the power, irrespective of what 
party you're into. (C17, f58) 
In conclusion, the articulation of democracy with a political class seen as corrupt 
and disinterested in working 'for the people' destabilises the 'positive' meanings of 
democracy as a 'civilised', normal feature, as the best way to govern. The disquieting 
remark 'it's not different from before' throws doubts on the advantages of adopting 
'democracy' from the perspective of the poor and disempowered. 
MeaninLys of freedom 
Vadim Tudor IStheleadeTof a fiercely nationalist party, similar to the British National Party 
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'Freedom' was the word that exploded in December 1989 - 'we are free now' was the 
leitmotif of those days and months. Freedom had both the meaning of 'free from this 
specific dictatorship', free from constraints and laws of the past, free from oppressive 
political systems and practices, and a more general understanding as the societal 
condition under democracy and capitalism. 
Freedom and democracy were strongly associated at the beginnings of the 1990s, 
but soon 'freedom' became the site of divergent meanings. In the political-intellectual 
discourse, freedom was understood as being able to choose one's rulers, from an array of 
political options crystallised into political parties with different platforms and positions. It 
also meant the ability to openly express opinions, and to criticise - free speech, together 
with an independent mass-media sector (civil and political rights). Ideas of freedom 
encompassed a re-positioning of the state in relation to society, less intervention and 
subsidising compared to the communist arrangements, and transfer of responsibilities 
towards the civil society - freedom from a paternalistic state. As under the communist 
society there was little distinction between the Party and the state, freedom from the grip 
of the communist party became extended in a chain of equivalence to freedom from the 
state more generally (separation of state from civil society). 
For ordinary people, democracy and freedom were also associated, albeit in rather 
different forms: 
Democracy means I'm free to do what I want! (T 17, m29) 
People think that because it's democracy, they are free to get drunk and shout if 
they want to. (C2, f6 1) 
In a more general understanding, freedom has connotations like 'free to do things that I 
could not do before', which covers a very wide range of social activities. 
Do I feel free? Freer? Ummm, yes. There are things I can do now... I've 
refurbished the whole house, painted it -I found original photos of the 
neighbourhood in the archives and restored the colour and everything. I couldn't 
have done this before... (C16, f57) 
Oh, yes, we are freer, of course. We can travel, almost everyone has been abroad. 
mean, among my friends. And... well, things that I can do in my spare time... 
(C6, f52) 
121 
But also the limits of this freedom are clearly drawn out: one is not free to do whatever 
one wishes. The new social order came with its restrictions and impositions, some 
coming from the functioning of the market - for example declining life standards 
imposed restrictions on what one was really able to do in this new environment in terms 
of consumption, leisure, socialising even, as all the above involve spending money. 
I'm free to what? To starve? Freedom for what? Do I need this freedom? (DT4, 
A 2) 
They can take their freedom and shove it ... it's poverty I care about, not freedom. (T 1, f5 6) 
We're all sinking into poverty, the state doesn't give a damn, but we're free 
(ironic tone) (T 13, f62) 
They all say we're free now from all the horrible things we went through during 
Ceausescu. But with all this freedom... I cannot go to holidays anymore, or even 
go for beers like we were doing. What was so horrible about that, tell me? (T 10, 
A 8) 
Freedom took on a huge variety of meanings, including resistance to the dominant 
understanding as a valued ideal, something individuals and society should strive for: 
freedom in itself is not desirable if accompanied by poverty or destitution; the articulation 
of freedom with poverty under conditions of the free market and retreat of the state in 
providing safety nets is dislocating the supposedly positive meanings of the concept. 
Meanings of 'freedom' also take shape through reflections on one's relationships 
with the others, especially when living side by side is involved: 
Now they beat their carpets at any time of the day, as opposed to the conventions 
we had before, when you could do it only between certain hours. Because 'they're 
free', you see? This freedom made people inconsiderate, you can not go to them 
and ask them politely to keep the noise down, because you risk to get a rude reply 
like 'I'm free to do whatever I want, lady, if you don't like it, go somewhere else, 
because IT do whatever I please'. (P5, SO) 
Ah, the music, it drives me mad, they play it loud late and I have to go to bed 
early because of my job, and I can't do anything about it... 
Int: Have you tried talking to them about it? 
What talking? They're free to do whatever they like in their flat, that's what 
they'll say. What they don't see is that the walls are so thin, so it really affects me. 
(T5, B 1) 
122 
Yes, I had some ... trouble with the neighbours. They're old and odd, they are not happy with me having people over for barbeques. They're envious probably, you know, old people... they did complain to my parents: T is making noise in the back garden with his friends... '. Well, that's their problem. It's my back garden, 
so.. - I'm free to use it as I want, I don't see why it concerns them. (C3, m27) 
The quotes above reflect an aspect of freedom as lack of respect and consideration 
towards others, as well as freedom from previous social conventions, from certain social 
norms, from forms of social control. Freedom as freedom from previous conventions and 
compromises engendered by living together can be seen as a move away from the 
communist past, when community came before individual freedom and compromise 
within communal arrangements was a widespread societal feature (from the workplace 
and activities organised through it, like outings and holidays, to living arrangements and 
to participation in the formal structures of the party, school and workplace-based 
organisations). 
Some respondents actively distanced themselves from the communist networks of 
relations and practices, from their normative underpinnings, from the social control 
element in the gaze of the co-workers, party cadres, neighbours, etc. 
Yes, I would say we're definitely freer now. I mean, we're not entangled in all 
that mutual ... doing things together, in the same way - and if you didn't do it as 
everyone else, someone would tell on you. (C 13, M) 
Understandings of freedom delimit a 'private sphere' and curtail the rights of the others 
to interfere in it; usually the other signifier that helps articulating the meaning of this 
private sphere is private property: as long as one is within the confines of one's flat, 
house or garden, any behaviour is acceptable and intervention in the name of other norms 
rejected (despite the fact that most spaces are actually interconnected, not perfectly 
sealed, meaning one's acts will resonate beyond this sphere and affect others). These 
representations have important implications on ideas of commonality and practices of 
sharing, as the case-studies in contrasting neighbourhoods (chapters 9 and 10) will show. 
There is a further element of freedom that stands out in relation to the past: 
freedom from responsibilities towards the others. 
Well, I don't care about X. If they cannot pay their share of the bills, it's not my 
problem, is it. I'm free, I don't have to care about everyone. (T17, m29) 
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This element is part of an individualistic stance that many respondents embrace: being 
free means not having to care for others, freedom from solidarities. 
One of the most important meanings of freedom revolves around choice allowed 
by the market. 
I can choose what I want to buy (DT9, f25) 
is a statement that was repeated in slightly different forms by many respondents. The 
issue of freedom of choice allowed by the market will be explored in the section below. 
Freedom tends to be constructed as the opposite of homogeneity; being 'different' is a 
trait through which some respondents valorise the present free market arrangements in 
contrast to the homogeneity of the past: 
Well, the shops had just a few items, we used to have the same things, clothes and 
all, you know... you could barely choose how to look, you had to go through lots 
of trouble to find things that were a bit different, so that you wouldn't look like 
everyone else around you. It was annoying to see the same coat on four people in 
the office, this homogeneity. Some people tried hard to be a bit different, some 
accessories, or redoing the clothes a bit, if they had the skills. Well, now the shops 
are full, you just need the money. (C 14, f63) 
Another facet of freedom though appears in its articulation with lack of social 
control and order, chaotic societal organisation (anomie), and also unbridled human 
wickedness. 
All this freedom means that no one does what they are supposed to, there is total 
chaos and disorganisation, no one obeys rules 'because they're free now', you 
see... (P 1, m29) 
Freedom went to the people's heads: look at how violent and evil they are. (DT 10, 
f5 1) 
The quotes presented here resonate with the classical debate in social thought around the 
meaning of liberty, as both lack of interference, usually from state agencies, and as 
regulation on the part of the government through laws and programmes aimed at 
enforcing freedoms - or negative and positive freedoms 
(e. g. Berlin's Two concepts of 
liberty). Freedom is profoundly entwined with governing: "freedom has been an objective 
of government, freedom has inspired the invention of a variety of technologies 
for 
governing" (Rose 1999, p67); at the same time, freedom has been conceptualised as 
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opposition to state planning and projects of social improvement and social reform (Rose 
1999, p64). 
In this light, the ambiguous embracing of freedom by some of the respondents, 
when articulated with social disorganisation and crime, points to the problems of the 
governing structures in defending positive freedoms that social thinkers have identified. 
In a move that reminds one of Marshall's (1992) ideas of citizenship, respondents posit 
the necessity of a modicum (which the state should provide through welfare programmes) 
in order to be free: this would enable them to lead a decent life (including being able to 
buy things apart from subsistence items like food, and to socialise with friends) and 
would give the notion of 'political rights' more credibility. 
"But if we look at all those nations of the former Soviet bloc that are attempting to 
turn themselves into societies of freedom, we can perhaps begin to gauge 
something of the space between freedom as an ideal, as articulated in struggles 
against particular regimes of power, and freedom as a mode of organising and 
regulation: freedom here as a certain way of administering a population that 
depends upon the capacities of free individuals" (Rose 1999, p64). 
In conclusion, the multiple and contrasting meanings of freedom gain shape 
through the ways social actors place the concept in relations with other issues - through 
processes of articulation: in some versions it is problematic because articulated with other 
social arrangements that engender poverty (like the free market and collapse of welfare 
programmes), or with societal disorganisation and proliferation of crime, or with more 
conflict, lack of respect in interpersonal relationships. In other accounts its status as a 
6natural', 'good' thing emerges in articulation with private property, private sphere, 
human nature and less compromising, less 'forced' social relations (more choice in 
deciding the terms and the content of the interaction as opposed to past networks of 
dependencies) - an effect of free market relations. The market 
both enhances freedom 
(choices, opportunities) and limits it (everything has to be acquired through money, 
therefore lack of money is severely limiting opportunities). 
The interviews also highlight the notion that freedom is not a valuable thing in 
itself, in the absence of a decent standard of living or within a society where the agencies 
of the state have problems in reinforcing the law and more generally in governing 
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efficiently. Freedom has no positive meaning to many of those affected by poverty. For 
these people affected by poverty for example, freedom is not some ideal beyond 
contestation - while many social science texts work with an implicit notion of freedom as 
an indisputable good, beyond questioning. 
Meanings of capitalism: free market, private property, work, meritocracy, 
competition and 'culture' or habits 
The media and public discourse are replete with a new vocabulary associated with the 
establishment of a new socio-econorm c order: terms like privatisation, competition, 
economic output, productivity, efficiency are constantly in use, from economic analysts 
to news presenters. One of the nodal points of the discourse of economic reform is private 
property as the pillar of capitalist relations. Private property as natural, good, and/or 
appropriate appeared as one of the most prominent articulations throughout the 
interviews. 
One needs to have one's own things: a house, or flat, at least. Your little plot of 
land (in the countryside), if that's possible. (DT4, f42) 
It's like that: humans need to own their property. It's the thing communists didn't 
understand. (DTI, m64) 
See, what the communists tried to do was against human nature. You cannot take 
one5s property away like that, and give them in exchange 'state property-our 
property' - how did the slogan go? People want their 
house and things... (C2, 
f6 1) 
Ideas of human nature abound in articulation with property: private ownership appears as 
the natural instinct or human feature that was denied throughout the communist era, when 
6 unnatural' arrangements of collective or state ownership predominated. There are almost 
no voices that question the importance or necessity of personal private property - the 
meaning of the signifier seems to be rather clear-cut in people's accounts as a good and 
desirable, something worth striving for. This translates into everyday concerns with 
owning something, especially flats and land; life strategies and efforts are coordinated 
by 
the desire to 'own', as previous obstructions to forrns of ownership have been removed. 
The dominant mode oi representation oi private property is -return to non-naiity', 
'as 
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things should be' and the communist limitations of private ownership are presented in 
contrast as aberrations and gross abuse or violation of 'natural needs'. 
However, private property acquires a knotty dimension when framed as 
'privatisation' of industrial assets and state companies. Personal private property in the 
form of flats and land is an unproblematic good, while privatisation of economic 
activities is not. 
Accounts of the type 
We must dismantle the inefficient economic units, that's the only way forward. 
Just that some don't want to accept it. (P4, m30) 
You need to privatise, I suppose, because you cannot have an economy without 
private firms and companies, so the investors will never come unless there is 
privatisation. (T7, m34) 
altemate with: 
My neighbour is 'privatised', he has this stall in the market, selling biscuits. You 
know what he does? He buys them cheaper from those warehouses that sell in 
bulk and puts the price up in the market. What the hell is that? What is he doing? 
He's not producing anything, just moving things around. That's all the privatised 
ones do, they are not producing anything. What is that? Is this right? I don't 
know. I don't think so. Is this capitalism? It's easy to buy and sell the same stuff, 
but as long as you don't produce anything... (T9, f55) 
Since they've privatised the company, everything went downwards. They didn't 
invest anything, just used the old equipment and made as much money as possible 
with no investment. Of course things are breaking down and all... they'll go 
bankrupt soon, that's for sure. They bought a decent company that had contracts 
with the West and all, it worked fine for so many years before, but they destroyed 
it in a few years, out of greed. (T 14, m66) 
They think if they privatise the factory, things will be better. I know who will get 
it, the bidding was faked, the buyer was decided beforehand, but they needed to 
respect the law so they dragged in a couple of phantom firms... anyway, the new 
owner buys it for next to nothing, he will sack most of the employees, then will 
try to get the most out of it before declaring bankruptcy, but by then he would 
have made a hefty profit without investing anything. And this is what is 
happening all over the country. In a few years we'll be completely ruined and 
with no productive capacities - because of the 'privatisation'. J3, m34) 
Privatisation appears in many interviews as foolish dismantling of factories and 
other production units, ridden with corruption, lack of respect towards the work of 
127 
generations that have built and used them, squandering of resources that could have been 
used otherwise. The well known debate of the 1990s 'Should we privatise massive but 
inefficient plants for one dollar? ' has divided the population. Opinions were split between 
'Yes' (and be grateful foreigners will take the problematic industrial plant off our hands 
and deal with it in a truly capitalist spirit and make it profitable or just do whatever is best 
with it, as they have the necessary experience and knowledge) and 'No' (we are being 
fooled by foreign interests, with a bit of effort these plants can be turned into something 
profitable - or at least, if they get privatised, they should go to Romanians: we shouldn't 
sell our country away). The slogan 'we're not selling our country away' was a powerful 
one in the 1990s and clashed with the view that the only way out of nation-level poverty 
is to sell. In the latter vision, the fact that foreigners will own an important part of the 
firms, factories, companies - from manufacture and industrial production to services - 
should not be a problem, it will just make us more 'Western'. 
See , if a German buys the company, what's the problem? They will introduce 
more... German methods and rules, and educate the workers... they have to learn. 
(C2, f6 1) 
We cannot keep on subsidising the mammoths. It's a drain, someone should make 
them efficient, they are not efficient now. (DT22, m3 1) 
If someone buys it, or invests in it, it should rather be a foreigner, because they 
have the money - who in Romania has this amount of nioney? And they can make 
it work, because they would have a company or something in their country that... 
they know how to ... well, invest and sell and all that. (DT26,04) 
Within the majority of interviewees' accounts, participating in the capitalist game 
means supporting efficiency and accepting the Western competence as well. Efficiency is 
a higher order consideration compared to national ownership. But the articulation of 
efficiency with private enterprise as opposed to state-owned economic units is often 
resisted by pointing to the flaws of the private running of a business in contemporary 
Romania. 
Respondents engage frequently with another of the most important signifiers of 
the specialist discourse on the market apart from efficiency, namely 'competition'. The 
issue of competition is not so much addressed in the general terms of economic 
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competition as a principle of the free market, but rather in terms of everyday life 
experiences, especially linked to employment. 
What has really changed is the way you need to really fight for jobs. (DT24,0 1) 
Lots of people, not so many jobs, so ... yes, 
it's a competition. (DT7,09) 
I do feel we compete all the time. Sometimes I think twice before I tell my friends 
about the jobs I'm applying for, because you never know... I mean, I never tell 
them exactly what I have in mind, they might then want to go for the same [job]. 
(DT27, m32) 
The image of scarce resources is often invoked in relation to competition, forging the 
powerful metaphor of survival in a hostile environment through ruthless competition. 
It's like aj ungl e, teeth and claws... (T4, f43) 
In the jungle we live in, one has to fight. (DT6, m28) 
The law of the jungle, that's what it is. (C7, m64) 
This construction invites reflection on the appropriate behaviour in a 'jungle'-type of 
society: what is the successful strategy for this type of competition, where lack of success 
in securing a reasonably paid job can mean 'ending up in the street'. 
You cannot waste energy on the others, they have to do their own thing. (C 12, 
m28) 
The priorities are one's family and... that's it. The family. J 18, f27) 
You can be polite and show some human decency, but most people feel they 
cannot afford that, it's everyone for himself. (DT20, B 1) 
Nobody cares about nobody, I can drop dead in the street or be sick, and people 
wouldn't stop.... This wouldn't have happened before, but people have changed, 
they care just for themselves and do not look around. At all. (DT 13, f64) 
There is a strong articulation of competition with individualism and less solidarity in 
social relations that is a constant feature in the interview material. 
One of the most important articulations of the free market involves the concept of 
choice - across a range of fields (from consumption opportunities 
to the job market), as 
exemplified by the quotes below. 
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It has made a difference [the introduction of the free market] in the sense of what 
you can find in the shops: you can find everything now, food, products, it's there. 
Yes, in a way its nice to choose what you think suits you or the house... (DT5, 
06) 
I can buy things that express my individuality, not something that everyone else has. There are tons of things to choose from. And the little things that matter: I 
want my cereals with berries, not bananas. So I buy the berries. That's my taste... 
(C6, f52) 
Now you can choose a job, move a bit around, try things. In the past you were 
allocated a position and you'd retire in the same position, no-one changed jobs or 
even workplaces. (C16, f57) 
On the same topic, antagonistic articulations are formulated: 
Well, yes, shops are full - of crap, by the way, but people are too stupid to tell, 
they don't even read the ingredients - so what? How many of us can afford to 
choose? You just go for the cheapest, always. (DT 12, B 6) 
You don't choose jobs, you get what they throw at you. I have a MA and couldn't 
find anything decent. I'm a PA. The only thing I could find. It requires the 
competence of a 12 year old... and a good figure. (T6, DO) 
The free market has reshuffled the meaning of work, occupations and professional 
careers. 
You know how they were saying under communism: we pretend we're working 
and they pretend they're paying us. You cannot do that now, I mean if you work 
for private companies, you really have to work. I don't know what they do in state 
jobs, probably continue to waste time. (C15,03) 
People were taken aback by the changes, because now they have to work for 
good, that's why. And they can't get their heads around it. It's about hard work. 
(T20, m35) 
With those lazy workers we'll never get in Europe, they need to learn how to 
work hard, not continue to steal and waste time. (C7, m64) 
The quotes above reflect the crystallising of an understanding of work under capitalism 
as opposed to under communism that is c haracteristically embraced by younger, educated 
professionals and the ones working in the private sector. It also resonates with much of 
the literature on work and workers under communism, which typically insists on the 
laziness and lack of work ethics among workers. 
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But at the same time, there are voices contesting the association of capitalism with 
hard, efficient work, and of communism with waste, chaos and bad quality work. 
I know so many people working for the private [firrns] and they all complain 
about how much they have to work, but if you're close friends they're going to 
admit, maybe... how much time they waste, playing computer games and 
emailing and making coffees. (DT26,04) 
You know what my colleagues do? We all compete to show how serious and 
committed we are and stay late, I'm sick of this game, because I have a life, friends, and all this staying late is stupid, I mean there is no work, we just stay in 
the office pretending. There is this guy, he's single and the rising star of the 
department, a creepy character, he stays everyday till I Opm at least. Checking out 
porn sites. But all the boss sees is a guy that comes in at 8am and leaves at I Opm. 
He has a reputation already. Hard working, I mean. Even the porter commented 
on that. (DT 11, f24) 
Some respondents point to the lack of efficiency and waste that work under the new 
'capitalist' conditions allows, especially office-based types of employment, as in the 
quotes above. In parallel to these comments, other respondents question the very purpose 
of jobs and of work that is not directed at production of tangible products - and which 
represent a major part of activities within capitalism. 
These people in offices, what work do they do now? I mean, what do they 
produce? They spend hours on the telephone. I've worked hard for over 30 years 
in the factory, lenses and such glass equipment. What work is done now? All I see 
is smartly dressed young people with the mobile glued to their heads pretending 
it's important. If that is work, then what was what I did all my life? How would 
you call it? (TI, f56) 
Look, after all, this country managed to produce and export things under 
communism, we were sending tractors and equipment all over the world. We were 
producing quality equipment, with those old tools and machines and everything. 
Now nothing functions any more, all sold, dismantled. We're producing crisps. 
What a waste. (T14, m66) 
As throughout Eastern Europe, occupational prestige was radically altered by the 
transition to market economy and the advent of a private sector. On the one hand, jobs in 
the private sector tend to rank higher in assessments of desirability and prestige. On the 
other, certain positions within the state sector are still seen as preferable to any private 
job, as long as they offer stability, a good wage and sometimes access to other resources. 
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If you want a good job and a good wage, you must get a job with some private 
company, otherwise you'll starve. (T5,0 1) 
Working for the state is tough, because you can work 12 hours a day and the wage 
will still be not enough to make ends meet. Look at professors, and school 
teachers and all sorts of functionaries. (DT3, f76) 
... the neighbours on both sides are quite well placed, respectable, solid people. They all work for some foreign companies, they are well off, look at the cars and 
all. (C15,03) 
Jobs in the private sector come and go, I mean they can close the factory the 
moment they think it's not that profitable and make everyone redundant. It's more 
difficult to get fired from a state job. (DT7,09) 
It's not so bad where I work, it's not as much money as in the private sector, but 
it's less stuck up and quite decent. I think the atmosphere at work is better than 
where I've worked previously (for a private firm) - and actually where I was I didn't make that much money... (DT16, f25) 
As for setting up one's own business, the interviews made visible divergent evaluations 
associated with this choice. 
Set up a business? Thought about it, but I'm not sure, you need backup, you need 
connections, otherwise you can lose everything. It's a very tricky environment, 
the law changes all the time, so you cannot count on anything, unless you have 
someone well placed to tell you when and how the law is changing. The 
successful ones have information that doesn't reach us, mortals. (DT17, m26) 
I have my own dental practice, I've had financial help and my own savings, but 
I'm very happy with it. It's small, but we work well... took lots of effort, we're 
working longer shifts... yes, financially is going well, cannot complain. (DT25, 
0 5) 
I've really lost everything, not everything, but... the lifestyle is gone, the car, the 
rest... because I quit my old job and thought I had a really great business plan. I 
had the money, and a partner -a relative. A company supplying gas. In one year 
it became clear that we didn't know enough about things... we were put out of 
business by the local politician, he has as well a gas distribution company. I knew 
about it, but didn't know it was his, so I thought... we have better deals and will 
push them out... I mean, the company is not in his name, someone, a cousin, is in 
the papers. Didn't know... (DT29, m33) 
The suspicions around the possibility of becoming an entrepreneur without bribing and 
'being connected' are clearly spelled out, together with the issue of corruption and the 
132 
dubious combining of official positions and business. While some defend the possibility 
of setting up a business and becoming successful through honest work (rather than 
bribing and well-placed contacts), the dominant opinion is that one should have a 'strong 
backing' (connections) before taking this path. 
The free market is articulated with meritocracy and 'just' distribution of rewards: 
jobs reflect social success. One has to use skills to survive and make it under the rules of 
the free market. Hard work will be rewarded, and the undeserving will sink. These 
representations around the free market are antagonised by voices that express doubts 
about the meritocratic principles embodied by the free market, which only reinforces 
previous advantages, is random and ultimately unfair. Honest work is not sufficient to 
keep one afloat. 
The most prominent meaning of the market is related to material conditions and 
their impact on standards of life (consumption). It reflects the importance of this issue for 
daily life and concerns for the future, and the magnitude of the change the new social 
order has brought about in this respect. One of the first criteria/basis for assessing one's 
general situation and for grasping the surrounding social reality is through the lens of the 
material criterion. People assess their material situation in financial terms (sources of 
income and ability to cope with expenses), material possessions and consumption 
patterns. 
The present, as constructed by comparison with the past, is one of increased or 
declining standards. The main yardstick for assessing the material situation is income 
(wage and other sources). How to make money or secure earnings seems to be the main 
concern of daily life for most people. Money has acquired a different meaning in the 
post- 1989 Romanian society. Firstly, it has 'real' value because one's material well-being 
'really' depends on it, as opposed to the past, when money was not of much use - under 
conditions of scarcity where products were obtained through 'blat' rather than direct 
purchases (see chapter 1). Money now matters for securing social status. 
'Money can buy you anything here', 'everything revolves around money' are 
leitmotifs of today's Romania. All individual efforts seem to converge towards getting 
more money. 
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People are obsessed with money. Everything is about money, about how much 
money you make. (DT8, m 19) 
I feel people look at me and assess me by how much I earn -I feel I have it 
written across my forehead. (T8, m30) 
Throughout my interviews remarks converged around the fact that everything 
seems to be appraised through its value in money, everything can be bought, everything 
is a commodity. All respondents agreed on the fact that the symbolic and concrete 
meaning of money has changed, and that 'money' is the single most important factor 
influencing the quality of life in contemporary Romania. 
Material possessions and consumption 
The changing meanings of material possessions and the importance of consumption in 
relation to social status are at the centre on many interviewees' concerns. This section 
looks at how these signifiers are interwoven in assessments of social change and of 
respondents' situation, and how in the process they take on meanings by being articulated 
with other conceptualisations. 
One of the most important material possessions for a person or family is the house 
or flat they own; they are correlated with quality of life and reflects one's material 
situation. Residential trajectories bring together in comparison the past and the present 
and serve to map out this particular dimension of one's material condition. 
I'm building a house in the suburbs. I'm sick and tired of this block of flats I've 
lived in for almost 30 years. I'm finally in a position of getting something I really 
want -a decent house. It's going to be made after my specifications, I have 
planned everything in detail... (P3, m40) 
I cannot afford my own flat, obviously, I'm on a 'normal' wage. I live with my 
parents and for the moment it's ok, but if I get married... I don't know, it's going 
to be difficult, all of us in a cramped flat. My parents had it allocated in the 70s I 
think, when I was born or something. I don't have their luck... (P 1, m2 9) 
Apart from the house or flat, other material possessions are brought into discussion as 
evidence for the material situation people live in today. The past is variously pictured in 
this respect. For some, it is a period of relative comfort, when cars, furniture, house 
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ap liances were affordable when there was also the possibility of buying them in r-P 
instalments, and wages allowed for making savings for these major items, 'the ones that 
really count'; the acquisitions of the past are valorised by comparison with the difficulty 
to obtain the same items today (when the credit system is excluding the ones that need it 
most - people with low incomes). From this position the present for many is 
characterised by the impossibility to acquire what is deemed to be 'important items' - 
because of their prohibitive prices. This engenders in many respondents a feeling of 
frustration: 
I went to the shop when my washing machine broke down, it was an old one... 
and realised that I couldn't afford any of the ones in the shop. They were out of 
my range. -nothing was out of my range before 1990. This was not a problem. Now it is... (T 10, f4 8). 
A different view on consumption and material possessions of the past is expressed 
by other respondents (generally they tend to be in the more well-off stratum of the 
population, but not always). They focus on the bad quality of the products available in the 
past, and on the shortages that made life difficult. Also, they emphasise the lack of choice 
in the old times, when products were few and standardised, so that many people ended up 
with the same appliances, the same furniture, the same clothes - while the present 
situation allows them to choose among a variety of products. 
What I really appreciate in these new times, despite misery and corruption, is that 
my life has improved, I mean there are so many things that make my life easier 
because I can afford them, while before I could afford them, everyone could, but 
they just weren't available. Like good shoes, I've always had problems in finding 
shoes that fit, they were designed by some imbecile that had no idea about a 
woman's foot, didn't care, and tens of thousands were produced: same model, no 
fit. (C8, f53) 
An individual's car is an important indicator of their material situation -a key status 
symbol. 
I keep showing up at my workplace in this old Dacia car, and... can't help 
thinking about what the others must think about me. I didn't care too much when I 
was working at the newspaper, the others didn't have much better cars, but here [a 
private finn] it's different. (T8, m30) 
I've put an order for a car, a SAAB. I've made a bank loan to get it. 
Int: Don't you have a car already? 
Yes, it's 2 years old, so I need a new one. (C12, m28) 
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I was ashamed with my car, I had to do something. The new one looks great, it 
has all sorts of accessories and airbags and everything. (C 10, f53) 
My colleague has got this new fancy car, really expensive model, but he's utterly 
unhappy, because of the plate number: people that know about these things can 
tell that the car was bought in leasing, not cash, so... he cannot show off to the 
ones that have forked out 30.000euros in cash for a car. (P4, m30) 
I'm not buying the car from the local dealers. They say it's the same Renault, but 
I want mine brought directly from France. (C7, m64) 
In conclusion, divergent images of the past and the present in relation to material 
possessions emerge. According to one's present material status, some experience the 
situation where certain (more expensive, but 'necessary') goods that were possible to 
acquire before are now out of their purchasing range (e. g. flats, washing machines, cars, 
furniture, fridge, etc. ); the 'reliable' goods of the past have been replaced by flashy and 
expensive ones produced in the West. Others find today's diversity and quality of the 
offer superior and preferable to the past. Accordingly, some will valorise the social 
conditions of the past, the others will praise the 'better' present situation. Money emerges 
as a powerful structuring element both in dealing with the materiality of everyday life and 
in the symbolic realm. The changed societal conditions - i. e. adoption of the free market 
- have bestowed on money a dimension that it lacked in the previous era, when the 
absence of products in the state planned economy meant that money alone could not 
insure a good lifestyle - or social status for that matter. 'Money' is signified by the 
possessions people surround themselves with and strive for. Consumption has as well 
taken on new meanings in the present. If during communism certain practices of 
consumption were performed as small acts of resistance or defiance of the system and the 
values promoted by the communist discourse (from purchasing books, to foreign jeans, 
toiletries and cigarettes), in the capitalist order money, consumption and social status are 
brought together by pervasive articulations. 
The issue ofpoverty figures prominently in representations of social life: 
There is so much poverty around... (C2, f6l) 
This country is made up of paupers. (T7, m34) 
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Everywhere you look, you see misery, I don't know how people cope, there seems 
to be so much misery. (C I, m63) 
All accounts seem to agree on the fact that, while communist standards of life 
were generally fairly low, poverty as such was not a mass phenomenon, or at least it was 
less visible. The magnitude of the phenomenon of poverty is seen as a relatively 'new' 
development in the Romanian society. Poverty can affect anyone, for example people that 
before 1990 were on the same material level find themselves now in divergent material 
positions, with some near the bottom of the income scale, and others financially 
comfortable or even well-off. Everyone seems to know a lot of people from their former 
social circle (friends, workmates, neighbours, relatives, acquaintances) that now live in 
conditions of scarcity. 
This ex-colleague of mine, we were sharing an office in the publishing house. 
Poor thing, she's alone, she has no children, she probably has a miserable pension 
she cannot live on, and she needs medication. I've seen her the other day, she 
looked awful, she must be really poor. (C16,57) 
My cousin is poor. He has a full time job, he does work hard, but doesn't make 
any real money, he lives with his parents. I help him out sometimes with little 
sums of money, but I can't do more than that... (T20, m35) 
You know what my niece does? She is a graduate, she did biology, but didn't find 
any job. She sells cheese in the open market, with all the peasants. She is in a 
desperate situation, and a relative has offered her this arrangement. Can you 
imagine? Selling cheese in the stinking market. It's so degrading. (T 15, f62) 
One of the ways poverty is made visible is through its emplaced forms and 
consumption patterns. Place-related features are used in the process through which people 
are working out their understanding and image of poverty. Places, areas, neighbourhoods 
have been all (but differently) affected by poverty. Neighbours that have lived in similar 
circumstances of relative material stability for tens of years find themselves pulled in 
diverging positions by the material factor. Poverty and material well-being are inscribed 
into the physicality of one's house of flat. 
Meanings of the role and responsibility of the state 
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One of the most dramatic changes in the post-communist era regards the role of the state 
- responsibilities and involvement societal affairs. The most important features that 
interviewees point to are the problems the state has in controlling or managing aspects of 
social organisation, corruption and the collapse of welfare programmes. 
The weakness of state institutions like the police are acutely felt, especially in 
relation to personal safety and crime: 
'The police? They are powerless, they are afraid themselves of the thieves: I've 
witnessed a situation with a person being harassed in the street and the police 
looking the other way to avoid getting involved. We're not protected at all. (C4, 
f6 5) 
They've lost control, the state has no control over all the illegal stuff that has 
flourished. Like drugs and prostitution. Actually, I think they are involved, they 
are hand in hand with the crooks. Policemen protect the brothels, and every now 
and then there is a raid, for the eyes of the press, but no-one gets caught and 
things resume the next evening. (T1 1, m22) 
The way the state handles the raising of tax comes under strong criticism from most 
respondents: 
They complain that the budget is very small. This is because they let the big 
companies get away without paying tax. This is unfair: the rich ones walk away 
without paying taxes, only the poor get overtaxed. (DT2 1, m43) 
What does the state do with the money? Nothing goes to health and education and 
culture, all goes to subsidising inefficient factories and keep the salaries of 
officials high. (T14, m66) 
If the budget is so small that they cannot afford to subsidise medication that could 
save lives, how come they can afford those wages? Anyway, they are corrupt to 
the bone. (C8, f53) 
People are starving, and what does the state do? Nothing, absolutely nothing. You 
know how much the monthly child benefit is? 30.000 lei [equivalent to one 
pound]. This is mockery, it's indecent: a litre of milk is 15.000, so... not to speak 
of clothes, books, stationery when they go to school... (DT12,06) 
This is ... I don't 
know... it's not right, it's very disturbing. What world are we 
living in? with people starving in the street, families thrown out of their homes, 
living in a tent in the park, all that... you didn't have this before. People were not 
living in the street, families with children. Where is the state? In my opinion, the 
state should not allow for this to happen. (DT2, f65) 
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Meanings of state institutions and their responsibilities are combining to create images of 
weakness in the governing process (as in assuring safety and preventing crime), of 
corruption and impotence in the face of the tax-evading strategies of powerful companies. 
For many, the most disturbing feature is the failure of the state in preventing destitution 
and in ensuring a safety net. 
Issues of redistribution and the role of the state are present in interviews, and they 
highlight the positions social actors take in relation to deeper matters of social justice -a 
vision of the social and of the place of individuals in it. 
I don't see why I have to pay tax for certain things. Ok, health - that is acceptable, 
and education, I suppose. But I don't see why my earnings should go into 
subsidising the wages of the miners, for example, just because the government 
doesn't have the guts to close down the mines. Or on their benefits if they are 
made redundant. Everyone should look for a job, not stay home and wait for 
benefits to come. (C6, f52) 
Where does my tax go? I don't know, in the wages of politicians? Certainly not in 
my child's school or my mother's pension. (T 19, f46) 
I don't care. I'm working hard, and I get no help, so why should unemployed 
people get benefits? Why don't they get jobs? (T2, S 1) 
These remarks illustrate some of the ways the social is thought, what images people use 
in order to make sense of the social, and the ways social solidarities are envisaged. 
Conclusion 
This chapter, based on an analysis of the interview data, has explored the ways people are 
engaging with the dominant discourse and its nodal points, from the perspective of lived 
experience and relevant concerns; it highlights the process of investing signifiers with 
meaning, the processes of fixation that emerge through struggle and resistance. 
Generally respondents rarely use terms like 'free market' - the situated meanings of the 
signifier 'free market' surfaces in interviews through discussions about their attempt to 
set up a private business, for example, or about the material status of the household; 
reflections around the market are couched in terms of 'business opportunities' and 
4 poverty' for example, and linked to concrete life circumstances. 
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Similarly, 'democracy' is engaged with as the present, lived political situation in 
Romania, rather than as an abstract concept of organising the polity. Therefore, the 
critique of the contemporary political arrangements and practices of the political class can 
indirectly destabilise understandings of democracy as 'something good' or 'necessary'. 
As for 'freedom', its meanings are articulated in contrasting constructions through 
association with, among others, individualism and independence, anomie, unsafe society, 
opportunities for improving one's life. 
The 'free market' as the core of the capitalist order is not a uniforrnly 'good' 
arrangement, mainly because it is linked to poverty; the meritocratic principle that 
underscores it is both supported and contested throughout accounts: exposing the un- 
meritocratic aspects of Romanian society is a strategy for de-legitimising the 
arrangements of the free market, and so is the contesting of the appropriateness of 
privatisation (a central tenet of the market). Support or rejection of the free market comes 
also through the prism of consumption and material situation: the availability of products 
and the possession of goods are highly valued by some social actors, while others focus 
on the impossibility to acquire them, the frustrating experience of not affording what the 
market has to offer. 
What is at stake in these debates in which people engage (the interview offers 
them the space to do so and encourages them to direct their reflections on their own 
circumstances and the process of social transformation) is the very nature of the social 
and the place of individuals in it. The analysis follows the main concerns and questions 
people ask in relation to society and themselves. Normative positions emerge and are 
invested in discussions on the principles of organising the social, ideas of 'the good 
society', and concepts of human nature. 
The next chapter will continue the analysis of the production of the social by 
examining the emergence of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic articulations that 
incorporate the meanings discussed in the present chapter. 
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CHAPTER 8 
NEW HEGEMONIC AND RESISTANCE ARTICULATIONS AND THE ISSUE 
OF IDENTITY 
Introduction 
This chapter continues the exploration of the contours of the social in post-communist 
Romania by looking at a central concern regarding the social and one's place in itl 
namely the reshuffling of social hierarchies and changed nature of social ties. These 
insights are connected with the new shape of the discursive landscape in Romania which 
restructures the social, including hierarchies. 
There is a wide debate in the social sciences about the dimensions of stratification 
in Eastern European communist countries - and the forms re-stratification has taken post- 
1989, which has been introduced in chapter one. This analysis is a contribution to the 
respective debate from a discursive perspective, based on fieldwork and interview 
material, and it tries to capture some of the ways the workings of discourses produce lines 
of social division, social categories with valuative connotations, and places them in 
hierarchical relations. In this process subject positions are constituted for social actors to 
occupy. 
A dominant set of articulations is presented, together with the criteria for 
assigning individuals to subject positions, then counter-hegemonic articulations are 
analysed. Through the interplay of different subject positions, social actors' identities are 
constructed, a process which leaves variable spaces for the negotiation of these 
positionings. 
The 'catching up with the West' discourse presented in chapter 6 has portrayed 
the social reality during the decade after 1989 as a transition period of rapid change and 
deprivation necessary in order to achieve economic development and prosperity 
comparable to Western standards; it has posited the necessity of 
dismantling the 
institi-itions, of the previol-Is ern, tbe, necessity for 'Racrifire' in order to citch i, in - therefore 
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it has legitimised inequality and impoverishment of some strata, and the declining 
standards of life for a large part of the population (concomitant with the accumulation of 
wealth among a minority). As discussed, this discourse has been supported by a multitude 
of institutions, from international agencies, to national successive governments, and the 
media - and has provided actors with a way of understanding and making sense of a 
variety of events. The impact of the media on everyday life in Romania cannot be 
underestimated, as "[t]he media represent and reflect human action, but they gradually 
acquire an independent ability to produce reality because their messages are incorporated 
and reproduced in social praxis, in a spiral which seems destined to feed upon itself and 
grow in a never-ending process" (Melucci 1997, p59). 
The previous chapter has detailed some of the processes of filling empty signifiers 
(freedom and democracy, the market, choice, the West, etc. ) with meaning; this investing 
of meaning occurs as people think about their daily life and position or identity - an 
emplaced, situational approach to making sense of the social, from which identity issues 
cannot be extricated. Similarly, social hierarchies, their criteria and multiple 
determinants, as well as the ties connecting people and the norms behind them, are 
engaged with in the process of reflecting on or accounting for one's circumstances, 
trajectory and general positioning in the new hierarchies. 
While defining social goals such as emulating the West through democracy, free 
market, free enterprise, and competition, the transition as 'catching up' discourse has 
facilitated the adoption of values, norms and models - articulated in the form of other 
dominant or hegemonic discourses. 
The societal project of catching up through market reforms and democratisation 
has set in motion a series of policies-, institutions and mechanisms that have filtered down 
to the level of conditions of everyday life. More generally, new discourses produce and 
structure society both at the level of beliefs, knowledge, concepts, symbols and at the 
level of material relations - that is to say that new symbolic, material and institutional 
relations of power mould the local lives. The discursive landscape provides the categories 
and constructs through which the social is known by social actors, the rules which they 
use to objectify social reality and constitute the life-worlds they inhabit. New 
articulations. promoted from dominant sites of power and reinforced by the media are 
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taking shape, infiltrating the everyday and becoming interwoven with practice, and taking 
up the form of common sense knowledge and behaviour. 
The different discourses constituting the social provide new subject positions. 
Emergent culturally approved stereotypes or models of social success crystallise in 
everyday practices and forms of fashioning the self. A new moral framework within 
which everyday life is undertaken is imposing itself, together with new 'scripts' by which 
individuals have to live. 
Structurinu of the social through new lines of division, new categorisations, norms 
and values 
One of the most relevant issues in the accounts of my respondents refers to stratification 
or divergent social evolutions post-1989. Uneven social evolutions are prompted by the 
fact that some social actors were able to 'transfer' and valorise their resources in the new 
contexts, while others found that their old 'resources' did not fare well in the new 
discursive context (e. g. old skills that are now useless). The new system of difference and 
hierarchisation, the values underlying it, its impact on issues of social solidarity and on 
personal and group identity, figure prominently in respondents' accounts. 
The issue of stratification and new social hierarchies is narratively integrated with 
accounts of the changed nature and content of human relationships. Social ties are 
addressed in relation to the 'concrete' circle of friends, acquaintances and neighbours, 
and at the more abstract level of 'people in this society', as examples of 'what has 
changed' after 1989. Taking as an anchoring point one's life circumstances and 
experiences, respondents describe the changed nature of sociality, and again comparison 
with the past emerges as a prominent narrative device. Interviews are replete with 
statements of the type: 
I had more friends before. Now people have been drawn into other things, or have 
changed. My friends have changed, there isn't any of the old feeling left. 
Int: In what way have they changed? 
... just 
different. Some got rich, and it's all about their business. Others, on the 
contrary, are not doing that well. So... we just don't feel comfortable together 
anymore, it's obvious. (CIO, f53) 
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We used to do things together, go out together, or on holidays, or just weekend 
outings. 
Int: Why did you stop doing it? 
It just happened, people have other things to do, or prefer to do other things. Like 
stay in front of the TV. But it's also a matter of money, some of us cannot afford 
going out. And, to be honest, personally I'm embarrassed about inviting people 
over, because of the way the place looks. As you can see, it's old furniture and all. It really didn't matter before, it was a good place to get together and have some drinks or something, but now... I don't know, just don't feel like. People judge 
you. (T10, f48) 
I lost contact [with the old friends/acquaintances] after 1990,1 used to have a 
more active social life... 
Int: So-what happened? 
I'll tell you what. Some in the old group are politicians now, they have no time for 
us, and we really don't want to see them. A couple have made money, and you 
can imagine, it would be awkward to be together and ask questions... we all know 
how they've made the money, and they know we know. And someone, an old 
friend, is really poor now. Imagine us just sitting together or something. This guy, 
who's lost his job and struggles by giving private lessons, and the couple who got 
loans from Bancorex 1, tens of thousands of dollars, which they never had to 
reimburse. How would that be? What would we talk about? (T4, W) 
I kept some of the old friends, the ones I can still talk to. Because there are things 
that you need to have in common to be friends, some values and ideas. Otherwise 
you cannot be together. You need some common ground, you know? If one is 
into ... let's say books and art, and the other can think of money as the most important thing in life, what common ground is there? None. (DT3, f76) 
Social ties and forins of solidarity have been affected by social actors being discursively 
placed in different categories, characterised by different resources and different outlooks 
on life, divergent values. The metaphor of being 'pulled apart' frequently used by 
respondents indicates a clear understanding of the present as defined by re-stratification 
processes (and an implicit understanding of the past as more egalitarian). 
What are the processes that push people in one or other 'position', how are these 
'positions' that constitute social strata or categories defined, according to what criteria? 
Respondents manage to address these questions and offer responses in the context of 
talking about the fate of their friendships, quarrels with the neighbours, a colleague's new 
tbnt fq-rnniir, fnr o-rpntino, Innncz on Pt politirn] 
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house and car or someone's trajectory from anti-communist dissident to prosperous 
businessman. 
Across these accounts one can detect various overarching articulations, constantly 
used, in a rather stable configuration. Some are dominant articulations that bring together 
criteria for stratification, ideas of human nature, norms and values built into the social, 
others are resisting articulations, putting forward a different normative constellation that 
threatens with dislocation the meanings fixed by the former. 
The analysis follows the way respondents engage with the signifiers of societal 
discourses by starting from personal, or everyday concerns - among which the issue of 
6 stratification' as symbolic allocation to different strata (with a clear 'material' 
dimension) is central - as a way to access wider articulations that touch upon the nature 
of capitalism, ideas of 'freedom' and social justice, and to offer insights into the 
non-native societal landscape. 
Hegemonic discourses 
Issues of stratification are tied to the changes in the discursive landscape and in the nature 
of the codes, norms and values underpinning interpersonal relationships and ultimately 
the texture of the social fabric. 
What seems to surface in contemporary Romania (and throughout Eastern 
Europe 2) is a dominant discourse that articulates ideas about the nature of the social and 
of individuals, the 'appropriate' values that should guide individual action and social 
goals, notions of social worth - crystallised into criteria for social hierarchies. 
People are in different strata, we belong to different strata. 
Int: What sort of strata do you refer to? 
Well, different... we don't belong to the same... I guess money, and what people 
do with it... (DT14, m38) 
Society has polarised. It used to be more homogenous, that's for sure. (C 13, f6O) 
Differences between people are very visible, you can see how big they are. And I 
don't mean just the fact that some are very rich and some very poor. J7, m34) 
2 Fnr qn nnP)v4z'4z lkxlitk zimi 
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Respondents articulate stratification with the emergence of the free market, which has 
allowed for sharp differences in material situation to surface. With the end of state 
control over the job market and private property, money becomes a strong criterion for 
assigning individuals to different categories. 
No, it's not like before. Because people have come to realise that you cannot have 
everything planned by the state. They've tried, and what did it lead to? Didn't 
work. I know what they say, there is too much poverty because of the way things 
are organised now, with private property and private companies and competition 
for jobs. But that is it, you cannot have the past, you have to live in the present. 
(T20, m35) 
These comments are illustrative of a widespread conceptualisation and acceptance of the 
centrality of free market arrangements as a societal structuring principle. Romanian 
society and ordinary life cannot be thought of as divorced from the workings of the 
market - in this sense the articulation of capitalism as the only viable socio-economic 
arrangement is a hegemonic one, which does not allow for other conceptualisations to 
take form or gain legitimacy. 
Everyone can get a job if they work hard. Before you were given a job no matter 
your qualifications, and obviously the politically active were getting better deals 
than well trained, decent people. (T5,0 1) 
The new social arrangements are also associated with meritocracy - in contrast to 
the past system of allocating jobs and social rewards. Money and material status are seen 
as valid criteria for stratification, that bring this society in line with the 'civilised Western 
world'. Respondents defend this stance by reference to other values and norms - for 
example, material status is a just criterion because it reflects personal effort, hard work 
and entrepreneurship (hence a fair, meritocratic criterion). It is therefore a legitimate way 
of both shaping conditions of life and of awarding social status and recognition. 
Opportunities are open that did not exist before, including possibilities for material 
differentiation. 
Of course they're envious, and they wish they could go back to the levelled, 
homogenised communist society, where we had the same income no matter how 
and what we worked. This can't be, we5re not sheep, cannot be the same, and 
some will get more money and a better life, because they work hard ... I spend 10 
hours a day at work, it's not like money just happens to come to me ... (P 5, D 0) 
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New "public definitions for the general desirability of occupations" (Wegener 1992, p 
266) are worked out in contemporary Romania. The prestige of jobs tends to be assessed 
through their earning potential, while occupations that previously had some prestige are 
now looked do wn upon, because of their meagre earnings (teachers, performers, artists, 
etc. ). A strongly materialistic outlook seems to be a generalised norm that channels life 
choices and individual aspirations. Goals in life, or 'the things that matter' for social 
actors, are overwhelmingly formulated in the material realm, which is consistently 
valorised. Material and financial situation, consumption and social status are emerging as 
the interlinked facets of stratification. Possessive individualism plays into this 
articulation, reinforcing it: 
In my house I am the king. I have my things - which I have worked hard for. The 
world [Romania] is full of nobodies, people that don't have anything, no proper 
clothes, no things in the household, I pity them, they are nobodies... (C7, m64) 
The most important things for me? I don't know, my... well, affording things. So 
my job is important, I couldn't live on any job. And it's important to have a good 
life, a car so that you don't cram in the public transport, and a comfortable house, 
and the basic things... I don't know, furniture, TV, electronic equipment, 
dishwasher, these things. If I have kids they need to go to a private kindergarten - 
because I don't trust the state ones, obviously, with all the diseases and all... and 
bringing them up, that's money. (DT27, m32) 
What I want in life? This is a hard question. I just want... a job that pays well so 
that my family can have things. I probably want a nice lifestyle, being able to 
afford... holidays, going out, and ... yes, that 
is it. (P3, m40) 
Understandings of human behaviour that centre on self-interest and egoism are 
prominent, and images of social life as competition lend them support. 
You can only take care of yourself. One should focus on oneself. (DT22, m3 1) 
I feel the difference at the workplace. It's the same position I've had for more 
than 20 years, but now it's very different. People are very egoistic and 
competitive. Especially the younger ones. I can't be an exception, I must protect 
my interests, otherwise others will take advantage of me, of my work. (DT4, f42) 
Yes, I do feel sorry for all these people out there that cannot make ends meet. But 
you have to keep your focus and try to provide for yourself and family, if you 
have one. It's a very tough society, some will not make it... And because it's so 
tough people are less caring, less helpful. (C17, f58) 
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The norms underpinning social relations are highlighted in almost all interviews as 
'something that has changed' in contemporary Romania, in comparison to the 'past'; 
images of individualism, self-interest and retreat from certain type of ties (while positing 
the family as the legitimate focus of one's concerns and efforts). 
You cannot care about everyone, you know? It's their business after all how they 
make a living. I personally must concentrate on myself and my family... That's 
what everyone does. (C 12, m2 8) 
The relationships were important, people were caring about ftiends. Now it's 
definitely more a case of everyone for himself. (T3, m34) 
To be honest, I don't have time for the others. All of it, I put it into my family. 
(T19, f46) 
In the block neighbours used to have tight relations, exchanging and borrowing all 
the time. I suppose it was necessary then, but now I don't see the point. I like 
when people keep to themselves and don't bother you all the time with all sorts of 
requests. (DT29, m33) 
Frequently, respondents mention that one cannot afford to waste too much time on polite 
small talk or irrelevant conversations (with neighbours, for example). 
My neighbour would like to have a chat every day as I'm coming back from 
work, but I hate it. I just wish she left me alone, because I'm wasting time being 
polite to her, I'm doing a lot of work from home on top of my job... (DT 20, D 1) 
The leitmotif of lack of time (employed by the majority of respondents, be they employed 
professionals, housewives or retired persons) seems to become a marker of social 
worthiness. Not having time to waste reflects both adherence to the dominant 
materialistic discourse and its slogan 'time is money', and indicates peoples' commitment 
to engage in activities that could improve their material status (one's worthiness is tied up 
with the material situation). An image of personal merit as 'lack of time' or 'being busy' 
is part of an emerging cultural model that valorises the workplace and loyalty to the 
company (materialised in time spent on work). Lack of time is also invoked as the reason 
for reducing socialising activities: it rationalises unavailability and unwillingness to 
commit. The meaning of time is central to the new discourses, and it is articulated both 
with the individualistic and the materialistic outlooks. 
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In addition, respondents felt that they had to regulate and filter socialisation and 
interaction in order to demarcate the social group or stratum they belong to by interacting 
with people of a similar status or comparable social standing. 
You can't just stop in the street and talk to everyone. I do socialise... in my circle. 
Some neighbours have invited me for celebrations or such things, but... 
Int: Did you go? 
No, I didn't. They are not my class. (DT I, m64) 
I don't like my son interacting with certain types. He must find friends that are 
compatible, like same interests, same background, good family. What would he 
have in common with the others? (C16, f57) 
The quotes presented above capture the normative aspect in conducting interpersonal 
relationships that tap into notions of appropriate human behaviour and the place of 
individuals in relation to society, which have been at the core of classical sociological 
debates on the subject of social ties and solidarity. 
Ideas of social solidarity seem marginal in contemporary Romania in comparison 
with a normative ideal of privatised, self-sufficient and self-interested social relations. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, notions of independence surface powerfully in the 
context of concepts of interpersonal relationships. By portraying autonomy as the most 
appropriate arrangement in the present 'capitalist' order, and interdependence and mutual 
exchanges as characteristic of the communist period, a contrast is set in place which has 
as result the valorisation of independence and clear boundaries (physical and social) at 
the expense of cooperative behaviour. 
In a similar manner, social solidarity and social justice are articulated with 
'imposed equality' or 'forced homogeneity' and with 'communism', as opposed to 
inequality being articulated with capitalism. The clear rupture with the past and the 
discarding (or devaluation) of everything associated with the 'old regime' that the new 
societal reconstruction project of 'catching up with the West' entails has as a 
consequence the discursive marginalisation (including both modes of thinking and 
practices) of a set of concepts and ways of doing things - of which cooperation, 
interdependence and egalitarianism are part. 
Solidarity with the poor and disadvantaged becomes very problematic, as it is 
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resources (material or time), and in the present climate of possessive individualism this is 
often perceived as an unacceptable depleting of one's resources. This outlook is 
exemplified by the fierce defending of notions of 'private' resources (such as property: 
the flat, the garden, etc. ) against any sharing claims, throughout respondents' accounts. 
Solidarity is seen as having no use as one has to protect personal interests in a world of 
competition; cumbersome relationships with people of inferior material status, for 
example, can entail demands for help or 'favours' - which in the long run are considered 
to work to one's disadvantage. 
No, I am keeping it at the level of 'hello' and that's it. Because neighbours always 
know loads about you, so they know I earn well, and might come to me if they 
can't pay the water rates or god knows what... (DT29, m33) 
Independence from social obligations (associated with the 'freedom' that the fall of 
communism has yielded) becomes a dominant normative ideal that has a deep influence 
on the way interpersonal relationships are conducted and the social is thought by 
individual actors. This is ultimately inseparable from the form the structuring of the 
social is taking, and from debates on social solidarity, cohesion - or social anomie in 
post-communist societies. 
The new norms concerning interpersonal behaviour have transformed personal 
relationships and sociability, through their accent on individualism and independence 
rather than reliance on others in solving problems, through introducing a more 
contractual type of interaction as opposed to the personalised relationships of the past 
(necessary for obtaining preferential treatment in conditions of scarcity and building the 
blat network). 
The appropriate shape of association or relations emerges through a distancing 
from gregariousness and openness to others as 'communist' or 'Balkanic', and an 
embracing of 'efficient', goal-oriented relationships, and discerning socialising with 
people of one's choice, constructed as closer to (what is perceived to be) a Western (and 
4capitalist') cultural model of interaction. 
The dominant discourse upholds a version of the individual as a self-contained 
unit (autonomous, independent) that must pursue her/his interest in all social transactions; 
boldness, initiative, competitiveness, and sometimes ruthlessness are principles that guide 
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'appropriate' and successful behavioural strategies. The way society recognises and 
rewards 'talent' or 'competence' is through material gains; material prosperity commands 
social respect and status; patterns of consumption make material status visible. Pecheux 
(1982) has emphasised the idea that discourses occur in dialogue, in contrast, and 
opposition to other discourses. Following this insight one might see the ideal of the 
enterprising and bounded individual in the dominant discourse as constructed in 
opposition to what is perceived to be the communist prototype - passive, dependent on 
the state and on other people. 
The worldview sustained by the local dominant discourse sees society structured 
by competition for material gain (the marker of social status or position in social 
hierarchies), which produces winners and losers. The material status as signifier of 
success is one of the strongest themes through respondents' accounts. This is a situation 
3 common in the post-communist landscape . 
Due to the representation of equality and capitalism as incompatible (insofar as 
equality is the core feature of communism), poverty and unemployment are mainly seen 
as unavoidable - and legitimised by the needs of the capitalist system. The anti- 
egalitarian view is articulated both as 'anti-communism' and as 'freedom'. These 
articulations are present not only in my respondent's accounts, but in popular, media and 
academic discourses. Wnuk-Lipinski (1992, p187-188) posits freedom and equality as 
4alternatives' and asks: "Is then a society, which lived under communism for over four 
decades, prepared to live in more freedom at the cost of less equality? ". Preoteasa (2002) 
highlights the present tendency among Romanian intellectuals to de-legitimate notions of 
equality and social justice by their articulation with communism, while Fuller (2000, 
p594) points to a deeper propensity of Eastern European intellectuals towards 
inegalitanan principles, that took the form of a rejection of "'dysfunctional' wage- 
levelling policies under socialism". 
' For example, Roberts et a] (2002, p3) detail the definition of success that social actors use in Russia: 
"There are, of course, many ways of defining success. It may mean having a satisfying job, or one where an 
individual's particular capabilities, maybe developed in education, are fully used. Nevertheless, the 
definition adopted here should not prove controversial. It means having a full-time job and a total income 
of ai leasi 120a') a morun. 
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'Fairness' is a critical dimension in the context of representations of society. It is 
one of the most contested issues in respondents' accounts, as will be discussed in the next 
section. Fairness is sometimes linked to the existence of opportunities and to hard work, 
which give access to social success - an articulation with meritocracy. Meritocracy is a 
strong representation, where the 'best' (in terms of professional competence, skills, hard 
work) are rewarded in material terms and entitled to highest societal rewards. But this 
articulation has to impose itself against strong contesting alternatives. 
The fact that the articulations and meanings they fix presented above have a 
hegemonic status is confirmed by their widespread acceptance as representations of the 
social order, and by the way they manage to impose principles of social organisation and 
to structure practices, both at institutional and everyday interaction levels. It can be 
argued that the dominant articulations perform a masculinisation of the social: sharing 
and compromise, open or more fluid boundaries are devalued in the general normative 
climate, while at the same time being culturally associated with feminine qualities - 
while private property, individualism and strict, rigid boundaries are culturally coded as 
masculine. Hegemonic articulations are bound up with and derive legitimacy from other 
powerful discourses concerning the developed, 'civilised', prosperous capitalist world 
('the Western world') as the best possible world and are constructed through a distancing 
from or rejection of the communist past. 
"Hegemony is not a type of articulation limited to the field of politics in its 
narrow sense, but it involves the construction of a new culture - and that affects 
all the levels where human beings shape their identity and their relations with the 
world (sexuality, the construction of the private, forms of entertainment, aesthetic 
pleasure, etc. ). conceived in this way, hegemony is not, of course, hegemony of a 
party or of a subject, but of a vast ensemble of different operations and 
interventions that crystallize, however, in a certain configuration - in what 
Foucault calls a dispositif ' (Laclau 1990, p 189-190). 
The dominant cluster of discourses on the social that claims to appropriately frame social 
facts and provides guides (motives and justifications) for action (a 'new culture') 
coagulates around the signifiers of materialism and individualism, and has the power to 
152 
marginalise alternative ways of thinking the social world. Nevertheless, there are counter- 
hegemonic articulations that oppose it. 
Hegemonic articulations of gender, age and race 
Before addressing these processes of resistance, I will briefly look at discursive 
strands in relation to gender, age and ethnicity and how they have been affected by the 
generalised changes in the discursive sphere. 
The anti-feminist backlash after 1990, backed by a traditionalist view imposing 
'acceptable' gender roles, a process that has been similar across ex-communist countries, 
has been well documented (Miroiu 1999, Smejkalova 2004, Watson 1993, Waylen 1994). 
The 'return' to a 'femininity' that the communist era had stripped women of by quasi- 
compulsory participation in the labour force on comparable terms with men is a new and 
powerful representation of gender roles. Essentialist notions of the 'natural' role of 
women and men are intertwined with characterisations of the more egalitarian past as 
aberrant and 'against nature'. Now that employment is not compulsory any longer, 
women can cregain' their femininity by retreating into the realm of the household. A 
gendered reconfiguration of the social spaces is visible, with a tendency to position 
women and men in their 'suitable' places - the 'warm' home and the 'ruthless' market 
respectively. 
On the other hand, representations of society as ruled by the market and 
competition, and the valorisation of the enterprising agent seeking to improve his/her life 
through a well-paid position, support an image of the working, active, economically 
independent woman, competing on the market and selling her skills. Women have to 
negotiate identity and choices within these dominant subject-positions available in 
relation to gender. 
Another discursive turn is represented by an emerging ageist discourse, in the 
context of the valorising of work, competition and active struggling for survival, brought 
about by the dominant worldview; representations of pensioners and elderly people 
contain open hostility towards them: they are presented as 'useless', 'draining resources' 
too Ml-'C'k 'o-n-5 - 
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overcrowded public transport. While the communist discourse or propaganda promoted 
respect towards the elderly, and the conditions of everyday life allowed them a more 
powerful position (for example, as they had free time, they were able to queue for many 
hours a day, contributing to supplying the multi-generational household with foodstuffs), 
the new social normative order pushes them into powerlessness and silence. 
The age or generational dimension of social change runs deep. It is evident that 
the ones hardest hit by the negative consequences of social restructuring are women 
(disproportionately represented in unemployment statistics) and the layer of the 
population over 45 years old, in manual and skilled jobs. Even when they manage to keep 
their jobs, many of the respondents in this age group seem to be most affected by the 
changing social ties. 
Remarks about a shrinking social life bear a strong age group pattern. For the 
generation over 40-45 years old, the past is one of intense sociability as opposed to the 
present, when many declare that their social circle has considerably diminished, because 
the different social trajectories of the individuals in the fonner social circle have pulled 
them apart. Differences in material status, political choices, career and social success, 
together with differences in basic values that organise a person's actions and choices, 
means that older friendship ties are affected and the old patterns of shared social activities 
cannot be maintained. They also find it difficult to establish new friendships, to 
reconstruct their 'social circle'. The younger generation (under 40 years old) on the other 
side did not complain about levels of interaction with friends as much: many had thriving 
networks of friends and acquaintances and socialised often. 
Apart from economic disadvantage (the difficulty in finding a job), and loss of a 
social circle of friends, 'loss of meaning' or 'value confusion' seem to affect the age 
group over 45 excessively. This is again evident in the interview material, as older 
respondents voiced their widespread feelings of inadequacy and loss. 
A whole generation is indirectly portrayed as having lived the 'wrong' kind of life 
by strong discourses that devalue the communist period - the past is stripped of the 
possibility to offer positive identity supports. These respondents feel socially looked 
down upon because too much of their identity is tied up with the 'wrong' values, norms 
vurn"ry 1; -Fi- 
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social normative configuration); their life goals and accomplishments (part of processes 
of identity construction and appraisal) have been rendered irrelevant and futile, in the 
light of the new criteria for 'a well-lived life'. For example, the fact that they have not 
been able to enjoy for most of their lives (i. e. under communism) the leisure and 
consumption that the present offers opportunities for, defines their lives as deeply flawed. 
The delayed personal gratification norm, relative lack of social or professional ambition 
(compared again to the opportunities of the present), and modest levels of material 
accumulation - all are associated with the past and are constantly scorned and belittled by 
the younger generations. 
The strong representation of 'communist man' exposed in a previous chapter has 
an impact on the way older and middle aged people imagine themselves and are 
perceived by others; a generation is tinted by these meanings of uselessness and rigidity, 
lack of initiative and skills in coping with the new arrangements. 
This discursive positioning is met with both frustration and feelings of 
inadequacy. Older respondents consider overwhelmingly that they can still bring their 
contribution to social life and should not be pushed aside. Often, they are 'used' by the 
younger generation, especially in taking care of the grandchildren while both parents 
work, but do so without recognition: they are expected to take up parenting duties with no 
social visibility of their contribution. 
Finally, an overtly racist discourse has surfaced - Romanian society has always 
been racist towards the roma minority, but there was a degree of censorship during 
communism which did not allow for such open manifestations of racism; however, under 
the newly acquired 'freedom of speech and opinion', racist views are legitimised and 
freely voiced. The existence of a free market combined with this racist discourse also 
means that the roma are not able to get jobs (as opposed to a situation of quasi-full 
employment during communism, which included the roma) and their situation is one of 
extreme deprivation and marginalisation. Part of the accession to the EU negotiations 
involved changes in legislation and politically correct measures that would protect the 
roma minority from overt discrimination (such as forbidding the 'roma need not apply' 
statement when advertising jobs), however, this has not been translated into changes in 
their socin-eranornir, cirri_imstanoes. 
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Resistance or counter-begemonic articulations 
The resisting articulations operate by trying to recuperate and valorise some aspects of 
the past and by de-legitimising the present, and generally by not allowing for the closure 
of meaning that the dominant discourses strive to achieve. As mentioned earlier in the 
chapter, it is impossible to think the social outside the market/capitalism. Resistance 
discourses do not propose a true alternative, but contest some of the meanings or claims 
of the dominant ones. An example of destabilising mechanism is to contest in varying 
degrees the legitimacy or necessity of present social arrangements, by appeal to 
contrasting moral principles and values. 
Some articulations aim at displacing the materialistic outlook embodied in 
hegemonic nonns and which dominate life strategies. 
Money... it really cannot bring you the same satisfaction as... I don't know, 
people have money but only want to show off, it's not about being happy and 
doing something positive with it... it just serves to make the others feel like scum. 
(DT 5,06) 
You didn't need so much money to have fun. We were just going at lots of 
student parties and bringing drinks and all, it was great. I really had a great 
student life, I finished in time! Because now it's more difficult to do it when 
you're poor. I mean, we were going to the movies, or reading books, and didn't 
need much money for that. And we had holidays where we were cramming 6 
people in a hotel room - and still having a ball. (T3, m34) 
One of the major claims of the dominant discourse, material status as an 
acceptable or just criterion of social stratification, and the main one, is strongly contested 
- by a minority though. 
Some respondents contest the desirability of having people separated into strata 
based on their earnings and material possessions, and suggest alternative criteria, such as 
education. They contribute to an articulation that re ects the role of material situation in 
separating between the worthy and the unworthy, between the successful and 
unsuccessful in Romanian society - therefore resisting the positions that this particular 
criterion creates and imparts. There are attempts to substitute the material/financial 
factor 
witli otber criteria for social differentiation and social status, like educational status* 
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The so-called new rich... I have a neighbour, he has opened a bar and makes 
loads of money, he has a new car, an enormous jeep, because he's a 
'businessman'... really... I mean the guy didn't go to university, he hasn't got 
any education! (T7, m34) 
Social actors try to indirectly challenge the hierarchies that the market imposes by 
destabilising the meaning of meritocracy, which is one of the devices legitimating the 
allocation of rewards (material prosperity and social success) in the context of a society 
ruled by the free market/competition. In Romanian society, while the high social status of 
successful (meaning wealthy) professionals is the nonn, 'meritocracy' can take on 
unexpected and subversive meanings. In the popular opinion, the overwhelming majority 
of very rich, successful people have arrived in privileged positions through illegal, 
'dodgy', corrupt activities - 'the main way of getting rich' - with a minority making it 
through hard work and 'playing by the rules' rather than by-passing them. 
This guy, I don't know how he made his money, and I don't want to know. I 
mean, we know how they've all made it. Who's getting rich in Romania 
overnight? The cheats and the corrupted, they're on top... (C2, f6 1) 
On the one hand, a critique of the supposedly meritocratic principle embodied in the 
functioning of the free market is mounted by positing social success as dependent on 
corruption (rather than honest work, as an ideal view of the role of the market would have 
it) and refusing to accept the latter as an appropriate, legitimate path to social/material 
success. 
On the other hand, a more subtle dislocation of meaning occurs (which has the 
potential to destabilise understandings both of meritocracy and of how rewards are 
distributed in a market context), by a proper inclusion of corruption and illegal practices 
under a 'meritocratic' umbrella, as, after all, misappropriation of resources, corruption 
and dubious financial schemes require 'work', time, talent and effort as well. Practices 
like embezzlement, corruption, illegal operations, if resulting in material gain, can 
overlap with the 'meritocratic' principle. 
People spit at the new rich in this neighbourhood and hate their guts, because 
they've made it, but all I can think is 'well done'. God, I wish I was clever enough 
to come up with some sort of scheme for making money, some legal or illegal 
stuff, like they did. But I'm not smart enough. (C5, f26). 
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Another point of resistance to dominant meanings coagulates around the form and 
content of relationships: images of decline in sociability and changed quality of social 
ties; explanations around this deterioration focus on the new societal arrangements and 
their impact on the way social actors conceptualise themselves and the others, the norms 
employed in interaction. 
The present is portrayed as one of self-interested, cold, formal, impersonal 
market-type relations taking the place of more 'humane' and warm relations at society- 
level. Against individualism, indifference and selfishness a different norm is articulated, 
of human warmth, help, concern about the other and solidarity as 'desirable'. 
Why can't we be nice to each other? We live among people, we're not savages in 
the woods. We cannot turn our back to the others, we might find ourselves at 
some point in a situation where we 
just need a kind word from the other. (DT 13, f 64) 
Ideas of human nature and of the good society are formulated: interaction is a basic 
feature of human nature, and without interpersonal exchanges one loses one's humanity, 
and creates an unpleasant, unkind if not cruel and mean social world. 
Interaction and maintaining good relationships become vital for a good life and 
peace of mind - especially among neighbours. 
My neighbours, I talk to them a lot, and try to have a kind word or just be polite 
when I meet them in the hallway, even if I'm back from work late. It's not only 
that good relations are a must in a block, you sometimes need your neighbours or 
depend on them for some help, but also it makes me feel better, the day seems 
brighter when I exchange a few words with them. (DT7, f 39) 
Additionally, while for some anything they need can be obtained with money, and 
therefore they prefer 'contractual'-type relationships, for others networking and mutual 
services, or obtaining information through acquaintances, or building a clientele for one's 
business still necessitate a lot of interaction and actively cultivating a social network. The 
'lack of need for each other' is constructed as a sign of the degrading of present day 
people's human nature rather than a sign of the functioning of the market and other 
institutions. The self-interested, egotistic human that tries to reduce interaction and 
exchange to a minimum is seen as the product of a hard life rather than the 'natural' 
capitalist citizen (examples of the kindness, friendliness of Westerners are used as proof 
that capitalism and 'humanity', helpfuiness are not incompatibie)- Often respondents 
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bring together representations of society as ruthless, a harsh environment, and the ways 
this social reality has 'changed' people and turned them into selfish, mean humans. 
I have a lot of problems with my neighbours, and it's all started after 1990. 
Honest, they used to be decent folks, we never had fights, and now, you wouldn't 
recognise them. 
Int: How have they changed? 
They are just mean, they do things... mean people, this situation has transformed 
them, all the poverty and misery and ... (T15, f64) 
It can be said that resistance articulations put forward more relational notions of 
personhood that stand in contrast to the "self-contained individualism" (Sampson 1989, 
pl) espoused by the dominant view. Compromise and less shielded boundaries around 
the self, allowing the others a degree of access to one's personal 'space', resources, 
property, time, are posited as 'normal' and beneficial in terms of both personal well- 
being and societal outcomes (I ess aggressiveness and conflict, more cooperation and 
cohesion). 
Finally, a strong critique is aimed at the legitimising core of the new social order. 
'Catching up with the West' by embarking on a societal restructuring around democratic 
and market institutions also implied reaching at some point a degree of generalised 
prosperity, comparable to the one the West enjoys. Therefore one of the central elements 
of the dominant discourse is the implicit promise of a 'better' life than under 
communism. 'Capitalism' in the form it is conceptualised in contemporary Romania 
cannot be separated from prosperity, because of its firm association with the West. 
Therefore the obvious impoverishment of large parts of the population is discursively 
used to de-legitimise the present social arrangements. 
Many people live in atrocious conditions. They cannot afford to eat enough, not to 
talk about the appalling conditions in which they live - overcrowded shacks with 
no electricity or water, because they cannot afford a flat. They live off begging 
and little jobs. They don't even send the children to school. That's what we've 
been reduced to. Misery. (C14, f63) 
What can be detected across many of these resisting accounts is the consistent use of 
some discursive constructs, which I will term communalist. They do not amount to 
counter-hegemonic discourses at societal level, but are mobilised in certain circumstances 
by social actors -a process which will be explored in more detail in the case-study 
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chapters 9 and 10. The communalist strand tends to emphasise notions of solidarity and 
cooperation as the appropriate ways of conducting social relations, together with a 
rejection of the idea of material inequality (especially in its extreme forms) as 'natural' 
and desirable, by emphasising its negative impact on the quality of social life. It tends to 
valorise certain aspects of the communist past in order to de-legitimise the normative 
core of the present discursive landscape. 
Resistance articulations tend to be endorsed by the older generation, and by 
working class respondents, while the dominant ones are supported by intellectuals of all 
ages and predominantly by successful (usually young to middle aged) professionals. 
The processes detailed above indicate the ways in which social actors formulate 
points of resistance or counter-hegemonic articulations in relation to what is perceived as 
a dominant cluster of discourses that produce and regulate the social, at normative and 
practice levels. Their efforts can be seen as tactics of destabilising meanings, but they do 
not coalesce into a strategy that would seriously threaten the dominant worldview (see 
the discussion on tactics vs strategy in the work of de Certeau in chapter 2). 
Nevertheless, these articulations have the potential to question, de-naturalise and 
destabilise systems of signification beyond the Romanian context: they engage after all 
with signifiers like 'capitalism', 'market', 'democracy', 'individualism', which are 
relevant to Western thought and practice. The impact of 'local voice' on the production 
of knowledge in the West will be discussed in chapter 11. 
Subject positions and negotiation of identity 
Stratification (including material circumstances and poverty) and related issues of 
change in the form and nature of sociality and solidarities come to the fore as the main 
concerns around which thinking and understanding of the social coagulates. They are the 
main prism through which the social is thought and assessed by respondents, and they 
help establishing 'moral' positions: as exemplified above, people in everyday life 
circumstances formulate questions around the criteria according to which 'stratification', 
- 
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distribution of rewards in society - accompanied by an assessment of the faimess or 
appropriateness of these processes which orients their actions. "Thus, those beliefs that 
we can dub as moral ones display a complex and integral relationship to moral values, 
standards and criteria, a relationship which shows up in the very practices of social life" 
(Jayyusi 1984, p15). In the process of reflecting on aspects of the social change, people 
are compelled to take a stand, to place themselves in a moral context, which intersects 
with the subject positions that discourses place them in. 
Questions of 'with whom do we belong' or 'What should we strive for? ', 'What is 
the good life and the right goals to pursue? ' come to light as respondents reflect on the 
reconfigurations of social strata and the normative substratum of life projects. Positioning 
oneself in the new configurations is a very strong concem, which also highlights the 
decomposition of old solidarities and emergence of new ones. This positioning is 
effectuated through an interplay of the workings of discourses through assigning subject 
positions and the social actors' own efforts to place themselves, or to resist being placed, 
in a certain 'category' or position. 
It has been asserted that re-articulations in the social symbolic order are linked 
with the production of new subjects or identities: "the sense of self we come to live out is 
intimately connected to the kinds of social condition in which we are embedded" (Burr 
1995, p 110). 
The new discourses mean also discourses of subjectivity, as they set the 
parameters for imagining, constructing and understanding oneself, and the practices and 
disciplines through which the subject is constructed. Foucault describes the process of 
subject formation that discourses carry out, by enacting relations of power. "This form of 
power applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorizes the individual, marks 
him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on 
him which he must recognize and which others have to recognize in him. It is a form of 
power which makes individuals subjects" (1983, p212). 
The new discursive context (including elements of resistance) structures the 
available forms of recognition: "we are produced by acts of recognition deployed by self 
and others" (Bach 1993, p199). By producing knowledge, including normative 
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discourses create subjects; knowledge-making practices (entangled with the operations of 
power) make possible acts of recognition which "bring the other into view as a subject II 
(Bach 1993, p201). This knowledge becomes socially organised and embodied in 
institutions, media, face-to-face interactions. 
As stated above, there is a dominant discourse in post-communist Romania tying 
the individual to her identity or subject position, which tends to hierarchise the population 
according to the material criterion (and consumption associated with material status) - 
while the power of other discourses to stratify or classify is diminished. This results in 
social actors being roughly allocated to the 'winners' or 'losers' symbolic camps, with 
fine gradations within these categories. Also, strong representations of the 'new man' 
(competitive, flexible, self-centred and motivated by material gain) vs 'communist man' 
(stuck in past ways of seeing and acting in the world) that are promoted by the hegemonic 
articulations have to be negotiated (adopted or resisted). 
Another aspect that plays into the formation of new subjectivities in Romania is 
the increased grounding of identity in consumption. Rose (1989) has described a shift in 
the locus of identity form work to consumption in the Western world, where 
"The primary economic image offered to the modem citizen is not that of the 
producer but of the consumer. Through consumption we are urged to shape our 
lives by the use of our purchasing power. We are obliged to make our lives 
meaningful by selecting our personal lifestyle from those offered to us in 
advertising, soap operas, and films, to make sense of our existence by exercising 
our freedom to choose in a market in which one simultaneously purchases 
products and services, and assembles, manages, and markets oneself' (Rose 1989, 
p 102). 
Consumption as a signifying practice has a prominent role in contemporary Romanian 
society. Identity work as consumption practices was a visible feature during my 
fieldwork. As Eriksen (1995, p176) puts it, consumers are "conscious actors who 
appropriate the material culture of their environment to strengthen their own sense of 
personhood and identity. Viewed in this way, things become important elements in 
cultural projects; they objectify social relationships and hierarchies, are used in the 
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In chapter 21 have identified some possibilities for forms of agency as identity- 
work actors can engage in at the intersection of discursive structures and constraints. For 
some social actors , identity-work is a matter of taking up a subject position, through 
processes of identification. "The notion that an effective suturing of the subject to a 
subject-position requires, not only that the subject is 'hailed', but that the subject invests 
in the position" (Hall 1996, p6). Identification includes consumption patterns and various 
practices of the self that indicate the person fittingly occupies the respective subject 
position. In the case of the wealthy young professional, for example, who accepts both 
the system of categorisation and his place in it, being a 'proper' subject involves adopting 
and investing in a cultural model of consumption and behaviour that has taken almost 
standardised forms: items such as an expensive car and electronic equipment, the 'proper' 
holiday destinations, types of entertainment, including the type of restaurants and bars 
one has to frequent, and the type of sports one would do, in the right type of gyms. Effort 
is therefore put into performing as well as possible the 'tasks' and practices (behaviour, 
consumption) that are attached to and help to define the subject position. 
For other social actors, processes of positioning involve dis-identification or 
negotiation, as they try to resist a certain subject position (or rather some aspects of it) by 
accessing others. This might involve a rejection of the system of categorisation, or a 
rejection of the subject position, or more often just trying to bring forward valorised 
aspects of one's position and play down the devalued ones. This is made possible both by 
the existence of accepted normative frameworks (hegemonic articulations) that would 
give one a sense of his/her 'position', and by the nature of identity. As Mouffe (1988, 
64 p44) puts it, we are in fact always multiple and contradictory subjects, inhabitants of a 
diversity of communities (as many, really, as the social relations in which we participate 
and the subject-positions they define), constructed by a variety of discourses and 
precariously and temporarily sutured at the intersection of those positions". 
This conceptualisation of the subject is compatible with that of self-in-process, 
"actively re-interpreting in the face of contingencies, and always confronted with new 
possibilities for making meaning" (Bach 1993, p193), which is helpful in making sense 
of the practices of identity-negotiation social actors engage in. Identities can be organised 
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social strategies (Gregg 1991, p42), highlighting dimensions of the social actors' agency; 
according to different audiences or contexts different configurations are pulled out. 
At the same time, there are limits to the possibilities for negotiation or 
reorganisation of identity- facets. The 'space of manoeuvre' within which social actors 
can reject or highlight chosen aspects of their multiple identity positions is dependent on 
both the context in which the individual acts and the resources on which she can draw. 
Identity construction (or identification in the form of taking up a subject position) 
involves the active production of difference. "Like all signifying practices, it is subject to 
'play', or difference... And since as a process it operated across difference, it entails 
discursive work, the binding and making of symbolic boundaries, the production of 
'frontier- effects'. It requires what is left outside, its constitutive outside, to consolidate 
the process" (Hall 1996, p3). 
Under circumstances of threatened identities, processes of boundary-making 
intensi . As the communist project of redesigning boundaries between social 
classes/hierarchies as prestige positions was abandoned, we witness active boundary 
construction in the new discursive context, captured in the interview material (this is not 
to say that social actors were not actively trying to displace some boundaries and reinstall 
others during communism, but at present new discursive and power resources are 
available, resulting in novel forms taken by social groups and the divisions among them). 
Some social actors will be more successful than others at navigating across positions, 
skilfully producing difference and similarities. 
Social actors struggle to represent themselves within a certain context, a moral 
universe5; they attempt to fashion their identities in an acceptable or socially sanctioned 
way in relation to the new criteria and moral parameters of the discursive context, and 
they do so by using certain resources. In order to illustrate some of these processes and 
limits of identity production and negotiation in the contemporary post-communist 
discursive landscape, I will use 'place'- which can be conceptualised as both a context 
and a resource with an important role in identity production. 
4 see the work of M. Douglas (1966) 
Many authors have empbasised the ways identity is shaped in a moral context or sphere (see Douglas 
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The relevance of place of residence for identity is more acute in the present 
context: before 1989 residential mobility was very low, most flats were assigned by the 
state, without much possibilities for choice on the part of the beneficiaries. Now that 
choice regarding the location and type of accommodation is possible, due to a flexible 
property market, place of residence becomes a matter of strategic choice and reflects in a 
different way from before on one's identity (under conditions of freedom of choice, there 
is an increased need to 'justify' why one lives in a given place or flat). Areas develop 
reputations (as representations that include the 'typical resident'), which create 
understandings around certain places being suitable for certain categories of people. This 
is prompted also by the emplacement of poverty and affluence: after 1989 many poor 
residents have been squeezed out from their place of residence, and other places have 
attracted exclusively a wealthy elite. 
The next two chapters will explore the role and uses of one type of place, namely 
places of residence within Bucharest. I will look at social actors' identity work as they try 
to valorise some of their positions in the light of the dominant discourses and downplay 
or reconfigure other positions discourses allocate them to, by using 'resources' within 
certain contexts. These resources are represented by anything that can be placed into a 
system of relations with other elements within discourses, allowing for the valorisation of 
one's situation. 
Three contrasting/distinct areas have been chosen, in order to explore and 
compare processes of identity-negotiation involving places that in principle would 
represent distinct contexts, with distinct potential resources. 
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CHAPTER 9 
PLACE AND IDENTITY-WORK IN AN OLD BUCHAREST 
NEIGHBOURHOOD: THE CASE OF COTROCENI 
The study-area Cotroceni 
The previous chapter has proposed an approach to identity-work (identification, dis- 
identification, negotiation, positioning) as a form of agency that social actors can exercise 
to various degrees in the context of a strong dominant cluster of discourses that produce 
social reality, including the subject positions in relation to which actors have to carry out 
identity work. The signifying practices that are at the core of identity-work are dependent 
on contexts and resources - both of which gain meaning through their placing within 
discursive structures. 
This chapter looks at place of residence as a context and resource for signifying 
practices and uses interview and observational material from fieldwork perfon-ned in the 
neighbourhood of Cotroceni (Q. Discourses do not shape uniforrnly social spaces, 
because local contexts (local practices, norms and values, and any locally-specific 
features) interact or intersect with the deployment of discourses. 
The analysis in this chapter details a few ways in which place-based contexts and 
resources allow for identity negotiation or identity-work, and the 'techniques' used by 
social actors. It is mainly based on accounts of the older residents of C, or the 'old guard' 
as sometimes they define themselves, and less on accounts from the new residents that 
have moved in over the past 5-6 years, and which are very well off families, or 'the new 
rich', meaning people whose high material status has been acquired over a relatively 
short period of time after 1989. The latter are mostly business people (company owners, 
entrepreneurs, etc. ), a few prosperous, retired politicians that have combined political 
I 
office with private enterprise and some very successful professionals (doctors, lawyers, 
financial consultants, sports stars). 
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Apart from an access issue (presented in the methodology chapter), the reason 
for conducting fewer interviews with newer residents is the fact that during discussions it 
became obvious that this category of people had a much less detailed account of the 
neighbourhood and placed much less emphasis on place as locus of identity compared to 
the long-term residents. Therefore, for the purpose of this investigation that looks at the 
role of place of residence in the negotiation of identity, long-term residents are the major 
source of data and the focus of the analysis. The newer residents tend to form a 
'cosmopolitan', mobile and de-territorialised elite, for whom the workplace seems to 
have a major role in producing identity; relations with peers and colleagues figured 
prominently in their accounts, compared with neighbourly relationships. 
The fact that the new residents are invariably very well off means that in the 
dominant, accepted hierarchy set out by the materialistic discourse, they occupy 
privileged positions (the 'winners' in the social transformation process). Their identity 
work seemed to be focused on adequately taking up the subject position the dominant 
discourse places them in (rather than dis-identification or other for ms of negotiation), 
which merges privileged material situation and occupation (the source of this affluence). 
Therefore, identity work is represented by a striving to fulfil the role of the successful 
businessperson, or professional, as codified by accepted, generalised practices meant to 
make this position visible (e. g. consumption and leisure practices), contributing thus to its 
further crystallising. 
In this process of identity-work, the symbolic resources represented by the job, 
firm or business (that are linked with material status) takes up a prominent role, while the 
place of residence is a rather marginal resource - in contrast with long-term residents, 
who constantly rely on place as a resource for negotiating identity positions. 
The long term residents are not equally affluent: while their property is very 
expensive, their income is usually just above the average (or even average in many cases) 
by Bucharest standards'; older or retired people make up for a large proportion of the 
long terin residents, and this group cannot access the subject positions that the job market 
offers. This explains why place of residence becomes a crucial ingredient in the identity 
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of the 'old guard', facilitating a better, more prestigious positioning in the social 
hierarchies of value and worth than decent (but not remarkable) income and being retired 
(non-participation in the workforce) would allow. 
Representations of place in the C interviews show constant similarities across the 
local sample, formed mainly of long-term residents, indicating the fact that a collective, 
pervasive articulation of the place exists and is accessed, circulated, re-produced by 
individual actors. 
A general level of representation is subsumed under the nodal points of 'elite' or 
'good quality' and 'civilised', which are filled with various, and sometimes divergent, 
meanings. Because of their open nature, these signifiers allow for flexible incorporations 
in the process of identity that negotiation residents perform. Through inscribing social 
signification onto places -a flexible and strategic endeavour - social actors use them as 
resources in the symbolic discursive economy. 
The main signifying practice through which C as a place is constructed is the 
contrast with block areas, which are portrayed as a symbolic 'other' that exhibits all the 
negative traits that C is 'spared of and lacks the positive features C embodies. Strategic 
plays of signification manage to associate the block areas with a wide array of meanings 
that are devalued by dominant worldviews - and conversely to imbue the representation 
of C with connotations that these discourses place highly in a hierarchy of values. Almost 
every feature that plays into the construction of C can be contrasted and positively 
evaluated in relation to corresponding features in block areas. 
C is a detached house neighbourhood situated centrally in Bucharest, built in the 
1930s. The geography of the area (enclosed by broad avenues, a river, the Botanical 
Garden and the ex-Royal Palace, now presidential residence) means that its boundaries 
are relatively clearly cut (they are portrayed as quasi-'natural' boundaries), offering 
reference points that allow for a relatively uncontested recognition by residents of these 
confines. 
The elements used in the discursive making of C, as they have emerged from the 
analysis of the fieldwork data, and which can be contrasted to block areas refer to its 
geographical location, built form, its dw ellers and their relationships, the local history, 
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status or prestige, a good quality and civilised place - of which the local moral order 
(local norms, values, practices) is an important ingredient. 
The production of place: physical features 
The geographical location anchors and facilitates symbolic constructions: the fact that C 
is placed in the centre of Bucharest, which is regarded generally as a high status location, 
as opposed to more peripheral block neighbourhoods, becomes a relevant ingredient in 
the representation of C. 
I prefer to live in the centre town, despite the pollution and all. Not that the 
peripheries are cleaner, they are close to the industrial platforms, so it's not better, 
and on top of everything they are far from everything. I can walk home from the 
opera or theatre, they [periphery residents] have to take a bus. I have a friend - 
and she's not a nobody, she's a doctor - and she lives in the middle of nowhere... 
the last row of blocks in DT, you can see the corn fields from their window. Some 
people don't have any luck in life, poor thing, she's stuck in there... (C13, f6O) 
The quote above repeats a common derogatory way of assessing a place or flat in the 
1990s; being close to the agricultural fields around Bucharest is an undesirable feature in 
a city where the periphery is associated with poorer, 'newer' residents (usually coming 
from small towns or the countryside), and less 'civilised' (far from cultural 
establishments, entertainment, shopping facilities, etc . )2. 
The architectural features, the presence of tree-lined streets and generally the 
perceived aesthetic values of C are a constant presence in the interviewees' accounts. 
It is a beautiful area, the houses have historical value because of their architectural 
style... (C4, f65) 
Every house is different ... houses have 
individuality and can be recognised by 
their features. Some of them have names, like for example the boat house, the one 
at the intersection of two streets as you come from the market place, because it 
has a funny shape, it resembles a boat... (C18, f56) 
Houses are described as 'unique' in a constant implicit or explicit comparison 
with block accommodation, which is frequently represented as ugly and standardised. 
2 These meanings began to change towards the end of the 1990s, as new residential neighbourhoods sprung 
up at the periphery of Bucharest, built by an economic elite emulating the American model of the suburb 
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Those people live in identical rows of flats, I don't know how they can recognise 
their own flat. They all look the same... (C1, m63) 
I refuse to drive in their alleys because I get lost in that maze, it's crazy, 
everything looks the same ... (C7, m64) 
Well, it's very ugly. Blocks are just ugly, cubes of concrete, all the same. (C 16, 
f5 7) 
Most descriptions of blocks contain the word 'ugly'. Other frequent expressions to depict 
the block neighbourhoods are 'all concrete, no vegetation', 'oppressive', 'they don't have 
human proportions', 'they all look alike - one gets lost easily', 'matchboxes' (meaning 
fragile, tiny, uncomfortable dwellings), 'sardine tins' (small and overcrowded), 'dorms, 
not proper houses'. 
Another observation concerns the lack of privacy - according to C respondents, 
block flats are badly insulated, and have thin walls, so one can hear what the neighbours 
are up to. An image of crowding and lack of comfort is put together, by the constant 
mentioning of the size, uniformity and aesthetics of the blocks, combined with the sheer 
size of the neighbourhoods and the sheer amount of people living there. This is 
articulated with lack of civilisation, and the impact on quality of life and of social 
relations: the block becomes an oppressive environment, unfriendly and unsuitable for 
'non-nal, civilised' social relations. 
Apart from block areas, the representations of C place it in relation to high status 
places, both similar older neighbourhoods and newly built residential areas where an 
economic elite has launched into building massive, sometimes extravagant dwellings. 
While the older neighbourhoods are considered of similar status, and positively appraised 
(they are close in both aspect and profile of residents to Q the new ones are 
systematically devalued. 
I couldn't live in the new D area. Those houses are just... I don't know, 
ostentatious, they scream 'I have loads of money', but actually they are quite 
pathetic: money cannot buy taste... (C3, m27) 
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of the town); this has engendered a partial re-valorisation of the idea of periphery. 
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I definitely prefer this neighbourhood. It has a special atmosphere, not the 'cold' 
feeling of other places... those buildings are out of proportion, they just don't 
look good, too big and cold ... (C8, f53 ) 
Rather than some pretentious new villa ... no, I like my house and the style of this 
neighbourhood. It is not arrogant, just comfortable, tasteful... and, well, made for 
a more elegant living. (C 16, f5 7) 
The C houses and flats are 'on a human scale', 'warm and cosy', suitable for comfortable 
living, as opposed to the more impressive villas in other high status areas, which are 
described as pompous, ostentatious, 'grandiose but without soul', or just 'bad taste' - 
making it easier to downplay the evident material prosperity they reflect and resist the 
articulation of conspicuous opulence with worthiness (aesthetic, social, moral, etc. ). This 
creates a space for an attempt to associate 'moral-social worth' with taste, sophistication, 
more discreet but discerning consumption, as reflected in the house one inhabits, which 
means C residents can place their area high on a desirability scale and valorise its 
particular features and, indirectly, their position as C residents. 
The built environment is a crucial element in the 'making' of the place: it is used 
as a marker of distinction and uniqueness, but also of 'adequate' urbanism and 'civilised' 
dwelling, impacting on the quality of life. Aesthetic meanings of C take shape in contrast 
with representations of blocks, which are reinforced by the discourse on civilisation and 
urbanism produced by architects and a part of the intellectual elite 3, that problematises 
and stigmatises the block as an aesthetic and social issue to be managed (proposed 
solutions' range from painting blocks in colourful shades to demolishing them). 
The specific arrangements in blocks (as described in the methodology chapter) are 
considered by C respondents to be a serious restriction of individual autonomy, a constant 
process of compromising at the expense of one's comfort. The problem of 'living in 
common', of sharing facilities and not being able to decide on certain issues without 
involving the neighbours, the lack of clear boundaries are appreciated as constrictive and 
See the magazine AThitext Design, and the discourse on the blocks (associated with ghetto and other A-; - -A 
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stifling 4- Furthermore, since some of the space and facilities is not individually owned, 
but shared, this is seen as encouraging neglect. 
I could never live like that, not being able to decide when and how much to heat up 
my house and leaving this matter to the local authorities. - -maybe I want the house to be hot. Maybe I want it cold and I shouldn't be forced into paying anyway ... (C2, f6 1) 
This is the most stupid system ... dividing the bill like that. Not all people consume 
equally ... let's say this guy goes for a few days away and leaves the water running - he doesn't care, he's not paying for it, but the whole 'block' is paying ... it makes no 
sense and it encourages people not to care about the property - it's not really theirs, 
since it's common. (C17, f58) 
It would drive me mad not to be able to decide something about space that belongs 
to me as well and to have to depend on my neighbours ... if I want the staircase 
painted because it looks depressing to me and I'm ready to pay my share or even 
more, and the others don't agree or don't want to pay anything, this means I'll have 
to live on with the dirty, depressing staircase... it's not normal (C6, f52). 
Another ingredient in the construction of place along the lines presented so far is the 
presence of green spaces, trees, gardens, parks, etc. Green spaces allow the creation of an 
image of the neighbourhood in opposition to the city and other block areas (noisy, 
polluted, mass of concrete, uncomfortable), as a more 'natural' environment, suited to 
human needs and 'human nature' (in contrast with the oppressive grey concrete that the 
blocks are made of). Within respondents' articulations, the greenery is directly linked to 
lower pollution, mental relaxation, civilised conditions of living and generally higher 
quality of life. The background that allows for the vegetation to become such a precious 
resource is a city characterised by few green spaces, very polluted, noisy and very hot in 
the summer - green spaces are seen as providing some protection from these factors, and 
as it will be detailed in the next chapter, they feature prominently in the symbolic 
construction of block areas as well. 
4 Interestingly, many of the C residents live in similar conditions: some of the villas they inhabit are divided 
among a few families, as they are split in self-contained flats, that share the entrance hall, the garden, etc.. 
It could be argued that these villas pose similar problems of boundary-control and need to compromise (the 
contact and intimacy between just 2-3 families can be high, compared to a potentially more diffuse, 
-U*-. ---. ---I *- _-r - 
M-1-N. 
aiiuijpi1vLAa LyF%, vL %, u 
All 
radically different from that of block flats dwellers. 
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One of the most important things about this neighbourhood is its greenery. Where 
else do you find in Bucharest such beautiful green mature trees and gardens? The 
rest is just concrete and dust. No wonder people get ill in blocks. (C17, f58) 
Yes, I do think this area influences my health, when I come back from work I just 
calm down walking through the neighbourhood. Just strolling around and seeing 
these trees and flowers changes one's frame of mind. (C8,63) 
I love the trees, the shade in summer, without them the asphalt would boil, like it 
does in block areas. (C 11, m60) 
To sum up, the idea of a certain type of (built) environment being more suitable for 
human needs and more 'civilised', 'natural' than others is a central device of production 
of difference and of placing the C neighbourhood and block areas in a clear contrast, with 
C being the one that can insure good levels of comfort and quality of life. 
The landmarks mentioned by C residents help to build up an image of high status. 
The C Palace, the Botanical Garden, the Opera House, the University buildings, the 
Elefterie Cathedral, the new business centre are mentioned by residents when asked to 
describe the area, especially its boundaries. Through the consistent use of these 
landmarks to delimitate the neighbourhood, C appears surrounded by what are generally 
regarded as prestigious sites: the value of the place is enhanced by the incorporation of 
symbols whose weight is acknowledged by most Bucharest inhabitants (the city has only 
one Opera house, the C Palace is the official presidential residence, the Elefterie 
Cathedral is one of the largest orthodox churches in town, etc. ). 
Beyond a generalised mentioning, there are some differences in the way these 
symbols are used by respondents. They are selectively employed by different categories 
of people, part of an effort to create a certain image of the self. For example, proximity of 
the University and Opera, and the advantages of this proximity, are mentioned by people 
with 'intellectual and artistic aspirations', the 'refined and educated', while the new 
business centre with its futuristic architecture (hosting mostly foreign firms and banks, 
and a symbol of money, success and prosperity) is mentioned often by the young 
professional residents. The C Palace (ex-royal residence) is used in accounts both to 
make a link between oneself and the 'aristocratic elite that used to live here', in the case 
of older inhabitants, and as a signifier of power in abstract. The prestige and elite-quality 
or the piace is enhanced by its symbolic location anct also by mentioning that other 
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neighbourhoods lack the vicinity of such noteworthy sites. These symbolic sites ofpower 
(artistic-intellectual, financial and political power) are brought into discussion in 
residents' stories in a coherent process of articulating place and identity. 
The history of C is also brought up in the construction of place. Residents will 
emphasise that their neighbourhood does have a past, it is not a 'new' place, as the block 
areas are. In the context of the massive demolition of the old city during the last period of 
the communist regime, this is one of the few older residential areas left, and this becomes 
a place-related resource which is discursively transformed into 'specialness' and 'value'. 
Various elements of the past are connected to create versions of the history of the place: 
why was it built, by whom, and for what type of residents; what characters inhabited it 
and what 'historical' events happened here (e. g. artistic movements and literary circles). 
This neighbourhood was originally built for doctors, that's why the streets are 
called Pasteur, Melitescu, Paulescu... (C 11, m60) 
Most of the intellectual, or rather artistic elite could be found here. You have on 
the next street the Ghiata memorial house, but there are at least 4-5 houses around 
that were turned into museums because famous people have lived in it. (C12, 
m28) 
In terms of use of history in building representations of C, there is a strong discursive 
effort to link C to the pre-communist period, when it was constructed. By connecting the 
neighbourhood to this past and valorising the latter as a 'golden period' in the national 
history, when the country was firrnly engaged on a capitalist and democratic path, 
residents symbolically access the 'unspoilt' pre-communist period. Respondents often 
claim privileged knowledge regarding the 'right' ways of doing things (which is 
articulated as non-communist norms and practices), due to their location (physical, but 
also moral) in a 'non-communist' neighbourhood. Conversely, block dwellers are 
inextricably linked to communism and bear the imprint of communist policies and ways 
of thinking. 
Place and 'the C resident' 
The contrast with block residents 
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A further element that serves as basis for the production of place, through attribution of 
meanings and values, besides the built form, the landmarks and the history is the type of 
people that inhabit or have inhabited C. Respondents mention either individuals 
(relatively famous residents: artists, opera singers, writers, politicians, business-people, 
sport stars), or categories of people. These categories encompass material status (well off, 
incomes above the average, rich professionals, company-owners or directors), 
professional status (doctors, engineers, academics, politicians), educational status (most 
residents are described as 'educated', 'civilised', 'intellectuals'), that converge into a 
unified image of 'good quality people' or 'elite'. 
What type of people live here? Well, it's quality people, obviously. Compared to 
the average in Bucharest, they have a certain material situation... and also, 
educated. (C13, f6O) 
It's a neighbourhood of intellectuals. And the remaining of aristocratic families. 
You won't see here many workers - there might be some exceptions, but most 
residents are educated, and it shows. (C8, f53) 
The level of civilisation in C is remarkable. The residents are overwhelmingly 
from a certain background, old families, and have the adequate manners, 
behaviour and all that. (C15,03) 
What's different in this neighbourhood is that it has only elite people, really 
educated, or from good families, or with good jobs. It's not like in blocks where 
you have first generation urban dwellers, or, to put it bluntly, peasants turned 
workers. (C7, m64) 
The 'aristocratic' or intellectual or bourgeois origins and nature of the locals are brought 
forward while simultaneously looking down on the working class or peasant origins of 
the population that lives in blocks. 
Some of the old social divisions of the pre-communist past (bourgeois vs workers 
and peasants), combined with divisions under communism (the intellectuals - workers 
divide) are mapped out onto places and identity forged through emplaced contrasts: 
peasants-workers are located in blocks and intellectuals or bourgeois families in 
residential areas like C (although many intellectuals live in blocks, this is regarded as an 
aberration and unfortunate situation). 
Many C accounts strongly sustain the desirability and naturalness of strict social 
divisions (coupled with resentment over the 'forced equality' the communist regime tried 
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to achieve) and of a spatial divide as well to mark the social one: people of different 
social statuses should not live in close proximity. In this context, the block embodies an 
unnatural blurring of social distinctions (this representation is made possible by the 
contemporary discursive environment that normalises the notion of social hierarchies in 
contrast to the communist experiment of social equality). 
Some respondents, especially older and born in C (some are descendents of the 
families that had built the houses in the 1920s and 1930s, therefore the house had 'stayed 
in the family for generations'), referred to the fact that the majority of block inhabitants 
are 'newer) residents of the town, pertaining to a different social stratum. A few 
respondents talked of themselves as members of a quasi-aristocratic class, belonging to a 
sophisticated, 'superior' culture - in contrast with the 'peasants turned factory workers' 
within a single generation who live in the blocks. 
You know, it takes generations to create a civilised person. It's not like you can 
start wearing all of the sudden elegant shoes when you're born into the 
countryside, they don't fit. It takes generations for the shape of the foot and calves 
to change so that you can wear elegant shoes, you see what I'm saying? It's like 
that with everything. Manners, language, education. Cannot be achieved by a 
family just by moving into Bucharest. (C7 , m64) 
The majority of C respondents consider that the people that 'poured into' Bucharest from 
the 1950s on 5 were totally different from the original residents of Bucharest in the sense 
that they were not accustomed to living in a big town and they brought with them values, 
behaviour and ways of life from the rural setting that were incompatible with 'civilised' 
urban living. Respondents from C also blame the degradation of the town in appearance 
and spirit (from 'civilised', artistically thriving, cosmopolite, pleasant, comfortable place 
to ugly, unfriendly and unsafe, 'un-civilised', not worthy of being a capital) on this 
massive migration of 'un-civilised' population of peasants/workers, that have 
outnumbered by far the original residents, who are the repositories of the true urban 
culture. 
They are the ones that have made this town so dirty: they spit and they throw 
papers and cigarettes in the street, they push you in the street and don't say sorry, 
they don't know how to behave properly ... (Cl, m63). 
They were part of the massive industrialisation effort started by the communist regime, that created a 
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In conclusion, the long-term residents of C negotiate their identity by creating a 
contrast with block areas and emplacing social distinctions: a civilised elite in C (old 
bourgeoisie and the remaining of the aristocracy; intellectuals and respectable 
professionals) and peasant-workers in blocks. Apart from this major axis of difference, 
there is another relevant category of people they have to create identity in relation to, 
namely the new residents of C. 
The contrast with the 'new rich' 
An important aspect of C is the rapid tum-over, as mentioned in chapter 4, with 
between 20% and 30% of the population having been replaced over the past 5-6 years, 
and a new type of residents moving in (usually very rich professionals, business-people 
or politicians). 
The relationship between the older and more recent residents is not without 
problems. The new residents consider the older ones to be too nosey, sometimes haughty 
and often embittered or resentful because they are not as rich and cannot afford certain 
items. The 'newcomers' can be aware of the disapproval by the old guard of their 
consumption and tastes, which they dismiss by defining the latter as just envious, and 
looking down upon their material situation. 
I don't like the neighbours too much. They are pensioners and all day long keep 
an eye on my house: who goes in and out, what have we bought, all that. They are 
very curious and sometimes make remarks like 'I see you're refurbishing the 
bathroom'... obviously envious because they cannot afford to improve their 
house. (C19, m39) 
The neighbours? I don't have much contact, because they are... they judge you, I 
feel they appraise my expenditure, the things I buy. Even if they are not poor, they 
exude this sourness ... (C21, m25) 
On average though, the new inhabitants seem less concerned with their neighbours and 
place of residence in comparison to the 'old guard'. As mentioned, for this category place 
of residence tends to figure less prominently in the overall production of their identity, 
and their accounts of place and neighbourly relationships tend to be less detailed. 
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In contrast, for many 'old guard' residents the relationship with their 'new rich' 
neighbours is an important source of tension, and they try to find ways of managing the 
influx of new residents and its impact on the image of the place and their own identity. 
The superior material status of the newcomers is a threat and a visible issue that has to be 
dealt with: while the inhabitants of other areas can be more easily dismissed as 'new rich 
in pompous and tasteless neighbourhoods', this strategic manoeuvre cannot be applied in 
the same way to 'new rich' living in the 'refined' C area. 
A lot of the hostility of the 'old guard' towards the new residents stems from the 
fact that the latter have moved into houses that 'old guard' people had to sell, usually 
because they could not afford the maintenance. Many of the poorest of the long-term 
residents had moved out by the time of the interviews, usually into a block flat (with the 
difference in money ensuring a relatively comfortable -life) and their houses had been 
refurbished by the new owners. 
X had to move out, into some block flat. He was a good friend... so shameful, 
good people have to go, and who takes their place? The rude new rich. It's not 
fair. (C13, f6O) 
Educated people have to leave, it's unacceptable, they have lived here all their 
lives. But now intellectuals are nobodies. Educated people have to leave and some 
businessperson moves in. What next? Some tanned guy 6 moving into my house? 
I'd rather die than see that happening (C I, m63). 
The resentment of the 'old guard' towards the new residents is also constructed around 
the conspicuous display of wealth the latter are seen as guilty of More than bad-taste, 
the lifestyle of the rich is interpreted as a direct offence -a sign of the problematic 
relationship between these different categories of residents. 
The new neighbours are truly awful. They have a young son, who is a typical new 
rich spoiled brat. He has loud parties at weekends, in the garden, and they often 
do barbeques. You can feel the smell of food... it's quite insulting. I cannot afford 
meat too often, and these new rich just throw their wealth in our faces. 
Disgraceful, there are so many families around, older people, living on a 
pension... they do not deserve this, being humiliated like that. (C8, f53) 
Therefore the old guard's identity work incorporates the 'new rich' in distinct and 
opposed ways. On one level, they try to discredit the new residents (that are higher placed 
Euphemism for Rorna person 
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in the social hierarchies due to their material situation) by pointing to their lack of 
manners and downplaying the importance of money and consumption of luxury items. 
I don't know what occupation they're into, some business probably. They are 
rich, judging by the car, but they aren't very refined. She looks a bit flashy, and he is a monosyllabic, brutish guy. (C 18, f56). 
This form of identity work relies on devaluing the position of the new rich by proposing 
alternative criteria for social worth (refined tastes, good education, family background) 
and de-legitimising their belonging to the place, as the definition of the 'sort of people 
that live here' has to be protected. 
The contesting of the legitimate belonging of the newcomers (through the prism 
of their perceived characteristics and cultural baggage in terms of values, norrns, etc. ) is a 
technique for claiming exclusivity to the definition of place and protecting a certain type 
of identity grounded in this definition. 
The family that moved in the next house are new rich. I don't know what sort of 
background they have, but they don't look too educated to me. They seem more 
interested in watching TV than going to the theatre ... (C14, f63) 
It pains me to see this kind of people moving in. They don't belong here! This is 
not their kind of neighbourhood, it is not a neighbourhood for new rich where 
they can show off. Why didn't they choose a new villa in the suburbs? (C14, f63) 
Concomitantly, the 'old guard' tries to forge a 'legitimate belonging' narrative for 
themselves, that builds mainly on length of residence (although on closer scrutiny some 
of the self-defined old guard did only move in a few years before the wave of newer 
residents), family links, and fitting the 'moral profile' of the area (a point detailed in the 
next section). 
Int: So, how long have you lived here? 
All my life. It's the family house. 
Int: Were you born here? 
No, I was born in a different town, my family moved here after the war. 7 Int: Your son mentioned living abroad and in Constanta ... 
Yes, I worked for six-seven years in Algeria. Then, shortly after returning to 
Romania, we moved to Constanta. 
Int: For a short period, or ... ? 
For about 10 years. 
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Int: So... you didn't actually live here for quite a long period 
... This is my house! (C7, m64) 
I'm an old resident... 
Int: When did you move in? 
Well, 8 years ago, but my father had a house here, so... I belong here, in a way. 
(C6,52) 
An alternative way of diffusing the threat that the 'new rich' represent (apart from 
de-legitimising their belonging) is to integrate them under the terms established by the 
'old guard', a type of assimilation that would not change the identity of the place and 
local values and practices. A condescending attitude is often put forward, together with 
the belief that the new residents will inevitably 'adapt' to the local norms and values and 
adopt 'adequate' or 'refined' manners and habits. 
They will have to adapt, you cannot live here and continue to behave as you did 
before. They will learn that we do not tolerate certain behaviours. (C 1, m63) 
Yes, they will change, I think. It will take some time, but... the place will change 
them; it's our way or their way... some have already understood how they must 
behave, and they are polite, keep themselves to themselves, do not make noise... 
(C4, f65) 
But at the same time there is another level of identity work in relation to the new 
residents that the old guard performs, which takes on a very different fon-fl. The process 
of identity negotiation reveals its strategic and contextual nature as the same 'new rich' 
that were thought little of in the accounts above become a 'resource' for enhancing the 
prestige image of C in certain circumstances, and their contribution to local improvement 
is acknowledged. 
It is a rich neighbourhood, with a situation above the average. Look at the people 
that have moved in, they are an elite. (C2, f6 1) 
Yes, they have refurbished many of the old decaying houses, it is true. The street 
looks prosperous, new paint, landscaped gardens, it has changed. A few years ago 
it was a bit run down, but new money has poured in. (C 16 5 f67) 
The presence of very well off neighbours in the midst of the 'old guard' is at the same 
time a threat and a resource. In the local context, their identity is threatened by the new 
rich neighbours, therefore identity work focuses on contesting, de-legitimising their 
privileged position. At the same time, in a general societal situation where the material 
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criterion is the main principle behind value hierarchies, the fact that many of the residents 
are 'new rich' is used, in circumstances or contexts usually outside the local, to extend 
the signifier 'rich' to the whole area and to local residents in general: being aC resident 
is invested with the meaning 'very well off. When the old guard residents position 
themselves in relation to other residents of Bucharest, they incorporate selectively traits 
of the newcomers (i. e. exceptional material conditions, prestigious occupation such as 
businessman) in constructing the image of the local resident. 
We have now [in the C neighbourhood] plenty of people that own their own 
business - and I don't mean some small enterprise, but really successful ones, 
with foreign partners. (C6,62) 
The property prices are going up in C, in part because of the rich people. It's 
good, in a way, they impose a certain standard, the way houses look, the cars they 
drive, the image of the area has changed. (C 15, S 3) 
Although conflicts, antipathies and looking down on various neighbours (be it 
because they are either 'new rich' or 'impoverished', not educated and mannered enough, 
or pretentious, etc. ) emerge during interviews, it is usually as a more 'private', 
confidential type of information, while the 'public' type of account invariably builds on 
the recurrent image of 'good quality' and 'privileged' residents. This image also rests on 
the discursive exclusion of poverty, low social status individuals, and problem- families 
among the local inhabitants (alcoholism, domestic violence, delinquency, etc. ) from 
representations of the place. These issues are absent from accounts about the place and 
become visible only in informal conversations, outside the tape recorded version, and 
only when the interviewer is perceived as an insider. They are also mentioned by 
respondents that are themselves 'outsiders' (e. g. the sales assistant at the local shop, not a 
resident but spending most of the day in the area dealing with the residents). 
The general image that emerges in the 'old guard' accounts creates 'the typical C 
resident' as a special, privileged type of person (through educational status, material 
status, occupational status, social origins, manners). The contrast with the population of 
block areas is clear-cut (despite the difficulties in accommodating the fact that many 
intellectuals, or people of 'good family and origin' live there) and plays into the 
valorisation of the C resident. As for the newcomers in C, a strategic, dual work of 
appropriation and exclusion is deployed. They are either excluded from the position of 
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'proper' C resident, or included under the signifier of 'quality people', together with the 
6old guard', glossing over internal divisions. 
As far as the new residents are concerned, the image of C- including the profile 
of the local resident - is not such a central tool for identity production. For some new 
residents, C is just a neighbourhood that adequately caters for their needs. 
Int: How did you choose C to move in? 
I chose it because it is quiet, clean, and the school is good. I'm not interested in 
socialising with the neighbours, and they seem to keep to themselves, which is 
rather good. I did consider about 3 neighbourhoods in Bucharest that would fit my 
criteria, and I ended up here because the estate agents were quick at arranging it. 
(C19, m39) 
The new residents' representations of C are encompassed by a general understanding as 
'adequate' to their material and professional position - in contrast to the 'old guard', they 
generally do not engage in a detailed account of the place and its meaning in their lives. C 
is a 'good' or 'adequate' place because it offers a certain standard of living (large, 
detached houses with gardens), tranquillity, and neighbours that do not present problems; 
these depictions do not clash with the good quality, high prestige and specialness image 
that long ten-n residents create. 
For other new residents though, the reputation of the neighbourhood as populated 
by an intellectual, cultured elite was a trait they actively invested into. These cases of 
direct use of the image of the C resident to valorise their identity are accompanied by 
keenness to integrate, and to sustain the image created by the old guard. 
I wanted my children to grow up in an old neighbourhood, to be in contact with 
cultured people, rather than new rich... you know, educated ones. (C20,04) 
I could have chosen other areas, but this one is much more distinguished. There is 
a quality about it, if you only look at the people in the street, it's obvious they 
come from good families, old academics and doctors and engineers, they are not 
rich, but they have a refined air about them. (C 15, S 3) 
This aspect highlights the ways place of residence can be a symbolic resource for identity 
negotiation in a variety of situations; for some new residents, representations of the place 
can be used in order to add sophistication to their image and take off some of the rough 
edges of the 'new rich' signifier. 
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An important issue in relation to the profile of the C resident regards the roma 
minority. One ubiquitously mentioned aspect in all cases of symbolic construction of 
place is the absence of Roma population as marker of the quality of the place - reflected 
in reputation of area, house prices, etc. Virtually all C respondents have mentioned the 
existence of 'gypsy families' as an undesirable presence: among the qualities of a place, 
the lack of Roma families in the neighbourhood was a prominent one and a source of 
pride. 
It's s good neighbourbood, we don't have gypsies here. (C8,53) 
We've kept the gypsies away. They don't fit in here, I don't think they would 
even like it here, it's so different to what they are used to, to what they like. (C 14, 
f63) 
The local moral and interactional order 
An important aspect of place (in relation to identity) is its moral dimension. 
Places are defined in terms of what type of social relationships they foster, what are the 
nonns and values embodied in these relationships, in attitudes and behaviours or 
practices prevalent in the place. Layers of normative stances, beliefs and attitudes are 
strategically, flexibly articulated into overarching representations of the place - in the 
forin of the 'spirit' or 'ethos' of the place. They build upon the image of the typical 
resident and depend on the similar processes of selective exclusion and inclusion, and 
distancing from a significant other - the block areas. 
Accounts of conflicts and their resolution, everyday life interactions, the 
exchanges and relationships between neighbours and what guides them are interwoven in 
the narrative of place (against the background of 'special', 'quality' people) help to 
contour the local moral order, as they highlight the local values and norms. Once again 
the social relationships and their normative framework are depicted in direct relation and 
contrast with the perceptions on the ways things are done in block communities. 
The local moral order gains substance through creating a sharp distinction with 
'block culture', the signifier under which the nonns and practices in block areas are 
grouped. The construction of the 'block resident' in terms of social origins and 
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occupational statusg is extended onto the normative-valuative underpinnings of social 
interaction, behaviour and more generally everyday practices. 
The components of this 'block culture' are constructed around inappropriate 
amounts of contact (either too high or too low), informality of relationships; 
gregariousness; diminished respect for one's private space, intrusiveness, frequent 
exchanges of an instrumental type (lending and borrowing of different items), rather than 
based on other sort of affinities - in short, 'abnormal types of social interaction'. 
Levels of interaction in blocks are portrayed as either intense contacts prompted by 
the communal use of space, or alienating because of lack of human contact. 
All day long bumping into each other, neighbours popping in, too much 
contact ... (C18, f56) 
It's a lonely environment, everyone behind their doors, they come tired from work 
and retire in their flats, people are not in touch with each other, they don't exchange 
a few words, it's so... solitary (C4, f65) 
At the same time, in C the neighbourly interaction is seen as qualitatively 'different' - 
just the 'right' amount of contact. Neighbourly relationships are pleasant and civilised, as 
suited to the type of people living here. 
We have... how should I put it? Almost British type of relations, that's the norm. 
We just say hello and we are polite, but that's it, no gossiping in front of the door. 
It's civilised. (C16, f57) 
People in blocks quarrel all day long... so many people, some from different 
categories, living in a small area... (C14, f63) 
Block areas become the symbolic repository of a variety of social problems and high 
crime, explained by the higher density of people in a restricted space, and also by the 
mixed social background and cultural givens of the block residents - this making for 
tense and conflictual relations, and allows for a contrasting depiction of the C 
neighbourly atmosphere, where the lack of conflicts ensures a peaceful, quiet 
environment. 
8A more delicate issue is that of the intellectuals and professionals who live in 'blocks' - while they 
obviously belong to the same social group, and in many cases are close ffiends of the C respondents, they 
are perceived as living in conditions below their status, ano more or less expncitly pitiect tor tneir situation. 
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The local relations in C are of mutual respect and respect of privacy, and not of 
the intrusive, vulgar, gregarious, informal type encountered in blocks. 
We don't pop at each other's doors whenever we feel like, there is concern for 
privacy and personal space. It's not like in blocks where they just think they can 
come in whenever ... (C2, f6 1) 
The 'block culture' is characterised by the fact that the invasion of privacy is more 
frequent and more acceptable -a different cultural norm regulating the entering of 
private space. The neighbour can knock on your door anytime, for a visit or a chat, 
without previous warning, while in the C neighbourhood this goes against the etiquette: 
people are supposed to phone first, or to wait for a more formal invitation. Meeting up in 
the street or garden and chatting can and does happen spontaneously and is an entirely 
different matter from a house visit. The issue of lack of discretion is frequently invoked 
in C accounts: in a 'block' everyone tries to find out as many personal details about the 
neighbour as possible, and it is more difficult to shun unwanted attention or 
inquisitiveness; social control and surveillance are seen as central to 'block life'. 
They all keep an eye on the neighbour's flat and goings. When I visit my friend in 
the block, there are at least a few neighbours that stop to talk to me, to pry on me, 
and inquire whom I'm visiting. When I ring, sometimes her neighbour comes out 
to see who's visiting... they are unbearable. It's not their business! (C 18,0 6) 
The fact that many block residents have to meet in their flats to raise and solve common 
problems is a typical trait of the 'block culture', a sign of interdependence and lack of 
autonomy, of mixing the private space of the home with public 'block issues'. 
This articulation of block culture with intrusiveness and lack of control over 
social interaction incorporates exchanges among neighbours, which in the C residents' 
accounts are described as 'quasi-compulsory': part of the 'block culture' is being 
immersed in a network of intense exchange, a 'demanding' environment, with lots of 
cpressure' to enter in all sorts of relationships and exchanging objects and favours. 
In contrast, C is presented as the site of a harmonious cohabitation based on 
limited, controlled interaction, characterised. by choice (with whom and over what to 
interact), a situation made possible by the similar background of the residents and the 
local normative contours. 
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The nature of the exchanges is posited as being different: while in C the typical 
(and appropriate) exchanges would be over recipes, flower bulbs or seeds and a friendly 
chat, among the 'block' residents anything could be the object of exchange, from house 
items (tools, flour, eggs, etc. ) to money and favours (e. g. driving someone to the town, or 
using personal connections to help a neighbour - putting him/her in contact with a good 
doctor or lawyer, or making a phone call on his/her behalf to a police acquaintance to sort 
out a fine or more serious matters). 
While among C residents these kind of favours and exchanges were performed as 
well, they were presented as less frequent, and reserved generally for 'emergency 
situations' - not a routine practice, not part of the local way of doing things. 
I don't feel comfortable about going to my neighbour and ask for salt or sugar... I 
just wait until the shops open and eat something else in the meantime. In a block 
is not like that, people would immediately go over to the neighbours to ask for 
salt... well, that's what they normally do over there, that's how they are ... (C 14, f63) 
This categorising of practices of neighbourly interaction - more restrained and 'civilised' 
in C and 'vulgar' or invasive in block areas - is part of the effort to produce distinct 
moral orders and to ground identities in these normative constructs. Many respondents 
have linked this 'different' 'block culture' to 'working class' or 'peasant' values: the 
informality of the contact, the different etiquette when it comes to interacting with the 
neighbours, the different norms dictating what is the appropriate object of an exchange or 
request. The rules governing behaviour in a block are constructed by C respondents as 
partly derived from the precariousness of life for the working class (mutual help networks 
are considered a feature of working class ways of life) and also partly derived from the 
peasant culture, with its emphasis on mutual dependence and reciprocal help. 
These people come from the countryside, so they are used to this way of doing 
things together ... (C7, m64) 
People in blocks, in general, are poorer than in C. Of course, there are exceptions, 
rich people, academics, politicians living in block flats. But generally they are 
poorer workers, so they always need something, their wage doesn't stretch till the 
end of the month, so they need to borrow foodstuffs, money, till the next pay. 
(C13, f6O) 
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C residents are keen to distance themselves from these forms of exchange and 
reciprocity, by articulating together 'peasant' and worker culture with mutual help and 
the norm of lending a hand to those in need. Moreover, reciprocity and helping out are 
discursively placed in the category of blat practices - which cannot be disentangled from 
the communist period. Again, the devaluing association of blocks with communism is 
reinforced. 
The norms of the interaction in C are constructed around ideas of independence, 
non-intrusion, self-reliance, and they restrict exchanges to people perceived as 'equals' in 
terms of status and background. C residents generally place great emphasis on their 
ability to keep clear, regulated boundaries between the private realm of the home and 
public demands and interaction. A defended private realm, control over private property 
are central to 'civilised' living and to the identity of C (and they as seen as lacking in 
'block culture'). 
All the traits of the local moral-normative order and local practices presented 
above as they come forward in C-based accounts are integrated into an overarching 
representation of 'high quality of life', 'civilised standards of interaction', and the content 
of these norms is compatible with features that dominant discourses appraise positively. 
This image reveals a certain normative homogeneity within the old guard C 
residents (in terms of ideals, worldviews, values, etc. ) sustained and circulated through 
networks of relationships and reinforced through processes of social control (gossip, 
exclusion/inclusion in local cliques, etc. ). The contacts between residents (in the form of 
the greeting in the street, casual talk or gossip in the garden or the house, informal 
spontaneous exchanges of remarks over one's dog or child, or more formal visits between 
neighbours, the 'talking over a coffee' ritual, or concrete instances of help or 
borrowing/l ending) reinforce, in a more or less overt way, this common representation 
and create solidarities and collective identities. 
The local interactional order in C has an important role in fleshing out subject 
positions; it is constituted through established practices informed by norms and values 
that are worked out in time among the same people and families that pictured themselves 
bounded to each other because of residential immobility. On the one hand, --mr- 
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place allows one to take on new (locally-specific) subject positions, that can be 
incorporated and used for identity work. On the other hand, the residents perform through 
daily interaction the role of the C resident, displaying the characteristics and behaviours 
that fit into/constitute this profile; importantly, place provides an audience that supports 
this performance, and validates the representations that it embodies. The residents of C 
support the idea of 'specialness' in their everyday interaction and through their 
conversations and practices keep alive the image of elite and superiority over the 
residents of other areas. 
The case of Mrs X (DT2, f65) 
The case presented below illustrates some of the issues of identity building in 
relation to place. 
The X family moved from C to DT in 1996. In the early 1990s, the family borrowed 
money from friends abroad and purchased the flat above theirs in a two-storey villa in C, 
then rented out both flats to a private company that would use them as offices, and moved 
into a cheaper flat in DT (rented from a private landlord). After a few years, the 
substantial income from renting out the C flats was used to purchase two DT flats (one 
for the respective family, and another one for their 30 years old son and his family) and 
subsidise the dental practice of the son. Ms X details the effects of this move on her life 
and identity. 
How is it [to live in a block in DT]? Horrible. Horrible. Look at me, I am a wreck. 
I'm on antidepressants. Honestly, my life is over. I did it for my son, otherwise I 
would have never, do you hear me, never moved out of C. It's the place where I 
was born, and where I belong. All the happy times of my life were spent there. As 
a young doctor, I had to go and practise in the countryside for a few years. And it 
wasn't easy, but every weekend I would be home in C, and recharging my 
batteries, seeing my friends. And then I moved back to C for good. And I was the 
soul of the neighbourhood. My parties were legendary, even during communism, 
we would gather, play music, and everyone would bring something, alcohol, nice 
cigarettes, nice food, whatever people had access to. And I knew many of them 
since childhood, so those were strong bonds, we were all of us from similar 
families and backgrounds, a certain category, you understand... Everyone knew 
me, and I had time for everyone. On my way back from work I was sometimes 
spending more than an hour chatting with people met in the street, and my 
greatest pleasure was to have people around for coffee, or go to their places for a 
I- -ý 
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Int: How about the new neighbours? 
What about them? I don't know them. I don't want to know them. They are 
horrible, uneducated people, what on earth would I discuss with them? I didn't 
tell anyone in the block I'm a doctor, because you know how these people are, 
rude peasants, they would knock at my door at midnight for whatever problem 
they have... No, I don't want to see these neighbours, they treat me with a 
familiarity that makes me sick. They call me 'lady neighbour', which I loathe. My 
husband doesn't understand, but then he isn't from C. he was born in a block 
neighbourhood himself. Everything about this place repulses me. These people... 
they do not understand how uncivilised and pathetic they are - even the decent 
ones. There are decent neighbours, like the administrator - he's not educated, but 
he is polite, and helpful, and correct. Yes. But some of the people in the block are 
just brutes. The whole idea of the block makes me ill. How it looks, the people, 
mostly the people, so many poor ones, they don't have anything. It's just 
so... awful. And I know I will die here, I cannot return to C, we cannot afford. Our 
only source of income would disappear, and my son... anyway, my only wish is 
to die in a hospital, a decent place, and to go to the cemetery straight from the 
morgue of the hospital. I'm adamant about it. And I've told my family: do not let 
me die in the block, my last wish is for you to take me to the hospital and not let 
me die here. I hate the block so much... 
The following extract is from an interview with a neighbour of the X family, 
living in the same block of apartments in DT. 
Int: Do you know your neighbour, Mrs X? 
Yes, a bit, we do not have much contact. They seem decent. The husband makes a 
bit too much fuss about his car, he looks very important polishing it, but she's ok. 
Int: Do you know their occupation? 
... no, they are retired, I think. Int: What do you think about your neighbours in the block generally? What sort of 
occupations are they into? 
Generally, good families. Quite a few are well-off, doctors and a lawyer, a 
painter, and also mechanics, and factory workers, and some work in retail. I 
would say most are educated. Lots of retired professors and teachers. 
The case of Mrs X highlights issues around the intertwining of identity and place of 
residence, in the form of a conflation of home, neighbourhood and identity. Martin and 
Mohanty (1986, p208-209) discuss this type of situation: "[t]he relationship between the 
loss of community and the loss of self is crucial. To the extent that identity is collapsed 
with home and community and based on homogeneity and comfort, on skin, blood and 
heart, the giving up of home will necessarily mean giving up of self and vice versa". 
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The identity of Mrs X was constructed to a substantial degree around being aC 
resident, with all which this implies, including a contrast with 'inferior' block areas, 
therefore she finds it extremely difficult to re-cast and use her new place of residence as a 
valid resource for identity-negotiation. The fact that the profile of the C area and of its 
residents are constructed by opposition to block areas means that Mrs X (who sees herself 
as 'belonging' to C despite her moving) cannot accept any of the traits of DT as positive, 
valuable features. She refuses to participate in any type of relationships with the new 
neighbours so as not to be part of the despised 'block culture'. 
The role of the neighbourhood 'audience' is central: her new fellow residents do 
not support the articulations through which the identity of C is shaped, in opposition with 
block areas - therefore the power of these articulations in creating representations is lost. 
Additionally, the reality of the block contradicts the typical depictions in C respondents' 
accounts: the fact that there are plenty of 'intellectuals' living in the same block 
destabilises the articulation of block with 'worker-peasant' dwellers, on which the 
identity of C as a contrasting neighbourhood of 'educated' people rests. The new 
neighbours do not support Mrs X's 'superior status' narrative. 
This case also points to the limitations of identity-work using place of residence. 
The constructs on which the identity of C is based and which are produced locally have a 
limited 'validity': audiences outside C might strongly resist these representations and 
impede a stable articulation or closure of meaning in the form C residents strive to 
achieve. 
Conclusion 
This analysis has focused on identity work carried out in relation to the place of 
residence - through the production of representations of C 
by the local residents, 
combined with strong identification with the place and forging a narrative of legitimate 
belonging. 
The production of place as a locus of identity takes place in a discursive 
environment that allows for certain features to be defined as valuable or desirable, and at 
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constructed and negatively evaluated -a technique of construction of difference that is 
heavily used in forging the 'profile' of C. 
The two major axes of place-based identity work for the 'old guard' residents are 
the block areas and the rich residents that have moved into C more recently. 
Representations of C operate a strategic distancing from the block areas (and also from 
the 'new rich' suburban areas). C is mainly constructed as a clear reverse of traits that 
blocks are invested with, from physical aspect to type of residents, norms and practices. 
As for the 'new rich' in C, they are strategically included or excluded (portrayed as 'not 
fitting in') from representations of the place, through the situated articulations that old 
guard residents perfonn. 
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CHAPTER10 
IDENTITY-WORK IN RELATION TO PLACE IN BLOCK 
NEIGHBOURHOODS: THE CASE OF TITAN AND DRUMUL TABEREI 
Block areas in Bucharest 
The areas of Titan (T) and Drumul Taberei (DT) are block areas. They are large 
units in terrns of both population and area, and they are made up of smaller areas or 
neighbourhoods. The following analysis is based on accounts from respondents living in 
neighbourhoods in each of these areas respectively. 
The production of place through representations and practices intersects with the 
production of identity. This chapter looks at identity-work performed by DT and T 
respondents which uses (constructs of) place of residence to negotiate the dominant 
subject positions presented in chapter 8. 
Representations of block neighbourhoods have been intermeshed with various 
societal discourses and socio-economic processes: in the 1960s for example, blocks were 
seen as a symbol of progress and salubrious accommodation, with facilities that older 
houses lacked (modem bathrooms and kitchens, hot water and heating centrally 
distributed as opposed to wood-fired heating systems, etc. ). As one respondent put it, 
In the 1960s and 1970s everyone wanted to live in a block, it was fashionable and 
modem, and those having received a flat through their workplace were looking 
down on us, still living in old houses. Well, now it's the other way around! (C17, 
54, female) 
In the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, the shortages intensified, and blocks were 
deprived of adequate heating, electricity, and their physical infrastructure entered a 
process of premature decay, resulting in a shift in the perceptions around them. This was 
coupled with the demolition policy that erased most of the 'old Bucharest', and displaced 
residents without their consent (they were allocated flats in blocks), which intensified the 
symbolic rejection of blocks by segments of the population, as they became equated with 
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the communist regime and its abusive impositions. Dissident intellectuals in the 
communist era, for example, have portrayed the block as a symbol of communism and 
breaking of the human spirit, remoulding of humans by communist distorted standards. 
Blocks came to be seen, to a certain extent, as tools of oppression during the 
communist regime, where the population was better 'controlled' because of the lack of 
autonomy from the central distribution system (as the providers of water, heating and 
electricity, under the strict control of the regime, could at the push of a button stop their 
distribution for tens of thousands of families -a frequent practice in the last years of the 
regime). 
At present, an important aspect concerning the 'block' study areas is the fact that, 
in contrast to the C neighbourhood, there is much more 'knowledge' or representations 
being produced about 'blocks', converging from numerous, powerful sites, such as the 
mass media , intellectual and 'new rich' milieus, etc. 
Newspapers, opinion magazines, TV talk-shows and even academic journals post- 
1989 have devoted entire issues to the 'block problem' and 'homo blocus' (the typical 
resident of the block). Blocks are seen as an unfortunate solution that the communists had 
to implement in response to the high demands for accommodation from the 1950s on. 
The 'lack of vision' which has accompanied the construction of block neighbourhoods is 
I 
now blamed for a variety of ills, from lack of parking space to conflicts and youth gangs 
Moreover, this type of discourse puts forward the notion that living in blocks has created 
a special breed of humans - 'homo blocus' 
2 that are unable to recognise the values of 
individualism and private property and has stifled civicness and initiative. In chapter 6 
the image of the 'communist man' as constructed in the backwardness discourse has been 
detailed; the profile of the block resident reproduces the same traits: blocks are after all 
seen as the 'natural environment' of 'communist man'. 
This type of portrayal of blocks and of their inhabitants is refuted by respondents 
in DT and T through their depictions of 'block life'. As the analysis below will show, 
most individual accounts challenge this representation and focus on the degree of 
At the same time, these type of accounts tend to ignore the fact that bad planning is not an exclusively 
4communist' feature; in the Western world as well, plenty of residential accommodation was built in a way 
that now engenders serious problems. 




independence that a block allows, on the pleasant and useful nature of social relations in 
blocks, and on the amount of initiative and self- organisation that life in blocks actually 
requires. 
At the time of the fieldwork, degrading or negative images of block life were 
frequent in public accounts -a feature that can potentially interfere with the ways block 
dwellers use their place of residence to ground identity in a valorising way. The media 
constantly presents blocks as problem-ridden, difficult places to live in, through relentless 
accounts of eviction situations, spectacular neighbourly conflicts, bad services, 
disintegrating buildings, the heating issue, rising costs of maintenance and services. 
The pressing issue of the rising costs associated with living in a block (where the 
charges for heating, electricity and water for a flat often surpass the income of the family 
3 living in it, especially in the winter months) has led to new problems for block dwellers . 
As the bill for most of these services is issued for the whole block rather than individual 
flats, having residents who can not afford to pay means that the rest of the neighbours 
have to come up with the remaining sum, if they want to avoid the whole block being 
disconnected from the heating system or water supply. If the families in debt (the so- 
called 'datornici') do not come up with the money within a certain period of time (subject 
to negotiation with both the block administration and the suppliers), the block 
organisation has no other option but to sue them in order to recover the due amount. As a 
result, the 'datornici' families have to sell the flat; with the remaining money after the 
block organisation has been paid, they usually purchase a smaller, cheaper flat, in a less 
desirable neighbourhood. Often though, the value of their flat barely covers the amount 
of the debt, in which case they become homeless. 
It is through this process that segregation between and homogenising within 
residential areas has occurred in the post-communist period, especially after the mid- 
1990s. The issue of evicted families is frequently mentioned in DT and T interviews, and 
points to the difficult and often painful manner in which it is dealt with by the block 
community, and to the underlying practices of solidarity or individualism (and the ways 
they are related to changes in the discursive structures). 
' It is a problem that started in the late 1990s, as a result of various policies that increased the price of fuel 
(including withdrawals of state subsidies) to unprecedented levels. 
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The symbolic construction of place in block areas proceeds through similar moves as in 
C, by attributing signification, among others, to the built environment, location, services, 
amenities, and residential composition, creating 'local character' in a valorising manner. 
Discursive deployment of the built environment, services and local history 
The C residents' representation of blocks emphasised their homogeneity, an 
image that is not familiar at all to block residents 4. The idea of sameness does not make 
sense for the inhabitants of blocks, who apply the same techniques of place production as 
in C: the creation of distinctions and the investing of differences with meanings. The 
environment of the block provides the 'material' that will be integrated in symbolic forin 
in the construction of place. 
The study area within T 
The study neighbourhood within the larger T area is formed of mostly four storey 
blocks among which some ten storey blocks were later interposed. It is placed near an 
underground station, and is bordered by a large avenue on one side and a big park on the 
other. 
A first step in creating this place is establishing of boundaries: residents delimit 
their area from the neighbouring ones on the basis of perceived characteristics of the built 
environment and of the inhabitants. 
Our neighbourhood, how is it different? Well, it's part of T, but then T is really 
big, with many neighbourhoods. This one is among the best. Best quality of the 
blocks, if you look at how spacious flats are. (T 16, f6 1) 
Where I live in T is a good area, a few streets down it's different, you have more 
destitute families, truant children that hang out in front of the block all day... their 
parents barely cope financially, too many worries about tomorrow, so they cannot 
keep them in check. It's not the case here, where people are not exactly 
struggling. (T7,00) 
The physical characteristics are used in a process of contrasting and comparison with 
other areas: the creation of place involves careful positioning in relation to other sites. On 
4 Also, C residents tend to talk about 'blocks' indiscriminately - they rarely acknowledge that there are 
significant differences between various block areas. 
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the first level there is the location of the particular block the respondent lives in within 
the neighbourhood (the characteristics of the block and the period it belongs to, as this 
location within the history of the area has specific consequences); on the next level, the 
neighbourhood is positioned within the bigger area of T (through a process of 
comparative evaluation, an effort to elicit the uniqueness of the respective neighbourhood 
within an area of blocks); on a third level, the residents look at T as a major area within 
the city of Bucharest, and appraise it in relation to the city centre, but mostly in relation 
to similar large block areas (like DT). 
In the case of T, the built environment and history are intertwined as the blocks 
have been built in distinct 'waves' starting with the late 1960s. This history of the 
neighbourhood - consisting of successive construction periods - is inscribed in the 
distinct shapes the neighbourhood took, in the recognisable traits the place displays 
(buildings, green spaces, parking lots, the park, etc. ). The oldest construction wave 
consisted of four storey blocks made of bricks as opposed to the newer 10 storey blocks, 
built in between and further away from the older ones, using lower-quality pre-fabricated 
units. 
Our blocks were built in the 'first wave', the 1960s, 1967 1 think is the exact year. 
Things were done properly then... (TI, f56) 
As you can see, these blocks are well-designed, with a clear architectural vision, 
that respected the need for open space, light and green areas; what was built 
afterwards, and especially in the 1980s, is a completely different story: everything 
was done hastily, and it shows. (T 19, f46) 
For our block they have used good quality building materials; it's brick, not pre- 
fabricated units; these blocks have emerged from the '77 earthquake unscathed - 
the new ones were not up yet back then, I'm sure they would have crashed. (T3, 
m34) 
The period the block was built represents a ma or reference point in assessing the 
appearance, value and benefits the place can offer. The preponderance of older four 
storey, good quality blocks (as opposed to much of the block accommodation throughout 
Bucharest famed for its low quality and fast degradation rate) is one of the main factors 
that give the neighbourhood in T its distinctiveness and also the reputation of a decent, 
desirable place to live. 
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There are in the neighbourhood newer blocks as well, this one there was built in a few months, honestly. I've watched them constructing it from my kitchen 
window. Ten storeys. This is not a solid block, I've seen how sloppy they were. But, thank god, they didn't build too many of those here, they didn't spoil the look of the place. (TIO, A8) 
This is a nice neighbourhood, it doesn't overwhelm you - because the blocks are 
mostly four storey high. The newer parts of T are very different: it's all tall 
blocks, with no green spaces in between, crammed, so that they could stack 
people in them ... (T4, A3) 
In the Bucharest landscape, most of T is portrayed as a 'good', desirable area. 
T and DT are good neighbourhoods, mostly quality flats. Look at the X 
neighbourhood: it was built much later, and it shows serious signs of 
deterioration. (T7, m34) 
Another component that shapes the image of the place is the green areas. The 
neighbourhood is described constantly as 'green' and pleasant. The space in between 
blocks has allowed for front and back green spaces to emerge, surrounding the blocks. 
Most alleys between blocks are lined by trees. Many of the green spaces are enclosed, 
and the residents have planted trees, flowers, etc. Some are better taken care of than 
others, and in a few cases much work has been put into transforming the green space into 
a landscaped garden, with benches, barbecues, flowers. Some of the residents bring chairs 
out and use these gardens to relax in the hot summer days. Most find the sight of green 
space from their window or balcony comforting, and also an antidote to the pollution and 
noise of the city. 
Look at this green space I have under my window... I do take care of it, together 
with a few other neighbours. It's worth it, it's not only a relaxing thing to do, but 
also the smell of flowers coming through the window, especially at night, in the 
summer, is priceless. It fills me with happiness, washes away bad thoughts... 
(T2 1, f6O) 
It makes a huge difference, having this sort of greenery around. When I come 
back from work, I take a shower and then spend some time in the balcony, staring 
at the trees and flowers. It's such a contrast, there is no noise here, and less 
polluted, the trees stop some of the fumes. (TI 1, m22) 
The presence of green space is one of the strongest markers of what a place has to offer in 
terms of quality of life. Every single interviewee from the study area within T has 
mentioned at the top of the list of reasons for liking the place or for enjoying living there 
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the 'green factor'. What makes the place unique is the proximity of a large park - it is the 
one thing none of the other block neighbourhoods in Bucharest has, in the opinion of the 
T residents. 
This place has an advantage over all other neighbourhoods - the T park, one of 
the largest in Bucharest. You know, a trip there is almost like ... a little holiday. I know, other areas have their parks too, but they cannot compare with ours, which 
has a lake, boats, an island... (T5, S 1) 
A further factor that contributes to the image of the study neighbourhood in T is 
the social aspect: by comparison with other areas, the study area is portrayed as a 'good', 
4quiet' area, meaning sheltered from violent social problems which plague many of the 
surrounding neighbourhoods (gangs, children and youth over whom the family has lost 
control, drug addicts, domestic violence, serious fights and discord between neighbours, 
poverty and squalor). The study area appears as an oasis of relative prosperity and 
tranquillity in a larger area made up of contrasting neighbourhoods - some affluent and 
others impoverished and dangerous (the so-called ghettos). 
In the ghettos ... the police 
don't go, it's very poor, unemployed people, families 
with children, and the kids and youngsters are into drugs. Discarded syringes 
everywhere... it's truly dangerous. I didn't believe such a place exists near where 
I live, but I've seen them myself. (T6, SO) 
Throughout accounts, the respondents from the study area employ discursive 
techniques to delimitate and separate it from the impoverished ones, which, although just 
across the boulevard, belong to a 'different world' that the interviewed residents do not 
come in contact with. Some of these contrasting surrounding neighbourhoods are 
portrayed as 'problem areas', unsafe, where one does not venture in the evening, others 
are just 'poor workers' blocks', inhabited by more destitute families, that display the 
signs of poverty (the hallways are poorly maintained, the walls are covered in obscene 
inscriptions, the lighting is dim, the lift is not working because the residents cannot afford 
the repair costs, etc. ). This process of symbolically delimiting one's neighbourhood from 
the surrounding 'different' ones is to be understood in terms of the issue of identity in 
relation to place. 
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The study area within DT 
DT as well is an 'old' block area, built in the 1960s. One aspect that sets DT apart 
from T is the fact that it is perceived as being more homogenous, and therefore the 
distinctiveness of the neighbourhoods within it is somehow less marked: there are no 
ghetto-areas in DT to provide a major contrast, and therefore the individuality of 
neighbourhoods does not come across as strongly. 
The study area is portrayed as a 'good quality' block neighbourhood, with large, 
airy flats and green spaces. The location is important, as desirability of a place is assessed 
in terms of access to the town centre 5, which puts this neighbourhood in DT in an 
advantageous position compared to more 'peripheral' block areas. The physical features 
of the place are valorised, in a manner similar to the other study neighbourhoods. DT is 
seen as having unique, special qualities that set it apart in the landscape of Bucharest and 
place it in an elite position among block areas. 
In contrast to the neighbourhood in T, DT enjoys a more glamorous image: the 
local residents struggle to impose a representation that, beyond good quality 
accommodation, encompasses lifestyle- enhancing traits. Apart from the greenery and the 
local park, DT has the benefit of the (recently privatised) swimming pool, good 
restaurants, tennis grounds, sports hall, and lots of bars. This pen-nits a 'better' lifestyle, 
compared to other places, and an intense local social life - this particular aspect was put 
forward by the younger respondents, most of them young professionals. 
I go out a lot. I eat out a lot, without spending that much money. Because the local 
restaurants offer great quality stuff, and the waitress knows us, and... I just enjoy 
going with my wife after a particularly tough day at work. (DT6, m28) 
Everything I need is here. The tennis courts are good, the bars cater for all types 
of pockets: it's not like in most block neighbourhoods where they only have 
cheap, nasty drinking places. You find in DT top of the range stuff, and less 
expensive as well. I'm not ashamed to come here for after-work drinks with my 
office mates. (DT21, m34) 
' Most of the shopping and leisure centres are located in the town centre, as well as most administrative or 
bureaucratic institutions, and the majority of white-collar jobs. 
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How often? I do go out everyday. To meet friends. We just get a beer, and spend 
time together in some open air bar, or if it's cold, in one of the local drinking 
places. (DT23,00) 
The existence of a 'neighbourhood social life' was emphasised as a unique feature: 
My friends in T don't have any place like that to get together, they do it in 
people's houses, which is not great, because you just want to go out sometimes, to 
feel you're in a different place. And sometimes they just take the subway to go 
centre-town, which is time consuming and expensive... I'm really glad I live here. 
It's a great place. (DT24,04) 
For other residents, other place-specific aspects took priority, such as the shops, the open 
market or the medical centres. 
What I appreciate about this area is the quality of products in the open market - 
they do not rip you off like in the town centre, pensioners can have a more decent, 
healthy diet here than in other parts of the town, and the fact that the clinic is 
close by, and the doctors very competent, and they have state of the art machinery 
and all... (DT3, f76) 
In general, the good quality of life in DT is ensured by spacious, good quality flats in 
blocks that are not crammed together, but also by facilities and a thriving 'use' of what 
the place has to offer in terms of entertainment and leisure. 
Residents constantly highlight the excellent quality of the local services and 
facilities, and the fact that they do not depend on the town centre for shopping, 
healthcare, socialising. This represents a way of positing DT as a self-sufficient area, a 
move which aims at erasing the 'dependency' or subaltern status of block areas in 
relation to the town centre. 
The use of 'local history' as a means of associating the area with significant 
periods of the past is a technique that both DT and T respondents deploy. Both study 
neighbourhoods were erected in the 1960s. By locating their area with the late 1960s, 
respondents make a connection with a part of the communist past when lifestyles were 
more pleasurable, the quality of life higher compared to later times, a period of progress 
and hope. DT especially, at the time, constituted an exemplary marrying of rational 
planning and quality. 
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Historical time is used to separate the DT and T study neighbourhoods from other 
newer block areas, which are associated with the more recent communist period, when 
living standards deteriorated and shortages plagued everyday life, and the dream of a 
better life was replaced by despair at being run by a ruthless dictator. 
This selective articulation of the built form with historical circumstances or 
intervals plays into the representation of the study neighbourhoods. 
Constructini! the profile of the local resident in the T and DT study areas 
The 'quality' of the residents is central to locally produced representations of the study 
neighbourhood in T. The inhabitants are generally seen as respectable families and of a 
certain material status: most poor families have been squeezed out, because of the 
impossibility to pay their share of the maintenance bills (generally they have sold their 
flat and moved out of the study neighbourhood). The lack of 'datomici' is one of the 
clearest indicators of the status of a residential area: 
When I bought the flat, first thing I went in the block hallway to check the list of 
residents 6_ and they didn't have any 'datomici'. It's a good block, everyone can 
pay, so that's one worry less for me. (T3, m34) 
We had some problems with a couple of families who couldn't afford the 
maintenance. In the end, they were evicted, it went very fast, poor things ... 
if they 
would reinforce the legislation with this speed in other areas, this country would 
get out of crisis much faster. Now it's only good families left. J16, f6l) 
Residents define themselves as coping financially, with many families above the average 
income. 
The neighbours? Not very rich, not very poor either. We do not have high state 
dignitaries among us, but we do not have very poor families either. J2 1, f6O) 
There are some poorer families, and some well-off professionals as well, the type 
that buy expensive cars and all. (T14, m66) 
The presence of young professionals (preferably working for foreign companies) 
is a 
symbolic resource that is used to raise the profile of the area and of the 
local resident. 
6 The list is displayed in the block entrance hall, with the names of all residents and their status regarding 
the payment of various block bills. 
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This category of residents buy flats in the area, refurbish them and contribute to all block 
expenses without accumulating arrears. The fact that well-off people choose to buy flats 
in the area reflects on the image of the place. 
The guy that moved upstairs paid in cash, 30.000 Euros. It's a two bedroom flat, 
and he refurbished it to high standards. And he's not an exception. Many people 
with money have bought flats here. (T2, D 1) 
Areas such as the study neighbourhood in T are considered an acceptable residence for 
young professionals; the first step in one's residential tra ectory that accompanies 
material success is moving out of the parents' house and acquiring a flat - in a decent 
block neighbourhood (flats in old residential areas tend to be very expensive, beyond the 
means of young professionals; besides they are too big usually, more suitable as family 
homes). Only later on, as their income increases, and they have a family, children, they 
are expected in the general normative context to move in a bigger, 'proper' house, which 
at the time of conducting interviews included big block apartments, but mostly newly 
built villas, or flats in new developments in the suburbs of Bucharest. 
In the meantime, the material status of this category of young professionals 
becomes a resource in creating valQrising representations of the place, despite them being 
a minority among T residents. 
While there are many intellectuals and professionals living in T blocks, they tend 
to work in the less lucrative state sector, and they are invoked less as a symbol of quality 
and prestige (which was the case in the C neighbourhood), and more as just nice, decent 
folks. At the same time, the same signifier of 'decent', 'respectable' applies to working 
class residents. 
The neighbours are decent people. All categories, from waiters to engineers. But 
there isn't much difference here between us - the professor upstairs earns as much 
as my son, who is a mechanic. We discuss together in the evenings in front of the 
block about all sorts of things, politics especially. (T22, m56) 
I've never made a fuss about me being an engineer and my neighbours just 
workers. No, what matters is being a decent person, a good neighbour. (T 14, m66) 
What sort of people live here? Well, all sorts, more and less educated, but most 
are respectful people, that you can depend on, helpful, and they take good care of 
the flat. (T4, f43) 
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The image of the resident in the study area within T coalesces under 'respectable and 
decent people' signifier, and her/his main qualities are defined in terms of how they 
contribute to a pleasant lifestyle in the block. This contribution has a wide range of 
meanings, which include, among others, being helpful and polite, taking good care of the 
property, paying the block bill in time, lack of arrogance, chatting to the others, and 
respect of privacy. 
The accent in all accounts is placed on the importance of living in relative 
harmony: the respondents in the T study area took pride in the fact that neighbours were 
(usually) reasonable enough to reach the necessary compromises, and there was enough 
common ground among residents for a shared understanding to emerge; the fact that they 
tended to broadly agree on ways of doing things allowed for the cohabitation to be 
pleasant or at least less stressful. 
Representations of 'the DT resident', or 'what sort of people live here' that 
emanate from the study area within DT focus around the signifiers 'elite people' and 
'good mix of people'. On the one hand, many well-off people continue to live in the area, 
along with respected academics, politicians, doctors, lawyers, etc. The fact that 
respectable, successful professionals and business-people choose to live here and 
consider the neighbourhood a suitable place for their position is a strongly valorising 
feature, which grounds a prestigious collective image. A few ministers and highly placed 
officials come from this DT area. On the other hand, although the study neighbourhood 
contained a high proportion of intellectuals and professionals, the composition in terms of 
occupation is rather mixed, and includes skilled manual and clerical; this characteristic is 
often described as 'a good mix of people'. 
Again, the residents' qualities that make DT a good place to live in and that are 
built into representations of the place are material and professional status, and, equally 
important, 'decency' and respect. Like the study area in T, DT is seen as 'good to live in' 
because 'quiet', meaning lacking social problems and major conflicts - due to the type of 
people living there. There are almost no mentions of 'datornici' in the DT study area, 
indicating a higher material standard on average than in the T neighbourhood. 
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DT is perceived more as an elite neighbourhood in the landscape of Bucharest 
block areas, with more 'educated' people than in T. 
The local moral order 
Neighbourly relations expose both a han-nonious side of the local interaction, and 
also divergences between visions on how to do things, or what the appropriate behaviour 
is. The blocks make visible the clash of non-ns that govern people's daily practices, and 
more generally life goals, and the criteria employed to evaluate people"s position and 
behaviours. 
The norins regarding neighbourliness in both T and DT oscillate between help and 
non-interference. Both types of interaction are placed in a moral context, therefore the 
characterisation of local relations can always be related to the larger normative 
background that dominant discourses set out. 
Some respondents draw out traits of the 'block life' that reaffirm the dominant 
individualistic ethos, with its emphasis on autonomy and self-interest. 
I think there are advantages to living in a block. If the block is 'clean', without 
'datornici% of course. You can be totally independent. All, the problems get sorted 
for you by the block administrator, so you don't have to worry about the roof 
leaking... it's their problem. (T 18, f27) 
Well, they say in the block you have to talk to everyone, but really that is a matter 
of choice. If you want, you can stop and make friends with the neighbours, tell 
them how your day was, all that. But if you don't, a 'hello' will do, and a firin 
hint you're not into small talk, if they are too nosy. (DT12,06) 
In this rendering, autonomy and freedom are possible within block arrangements, and so 
is the control of boundaries and the choice with whom to interact. 
The flat is my territory, and I've always made it very clear to the rest of the 
neighbours. We don't chat in my flat, but outside. (DT17, m26) 
You know, I come from a detached house. So I was a bit wary about moving in 
this flat [after getting married]. I thought I would have to fend off nosy 
neighbours, but it's not that at all, everyone is reserved, so you can choose 
whether you want to push the relationship towards friendship or not. I have a 
couple of very close friends by now, but that's it. The rest are not my type. (T5, 
B 1) 
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Sometimes, respondents stress the regulated (as opposed to inforinal) relationships that 
prevail in their block, the lack of neighbourly interference, as a positive trait, more in line 
with a 'civilised' type of interaction, and with the dominant societal norms. 
No, it's not informal, on the contrary, everything is very polite and planned. 
Block meetings are scheduled in advance, and agreed upon, and otherwise people 
don't chit chat, or ask for things from neighbours, unless of course they happen to 
be really good friends. (DT4, f42) 
This rejection of informality is usually accompanied by a refutation of the norm of 
mutual help and reciprocity - the latter is associated with the danger of interdependence, 
or 'too close' relations. 
I don't know, I wouldn't borrow and... this type of things. It is a slippery slope, 
you get dragged into relationships, and then expectations are built. It's better to 
keep this type of relations for the family and close friends. (DT20, B 1) 
I don't ask for help from neighbours. Only from family, I don't want to enter too 
close relations with the neighbours ... because then they will ask for things... (DT29, m33) 
The moral position that comes through in these interviews and that is enacted in the local 
system of relationships shows a reluctance to establish relations that can be associated 
with interference, mutual involvement and help, and an endorsement of norms of 
individualism. It also indicates the tendency towards a privatised lifestyle, and reluctance 
to enter reciprocal relations outside the narrow circle of the family and a few trusted 
friends. 
At the same time, a divergent normative position is fleshed out in the DT and T 
interviews, based on the valorisation of interdependence, of close contact and informality 
of neighbourly relationships. This approach is advocated on the basis of its advantages - 
grouped under the signifiers of 'pleasant' or 'useful'. 
It's nice to count on people, it makes your life easier. (T2 1, f6O) 
I don't mind close relationships, I've had close relationships with these people for 
so many years now, and that's what got me through some tough times. (T 10, A 8) 
My husband spends lots of time chatting with the neighbours, it's part of the 
pleasant atmosphere of the neighbourhood, all these friendships. They are like 
family by now. (T 13, f62) 
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Having good relations is very important, having people to ask little favours from, 
the neighbours are there for you if need arise, rather than the family. (DT27, m32) 
These informal neighbourly relations, including reciprocal help and exchanges, are 
articulated with advantages that a privatised strategy would not yield, and with normative 
stances on 'the good person' in this society - sometimes in direct contrast with the self- 
centred, individualistic perspective of the dominant discourses. 
I don't know how I would cope alone, I mean living in a detached house or 
something, without all these people nearby. I am a single woman, and these 
neighbours are all my help and comfort. I invest in the relationship, my door is 
open for help and I count on them to do the same. I don't earn much, and here I'm 
able to get things done by neighbours: from repairing the washing machine, to 
shifting the furniture around when I painted the walls. And so many other 
things... (DT7,09) 
I don't agree with this thing, that everyone seems to be into nowadays ... it's not 
normal to retire in your flat the moment you come back from work and to refuse 
to acknowledge that you live among people. No, a good word here and there is 
more appropriate, if you think of yourself as a decent person. (DT 13, f64) 
A prominent way of portraying neighbourly relationships in the DT and T areas 
associates them with warmth, meaningful interaction, and personalised contact (as 
opposed to impersonal, contractual relationships). For many respondents the block and 
neighbourhood become a support structure that enhances the quality of life through the 
rewarding dimension of human interaction. 
I am attached to these people, of course, we've been living in the block for more 
than 30 years now. We know each other's grandchildren, and talk about our 
families when we meet ... People care about these things. 
(T 14, m66) 
I'm spending most evenings in the summer on the bench at the entrance of the 
block, and talk to people about us, about life, and about where this country is 
heading to. It's better than TV, we can argue and throw in a joke. (DT 14, m3 8) 
I'm spending most of the day at the office, and when I come back it's refreshing 
to be able to exchange some words with these people. They are kind and ask me 
about my day and also ask for advice on various matters. I'm happy to help if I 
can, because they do care about me, it's ... different, not 
like my workmates. 
(DT16, t25) 
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As for norms at area level rather than in one's block, they seem to be diluted in T, while 
ostensible articulations are present in DT. In both areas DT and T norms were described 
both in a positive manner - what they consist of - and in negative one - by contrast with 
the norms in other areas, especially similar 'block neighbourhoods' of 'inferior' standing: 
in this way norms of acceptable standards of behaviour are created through opposition. 
The local norms that play into the construction of the study area in T as a 
particular type of place (and which are inextricably related to facets of personal identity) 
concern a 'decent' type of behaviour - meaning a degree of politeness, care for the 
environment (littering is frowned upon) and lack of aggressive shouting and domestic 
disputes. The latter are the characteristic of lower-standing neighbourhoods, the ones that 
foster stark deprivation, high delinquency, drugs problem, and therefore inappropriate for 
a 'decent' neighbourhood, like the study-area. 
In the DT area, place-based norms in relation to social interaction include respect 
towards the neighbours, respect of privacy, but also openness and helpfulness, and a 
general attitude of trust - respondents trust the good intentions of most residents (the 
place is perceived as very safe); and the fact that they can get help in emergencies from 
anyone in the street. This helpfulness norm applies beyond the circle of close neighbours 
and is considered part of a 'civilised' behaviour. Other norms refer to conduct in public 
spaces (littering is usually sanctioned by remarks from the passing-by residents; making 
noise, shouting, swearing in public is disapproved of). Most importantly, 'showing off, 
meaning an attitude of superiority, because of one's material status, is discouraged. This 
is one of the most striking norms in the DT study area among young residents, and it is a 
strong symbolic resource in the attempt to negotiate subject positions in a predominantly 
materialistic normative environment. 
People cannot come here and show off with their car or mobile, like they do in 
other neighbourhoods. We would just laugh at them. (DT28, S 1) 
The show-off type of new rich don't come here, at the local restaurants or bars. Or 
if they are new rich living here, they keep a low profile, maybe they go to show 
off in the centre town and throw money at the waitress, but here they are just 
decent. (DT24, S 1) 
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We just don't care about one's money. What I like about DT is that you can stay 
at a bar with a beer for hours and you are treated with respect, you don't have to 
spend like mad. (DT22, m3 1) 
Young adult DT residents in the study area work hard at discrediting the image of social 
success and worth as revolving around money and expensive items. They oppose this 
representation by re-defining value and worth around other features than material status 
and conspicuous consumption: being a good friend (including reciprocity, openness, 
trustworthiness), and having a 'decent' attitude take pre-eminence. The signifier 
'decency' is here defined in opposition to the show-off attitude: it means lack of posing, 
bragging and flaunting expensive items. 
I have a strong group of friends to count on, and moreover, I can count on their 
friends that I don't even know, that's how it works. If I need something, I have a 
lot of friends in the neighbourhood that will jump at my rescue. Even the ones 
with money are decent, they help if they can, and don't do all that posturing and 
flashing cars and credit cards stuff. (DT23, DO) 
Identity and the local interactional order 
A different level of identity negotiation by accessing a 'role' in the local system 
of relations is illustrated in block neighbourhoods - to a larger extent that the C area. Due 
to the specific arrangements in blocks there are 'roles' that need fulfilling, some formal 
and others informal. The formal roles are linked to the block administration, but apart 
from that there are duties and positions that some residents assume. 
For example, coming up with proposals and initiatives about how to improve the 
block, what to do about the green spaces, the parking space, petitioning the local 
authorities and keeping an eye on the children at play are 'roles' - or subject positions in 
the local system of social relations - that diverse people can take up and invest in. The 
ýroles' one plays in the place of residence sometimes allow one to feel useful and needed, 
or to develop a sense of power. Through being skilled at negotiating and influencing 
outcomes or obtaining better services for the block (like choosing the cheapest cable 
company for example), certain residents will derive a sense of identity and self-worth 
from the processes that take place at block level. 
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The block itself is a local hierarchical system of relations -a respectable position 
in this block system represents a subject position that can interact with other positions 
that a person occupies. 
In this way, some residents find locally-provided positions that will interfere with 
(and possibly dislocate to various extents) other subject positions in the societal context. 
This resource seems particularly useful for retired residents - as mentioned in a previous 
chapter, it is difficult to attach valorising connotations to the position of retiree in the 
current normative landscape dominated by an individualistic-materialistic outlook, where 
occupation (as a source of income and prestige) is an indicator of social worth. Older, 
retired people tend to be marginalised and devalued by this set of dominant articulations, 
but they can find a 'niche' for a more valorised subject position in the place of residence, 
in the local system of relations. Being able to show their competence at organising and 
managing block-related problems, and feeling useful and respected, is a way of 
mitigating the undesirable position societal discourses carve out for them. 
The case studies below illustrate the claims regarding the 'local roles' block 
residents can take and that are involved in the negotiation of identity. 
DTIO, female, 51 years old - the block administrator 
Ms M. is a block administrator in the DT study area. She is 51 years old, single 
with no children and had been made redundant two years earlier from a clerical job. She 
had tried to find other jobs, unsuccessfully, then accepted the position of block 
administrator. 
When I was made redundant, I thought I'll get another job soon, but it became 
clear that no-one would hire a middle aged woman. I was finished. I panicked a 
bit, and I was talking to my neighbours, and one said: 'why don't you take up the 
administrator position? It will be available soon' and I said 'but I know nothing 
about the block and suppliers and all that'. But... I did accept it. The block 
is full 
of young people with good jobs, so they don't have any time, no-one was 
interested in becoming the administrator, so I thought I'll do it! It's a source of 
income, very little, but then I don't spend much. The rest of the money comes 
from renting out a room in my flat to a student. Anyway, I had to 
learn 
everything! Look at me, at 50 1 had to learn about plumbing, some accountancy, 
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about how to deal with the suppliers... you should see me dealing with them, I'm 
better than a lawyer! I save people lots of money because I know about plumbing 
and appliances, and I fix theirs, they would otherwise pay loads, but they can 
choose to give me a little - not money necessarily, some prefer to give me a nice bottle of wine, it's up to them, I don't ask, but people always feel indebted and 
want to offer something. Of course, if they are pensioners I'm doing it for free, I 
don't accept any offerings. And now I'm indispensable, that's what they say. 
Other blocks have problems with administrators that run off with all the residents' 
money for bills, lots of money, imagine hundreds of families, the money for a few 
month's heating, water, all that. It's happening a lot! While my neighbours know 
that they can trust me, I am completely honest. 
I do a lot of things apart from the administrator tasks. I do the shopping for four of 
my ill, elderly neighbours. They don't have any family, and depend on me for 
their food. I really keep an eye on them, in case they need a doctor. And other 
things ... I care about this block, so I always try to motivate people to do a bit of 
work on the green space of the block... 
T12, male, 63 years old - the 'block pacifier' 
Mr G is a retired person, living in the T study area, with his wife. He details here his 
skills at appeasing conflicts in his block. 
I am retired now, I used to be a physical education teacher. I trained so many kids 
in the neighbourhood... I was in charge of the basketball team, and put a lot of 
effort into it. Nowadays I walk in the neighbourhood and meet them, and their 
families, and we always stop for a talk... because I'm this type of person, always 
open to listening to the other and offering advice. That's why in the block 
everyone calls me when there is a conflict: I am the one they turn to. I know how 
to negotiate with people and calm them down and make them reason. I never lose 
my temper and they respect me, therefore I can do it. So many cases of 
neighbourly conflict... some neighbours that were not even talking to each other 
anymore -I sorted them out, most of them, and created a nicer atmosphere in the 
block for everyone. It's a talent maybe that I have, but I also care about these 
people and I want us to live in a civilised environment. 
DT12, female, 36 years old - the 'block nurse' 
Mrs S is a 36 years old paediatric nurse, working in a Bucharest hospital. 
At first I was annoyed, I remember, when people were knocking on my door for 
all sorts of problems and emergencies. But I've got used now, and it's part of 
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what I do in the block. Of course, I'm not happy when they wake me up in the 
middle of the night because the kid has a fever, but then I realise that they cannot do without my help. Ok, they can call for an ambulance, and it's gonna take 3 hours for it to arrive. So in the meantime they go mad with panic, and they come 
to me. I'm doing it because these are nice, well-behaved people. And they show 
respect for what I'm doing. In the hospital is different, you know, doctors treat us 
like... no respect. We do all the dirty jobs, and they take the under the table 
payments. From poor people, they don't have any problems with that, I would be 
ashamed to take money from a poor family with a sick child. But doctors don't 
care, and of course they wouldn't give us nurses anything. Do you know how 
much I earn? It's shameful. ... When a neighbour calls 'Mrs Doctor, could you please give a shot to the kid, so 
that we don't have to take the bus to the clinic' -I do it. 
These cases are just a few examples of the multitude of 'local roles' block residents 
sometimes take up: most of my respondents in these areas talked about some type of local 
responsibilities or activities performed in the neighbourhood. 
The respondents above have found meaningful activities in the place of residence, 
that amount to subject positions in the local system of relations. The block administrator, 
apart from managing the block, has taken supplementary responsibilities in supporting 
her elderly neighbours; in this way she had found a niche, an alternative meaningful 
activity, that is recognised as valuable by the community she lives in, and that acts as a 
form of compensation for the loss of a position on the job market (and ensuing loss of 
status) - 
The block 'pacifier', called when conflicts get out of control, takes pride in his 
ability to play a significant part in the local context, one based on the respect he enjoys 
among residents and on his 'talent' -a talent that goes unnoticed in other contexts. As for 
the 'block nurse', she occupies as well an important position in the local web of relations. 
Her worth as a medically trained person is clearly acknowledged by the neighbours - 
who call her 'doctor' - and her locally earned respect has a great value in the context of 
being looked down on and being underpaid at her workplace, the hospital. 
The place can offer resources for self-esteem and identity building that the larger 
society and an individual's (materially determined) position deny, through roles that are 
meaningful locally, in the block or street system of relations and local moral order. 
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Conclusion 
Block residents use categorisation and the production of difference in similar 
ways to C residents in creating the identity of their area. They use the built form and the 
history of the place to create positive, valuable representations, that are supplemented by 
the image of the 'typical resident' and of the norms that guide practices in the place. 
The normative structure of an area is part of the symbolic construction of place. 
While in DT it was possible to identify from the narratives of the place respondents 
offered some overarching shared normative ideas about 'how we do things here' and 
4what sort of place this is' in terms of the prevalent values and norms, in T area-level 
norms seem to aggregate with more difficulty. As mentioned above, in the T area norms 
seem to have trouble in being extended and reinforced by residents beyond a small, 
circumscribed area - discussions on norms and values are restricted to the block. In DT, 
as opposed to T, respondents talk of a strong 'spirit of the place' and of their contribution 
to maintaining this 'spirit' (fiiendliness, openness, lack of posing and pretentiousness). 
Therefore DT offers a stronger basis for identity negotiation (through belonging 
to a place-based collective identity) than T. One of the forins of collective identity based 
in DT is the 'young DT resident' which asserts the values of friendship and cooperation, 
mutual help and trust, the tendency to oblige when asked for help (as exemplified by my 
requests for finding more respondents) and a strong rejection of the 'show-off attitude, 
meaning conspicuous display of material status. The practice of mocking and derision of 
behaviours associated with the financial elite helps young residents in various material 
situations (except the very wealthy) to ground a positive self-image that will be supported 
by the local residents and peers, in the context of massive societal pressures for 
measuring worth in terms of money and material status (the dominant articulations). The 
place-based moral order is a valuable resource for some residents to articulate alternative 
valorised aspects of their selves. 
Also, the combination of perceived quality of the environment and of the 
residents engenders sentiments of pride and satisfaction with the place that is more 
visible in DT than in T- which indicates an enhanced role for DT as an alternative 
resource for identity-work. 
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The level of the block as a local context is also relevant for identity-work. 
Residents occupy symbolic positions in this setting, and they have the possibility to 
invest in these positions and to attach responsibilities to them and gain recognition for 
them. The local standing is a resource that is often used to mitigate a less worthy position 
in the workplace (or the lack of such a position, as in the case of retired residents). The 
block context can valorise skills that are just ordinary in the workplace: the skills of a 
nurse, or of an accountant that neighbours consult for their own problems, become highly 
valued expertise. 
At the same time, in many situations respondents posit the world of the workplace 
as divorced from the place of residence - there are limits to the importing of workplace 
status in the neighbourhood context, where what matters is an income that allows the 
payment of the communal bill, and being a 'good' or decent neighbour. This approach 
makes for an egalitarian ethos, as far as the occupation of the neighbours is concerned; as 
norms of neighbourliness focus on good will and decency in all study-areas, the status of 
a person in the workplace is less relevant in relation to this norm - therefore the place of 
residence can act, to a certain extent, as an equaliser of status. 
This analysis has highlighted the ways in which place of residence - or- rather 
constructions of it that respondents create in a valorising effort - act as resources in 
negotiating identity, and has dwelled less on issues of exclusion and isolation among 
residents. Nevertheless, the latter are present and the ones affected by exclusion have 




DISCUSSION: PLACE AND THE PRODUCTION OF THE SOCIAL; PLACE 
AND IDENTITY WORK 
The analysis chapters 5 to 10 have used concepts of place as a structuring metaphor, and 
this chapter brings together different aspects of the generic relations between 'place' and 
'discourses'. 
In the first part I will present some of the implications of the positioning of 
Eastern Europe in relation to the West on the production of knowledge, in both locations. 
On the one hand, at present the Romanian social space is being produced through 
processes that are firmly linked to the above mentioned hierarchical positioning. On the 
other hand, the local struggle over meaning has the potential to affect the ways aspects of 
the social are conceptualised in the West. Both facets of the relationship between the 
West and Eastern Europe are addressed, and the related issue of the (relational) identity 
of these places is examined. A final section of the first part of this chapter concerns the 
responsibility of knowledge producers., through the lens of developments in Eastern 
European countries. 
The second part of the chapter examines a different aspect of the relation between 
the discursive and place (as place of residence), by bringing together insights from the 
analysis of the C, DT and T study areas. The chapter highlights in a comparative manner 
how place of residence plays into identity work in the context of dominant discourses and 
their subject positions. Notions of agency (in a discursive understanding of the social) 
will be discussed, in the light of research findings. 
The West - Eastern Europe relation 
This thesis attempts an exploration of the relationships between two locations, the West 
and Eastern Europe, at the level of discourse (and implicitly knowledge) circulation, of 
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exchange and mutual influences in terms of concepts, worldviews and cultural models. 
This section will draw out some of the possible outcomes and implications of this 
relation, while acknowledging that the field of articulations through which the West and 
Eastern Europe are constructed in relation to each other is structured by the nodal point of 
'backwardness'. 
The post-communist developments are a relevant field of investigation of the 
discursive relation between the West and Eastern Europe; they can potentially have an 
input in the debates on a range of topics, from the nature of capitalism and modernity, to 
forms of solidarity or individualisation in contemporary societies. These developments 
can be interpreted and used in various ways in theoretical and policy contexts, with 
diverse outcomes - hence the importance of the way they are represented. 
The issue of circulation of knowledge and theories has been a matter of interest 
for various social thinkers. Said for example, according to Carter et al (1993, pxv), was 
"concerned with the locatedness and mobility of theory. He wandered 'whether by virtue 
of having moved from one place and time to another an idea or a theory gains or loses in 
strength, and whether a theory in one historical period and national culture becomes 
altogether different for another period or situation"'. 
This resonates with Foucault's view on how discursive formations are 
incorporated in various contexts (which can refer to different 'spaces'), leading to 
adjustments: "taken up again, placed, and interpreted in a new constellation, a given 
discursive formation may reveal new possibilities ... ; what we are 
dealing with is a 
modification in the principle of exclusion and the principle of possibility of choices; a 
modification that is due to an insertion in a new discursive constellation" (Foucault 2002, 
p75). 
In the same vein, it can be said that articulations that are taken for granted in 
certain environments can be dislocated by the 'surplus of meaning' that other contexts 
bring - and this is particularly relevant 
in the relationships between the West and Eastern 
Europe, with the latter providing a distinct 'context'. 
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The travelling or exchange of knowledge, concepts, theories and practices (of 
discourses in short) between the spaces of the West and Eastern Europe' is conditioned 
by a particular positioning of these spaces, effected through a discourse of backwardness. 
This discourse, produced both in the West and through local contributions, has been 
presented in chapter 6. The representations it creates, the practices it engenders have a 
significant impact on the particular form social change took after 1989 in Eastern Europe, 
and on the ways this change has been interpreted or framed at the level of theoretical 
insights. The backwardness discourse can be seen as an oppressive representational 
practice, as it rests on power relations that give unequal voice to the actors involved, and 
establishes hierarchical epistemic relationships between these actors engaged in the 
struggle over signification and meaning. 
I will present below the impact of this discursive regime on a few levels: the 
production of the social in Eastern Europe after 1989, the ways the post-communist 
experience is interpreted, and the fixing of the identity of the West. The notion of 
responsibility of social scientists in producing knowledge will be also addressed through 
the lens of the backwardness discourse. 
The production of the social in Eastern Europe 
The production of the social in Romania and Eastern Europe has been driven by a 
societal project of 'catching up with the West', or 'return to Europe', which cannot be 
disentangled from the type of knowledge and understandings the backwardness discourse 
has created, as argued in chapter 6. Power operations, deployed through culture, "secure 
the authority to define the future" (Giroux 2004, p151-152); the hegemonic discourse of 
backwardness constrains the ways social actors imagine and act, therefore contributing to 
the shaping the social, including long-term societal projects. 
Social change in Romania (and Eastern Europe) is taking place through the 
working of discourses that re-order the social and regulate the creation of knowledge and 
that are inseparable from socio-cultural and economic models associated with the West. It 
1 The West and Eastern Europe are themselves produced as distinct 'places' through the workings of 
discourses. 
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can be argued that social transformation is driven through different strategies, that range 
from a direct implementation of theories and policies devised in the West (such as the EU 
conditions for accession, or the World Bank and IMF reform programmes), to concepts 
and representations diffused by the media (films, documentaries, etc. ). But at the same 
time the production of the social in Romania is not the result of a unidirectional travelling 
of theory and cultural models, but rather depends on the interaction between these models 
and the local context. The nature of this 'interaction' will be addressed in this chapter. 
The positioning of Eastern Europe and the West defined through the 
backwardness discourse has had a clear impact on the 'social reconstruction' projects that 
all these countries have adopted, and which both at the level of governmental bodies and 
formal institutions, and at the level of everyday life projects (identity- forging) have taken 
the form of becoming Western-like. Local actors have employed in this process their own 
understandings and representations of the West (which Westerners might find inadequate 
or caricatural). 
The dominant societal articulations in the form of materialistic and individualistic 
discourses, that have been documented throughout Eastern Europe, are correlated with 
the local social actors' outlook on social change (which, as mentioned, often means 
becoming westem-like). It can be said that, as far as the discursive struggle is concerned, 
the field of signification is dominated by a materialistic, self-centred stance on life 
(contained in the new hegemonic articulations). This dominant articulation has a central 
role in forging identities (subject positions), and also in establishing the ways through 
which social actors can show their belonging to a certain position - mainly through 
consumption patterns. As the positions in the dominant discourse tend to be assigned 
along a material status criterion, consumption of certain socially sanctioned items (status 
symbols) is supposed to reflect this material condition. 
The Western cultural models adopted (and adapted) in Romania have provided 
templates for how to fashion identity, such as the model of the professional, of the 
politician, of the private entrepreneur or businessperson, etc. Consumption patterns as 
well are heavily drawing on various (locally produced) images of the West, that in their 
turn are linked to the output of the media, from fashion and lifestyle magazines, to TV 
news, talk-shows and movies. The high status consumption items involved in reinforcing 
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identities tend to be 'Western' and their effect is assumed to make their owner more like 
a Westerner. The model of social success takes the West as its referent, and invests 
various products seen as quintessentially 'Western' with a special significance. 
This materialistic outlook that is characteristic of the post-communist social 
landscape is joined by a reaffirmation of individualism (chapter 8). In discussing the case 
of Slovenia, Ule (2004, p 162) emphasises the individualist stance as part of a neo-liberal 
ethos: "[p]ost-socialism also brought with it a resurgence of neo-liberal thinking with 
respect to the role of the market, which emphasises individual initiative, trust in oneself, 
and a strong sense of personal responsibility for one's own life. The changing 
characteristic of transition processes also inevitably induces changes in the structure of 
private and family life". 
These new discourses have consequences for the social strategies that individuals 
adopt, such as forms of solidarity or privatisation of life. At the level of interpersonal 
relations, market relations made possible by the new arrangements have largely replaced 
other ties of reciprocity (like the blat in Romania): while the latter are frequently rejected 
through an association with communism (although they are still part of daily practices, as 
shown in chapter 10), the former have gained legitimacy. Authors have pointed to the 
trend towards an individualisation and privatisation of life in Eastern Europe: "life 
options remain highly structured and collectively determined, but people perceive these 
as individual options and seek solutions to them in private and isolated ways" (Ule 2004, 
p 163) - public opinion surveys indicate an implosion towards privacy and the family, and 
many interviews testify a tendency to retreat from more solidaristic, or communal ways 
of acting. 
The impact of these articulations can also be gauged in the changing forms of 
social cohesion and division - new lines of separation have been created, with new 'us' 
and new 'them', with a prominent dividing line along material criteria. 'The rich' and 
'the poor' are such social groups demarcated by systems of categorisation; the workings 
of discourses have also created awareness around one's position, by compelling people to 
identify themselves as belonging to such categories. 
it can be said that the project of 'catching up with the West' has had an important 
impact on solidarities in Eastern Europe. On the one hand, the organisation of the social 
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space by a certain type of discourses (that are associated with the West) has led to the 
social divisions along material criteria described above. On the other hand, some of the 
consequences of Eastern European countries (including Romania) trying to become more 
Western and 'prove' their belonging to Europe have materialised as discriminatory 
practices. In Romania, for example, the resentment and discrimination towards the Roma 
minority has been couched in terms of 'their' role in slowing down the country's 
integration in European structures. Baltic countries have rushed to implement laws on 
foreign nationals and assert their fundamental difference from the Asiatic Russians 
(Bonnett 2004, p57) showing the eagerness to be part of 'Europe'. It seems that the 
dream of Europe (or of the West) has stimulated in Eastern European countries the need 
to find new ways of 'othering, which have engendered social exclusion and oppressive, 
discriminatory practices. 
New articulations or discursive practices create new social divisions, social 
formations, but also 'potential sites of resistance' (Giroux 2004, p155). As discussed in 
chapters 7 and 8, the local actors have resisted and questioned the meaning and 
desirability of concepts like freedom, democracy and the free market, the prominence 
conferred to money and material status as valid base for social hierarchisation. This is a 
form of resistance to the dominant articulations that represents one type of local voice 
which engages with the West and the types of societal organisation (including system of 
values) the latter fosters. As Chakrabarty (2000, p16) put it, this voice can renew 
European thought "from and for the margins". The next section assesses the prospect of 
local voices or local social arrangements to have an input into the ways the social is 
thought. 
The subversive potential of the 'local'-, modes of framing the Eastern European 
experience and their implications 
"[c]onflicts have a particular configuration that arises historically from the 
development of competing epistemic alignments and from the specific respects in 
which they come into conflict. Such conflict, however, spurs further 
investigations, articulations, and technical refinements. Conflict thus becomes the 
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locus for the continuing development and reorganization of knowledge. " (Rouse 
1994, pI 10). 
The quote above summarises the process of knowledge production through conflict 
between competing systems of articulations. In many respects, the West and Eastern 
Europe can be seen as sites where divergent discourses have been produced - this is 
evident in the distinct forms of social organisation associated to these sites, capitalism 
and communism respectively. The post-communist condition represents the afterinath of 
the confrontation between these divergent articulations, with the adoption of 'Western' 
forms which has prompted a reworking of the local established practices, modes of 
thought and ways of being. It is also a location for investigating the way knowledge is 
being reorganised. 
The analysis chapters 7 and 8 have detailed a type of processes of further 
articulation and attribution of meaning to the signifiers of social change, as they emerge 
from people's reflections on everyday life and their attempts to theorise the events 
surrounding them. This 'diversion of meaning' produced through local articulations can 
be seen as a form of resistance, in the sense that it impedes the fixing of meaning that 
other articulations (which are relatively established in the West) endeavour. Bhabha 
(1994, p2) has highlighted the transformatory potential of 'peripheral' spaces: "[t1he 
borderline engagements of cultural difference ... may confound our definitions of tradition 
and modernity; realign the customary boundaries between the private and the public, high 
and low; and challenge normative expectations of development and progress". 
The difficulties that the discourse of liberal democracy, for example, has in 
hegemonising the social space in Romania contains a subversive potential: they highlight 
the contingency of certain concepts (resisting a representation of democracy or the free 
market as 'normal', natural outcomes, due to laws of evolution), and the operations of 
power that are involved in its articulation. The local counter-hegemonic efforts have the 
potential to exoticise the West and its production of social reality, or its socio-cultural 
products, and to challenge its universalist claims. Local forms of knowledge, in other 
words, could 'provincialise Europe' (Chakrabarty 2000). The Eastern European 
experience has the potential to amount to a form of social critique through the de- 
naturalisation of concepts and practices that go relatively unquestioned in the West (such 
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as market and democracy); it could supply a vocabulary of critique of capitalism and 
democracy, by signifying "from the periphery of authorized power and privilege" 
(Bhabha 1994, p2). 
Therefore when looking at local processes of meaning-making one has to try to 
evaluate their impact in destabilising other articulations - do these processes amount to 
an obstacle to Western forms of fixing of knowledge, or do they engender a modification 
or refinement of various paradigms and theories? 
As mentioned above, the destabilising of meaning takes place through the situated 
use of concepts or meanings (that claim an universal status), and their contextual 
articulation in novel forms that 'confound definitions' (e. g. 'democracy' articulated with 
'freedom to do whatever one wants'), and through a more direct engagement with the 
way meaning is fixed in certain articulations (e. g. 'capitalism as a worthy or superior type 
of economic arrangement because it brings material prosperity' is countered with 
4capitalism means misery and it is not a superior or good form of organisation 9)2. 
Social actors employ in everyday practices concepts and statements from a variety 
of discourses, in a strategic manner; "statements... are institutionalized, received, used, 
re-used, combined together" becoming "instruments for desire or interest, elements for a 
strategy" (Foucault 2002, p129). 
These forms of appropriation of discourse tend to introduce and mix meanings - 
concepts are 'adapted' to fit individual social strategies, and they are modified from one 
context to another. The appropriation of symbols and their use in a modified form leads 
to the idea of subversive use: the initial meaning is altered and dislocated. Discourses 
originating in the West are variously appropriated, re-used and modified (as illustrated in 
chapter 7, that has detailed the overflowing with meaning of signifiers such as 
democracy, individualism or the free market), which, in a parallel with Butler's parodic 
repetition or repetition with a difference 3, can amount to a subversion of the dominant 
system of signification. This might mean that, if these local, "alternative domains of 
cultural intelligibility" (Butler 1990b, p145) are allowed to enter the space of the West, 
2 This type of direct challenge aimed at opposing (dominant) configurations of meaning tends to be 
produced by the 'losers' of social transformation, the most powerless social actors, rather than by the local 
elites. 
3 For Butler (I 990b), it refers to gender identity. 
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they might subvert the concepts, understandings and hierarchies created within the 
clusters of dominant discourses of modernity and capitalism. 
The outcome of these destabilising interpretations though is linked to the 
backwardness discourse. The latter places firmly in a subaltern position alternative 
practices and knowledges, making it easy for them to be marginalised and discarded 
systematically. By defining them as 'inadequate', it de-legitimises them and weakens 
their potential to challenge dominant Western conceptualisations. At the moment these 
alternative claims do not seem to threaten the ways concepts and theories are produced 
and used in the West. In short, there are oppressive representational practices at work, 
underpinned by clear power relations, that constitute the background against which the 
fate of alternative representations is influenced or even decided. As Bhabha noted, "the 
culturally privileged Western elite... produce a discourse of the Other that reinforces its 
own power-knowledge equation" (1994, p20-2 1). 
This discourse of the other creates understandings that encourage the dismissal (as 
inadequate') of anything that does not conform to approved types of knowledge. 
Another strategy social actors and knowledge-producers in the West tend to apply is to 
deflect the potential local critique of certain types of socio-economic arrangements by 
stating that the critique is actually applicable to the hybrid or distorted forms these 
arrangements have taken 'elsewhere' (including Eastern Europe), rather than to the forms 
of social organisation per se (meaning ideal-types, which tend to overlap with Western 
settings). For example, the critique of 'democracy' my respondents mounted by 
articulating it with corruption can be (and is) deflected by countless studies on the 
ýcorrupt' nature of Eastern European societies, including the political structures. The 
implications of such studies are a portrayal of democracy in Eastern Europe as flawed - 
due to local circumstances that have altered 'typical' forms of democracy. In this way, 
Westem forms of democracy are abstracted from their conditions of existence and reified 
as ideal-types, while local (Eastern European) democracy becomes a distorted version 
that can be legitimately critiqued on the basis of its divergence from the model - 'normal' 
functioning democracies in the West. The 'model' thus goes unquestioned: the 
implication of these strategies is a silencing of 'dissident' local voices, which cannot 
threaten the 'validity' and legitimacy of Western theoretical constructs, practices, etc. 
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This issue is part of a deeper question concerning the status of forins of social 
organisation, and more generally practices that have been developing in Eastern Europe - 
how are they conceptualised and represented? 
The example above has exposed one way of framing phenomena (i. e. democracy), 
that is influenced by the backwardness regime of representation. This mode of framing 
can be applied to the whole range of Eastern European post-communist experiences, with 
the result of defining them as flawed versions (of some established model), or hybrids - 
an inevitable outcome of this particular regime of representation. This type of 
representation is for example embedded in the concept of 'transition', that has been 
liberally and largely unquestioningly used to think about and act on Eastern Europe. The 
'transition' assumes some known end-point (in the form of ideal-type democracy and free 
market) in relation to which society has to be moulded, and that local 'variations' detract 
from. 
The ways what happens in Eastern Europe in terms of social transforinations is 
interpreted feeds into processes of knowledge production that are part of the relationship 
between the West and Eastern Europe, and that forge their relational identity. 
Processes or sets of practices like 'capitalism', 'free market', 'democracy', 'civil 
society', 'modernity', etc. are frequently categorised according to ideal-types that have 
been established by an elaboration of the forms they have taken in the West. The 
contingency of these practices in the West is erased in the process, and they emerge as 
disembedded concepts, models or blueprints that, because of the very process of their 
formation, cannot accommodate concepts and objects constituted outside their scope. 
When they clash with the 'local', the effect is an 'adaptation' or modification of the 
models, and it can be represented in normative terms. 
For example, the discussions in the literature around 'capitalism' in post- 
communist Eastern Europe bear the marks of this mode of approaching the local 
developments. While there is routine recognition that the West itself fosters a range of 
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capitalisms', the crux of the debates is to pin down the nature of Eastern European 
4 capitalism - which is ultimately done by implicit or explicit comparison to an ideal type 
Representations of Eastern European forms of social (and economic, political) 
organisation as 'flawed' or problematic are prominent in the post-communist studies 
literature. Another type of representation of these local forms is subsumed by the signifier 
'hybrid'; while it does not straightforwardly portray the local forms as 'defective', it is 
not without problems, because it can be seen as implying pure models, or authentic, 
genuine, in a word 'essential' forins (both on the side of the West and of Eastern 
European societies), that through interaction produce the 'hybrid'. 
To sum up, most of the concepts used to describe and understand Eastern 
European realities are exclusionary through their constitution: they have been elaborated 
from specific circumstances in the West, therefore have limited 'covering power' (despite 
their pretensions to universality) and cannot account for phenomena outside the 
circumstances they are developed from. 
To these types of representations I oppose one based on the relational creation of 
identities: following Laclau (1990), the identity of an object, a concept, or a practice is 
produced in relation to its context, therefore it is not adequate to try to grasp the identity 
of aspects of the social outside the contexts in which they emerge. The consequence of 
this approach that sees the identity of social phenomena as inseparable from the links 
through which it is formed, from the context in which it arises, is that these social 
phenomena ought to be studied in their own right, rather than assessed by a normative 
comparison to 'models'. For example, concepts such as 'democracy' or 'meritocracy' 
take form through the efforts to fix the meaning of signifiers - through practices of 
articulation (e. g. 'democracy as freedom to do what one wants'). Rather than defining the 
meanings they are filled with as 'wrong' ('democracy is nof freedom for everyone to do 
what they want'), analyses should investigate the processes through which 'democracy' 
as a concept and a set of practices gains shape. 
At the moment though, the dominant trend is not to assess post-communist 
phenomena in their own right, as the product of relations that include the West and the 
4 E. g., Ray (1997, p556) talks about unregulated capitalism, clientelism, informality in the case of post- 
communist societies, which can be seen as implicitly treating Western forms of capitalism as more rational 
and fon-nal. 
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local, but as 'variations' of the model. This has for effect a reinforcing of the positioning 
of the West and Eastern Europe, which also shapes their identities. 
Reinforcinjj the identity of the West 
The backwardness discourse and the ways social change in Eastern Europe is 
framed reflect on the identity of the West. As it has been asserted above, identities are 
relational, therefore the identity of the West is inseparable from representations of 
Eastern Europe. 
The fall of communism, followed by the swift strategy of 'catching up with the 
West', has fuelled self-understandings of the West that focus on notions of superiority, 
and a sense of confidence ('we were doing the right thing all along, now everyone else 
wants to be like us'). The 'end of history' debate points in the same direction: there are 
no alternatives left to liberal capitalism, with which the West is finnly associated. The 
backwardness discourse on Eastern Europe is strongly valorising the West (a 'model' to 
be emulated) and legitimises its approaches and choices. 
Local descriptions of the 'natural' and desirable path for future evolution (social 
reconstruction projects) include notions of democracy and free market, therefore positing 
the West (the repository of these forms) as an ideal and a model and implicitly 
reinforcing the backwardness discourse. The European cultural and social model is 
looked up to by a range of thinkers (generally the ones that were marginalized under 
communism or dissidents). While the cultural-intellectual elites yearn after the European 
cultural model, the economic elites tend to put forward the north-American model of 
social and economic organisation as something that the society should strive for, and this 
implies a necessary change in local mentalities and ways of doing things (largely 
inadequate and responsible for the slow economic progress) along American models. In 
short, the local representations of the elites are very much in line with the discourse of the 
West on post-communist societies. 
Representations produced by the 'backwardness' and 'catching up' discourses, 
embodied in courses of action, have outlined the identity of the West and Eastern Europe, 
their missions and trajectories. I will just give the example of the EU (a Western entity), 
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whose identity is constantly reshaped through internal struggle, but also by using 
representations of Eastern Europe - especially since the issue of eastward enlargement 
became a prominent one. By setting up the legal and economic criteria that candidate 
countries must satisfy in order to obtain EU membership ('the Copenhagen criteria'), the 
member countries have indirectly defined core features of the EU and have pointed to 
what the Eastern European countries lack or must alter in order to be integrated 
(articulating a variant of the 'catching up' discourse). The enlargement of 2004 was 
preceded by debates over the dangers and advantages of integrating Eastern European 
countries. On the one hand, the financial and political cohesion of the European Union 
appeared under threat: "differences in political institutions and cultural mentalities 
challenge the political coherence and cultural convergence of the European Union... the 
Eastern enlargement considerably strengthens the centrifugal and potentially fragmenting 
forces within an extended European governance regime" (Triandafyllidou and Spohn 
2003, p7). On the other hand, the enlargement "strengthens the legitimacy of the 
European Union as a political project that promoted democracy and Western liberalism" 
(Triandafyllidou and Spohn 2003, p7). This assessment of the situation tends to 
emphasise the coherence of the EU project and homogeneity of political culture before 
enlargement, glossing over internal conflicts, power games and very different visions of 
social, economic and political organisation - Eastern Europe is the 'Other' against which 
a presumed unity of Western Europe can be constructed (in this case, via the EU). The 
enlargement also prompted articulations of the EU with democracy, economic 
globalisation and security. The rhetorics behind the Eastern enlargement included "the 
extension of democracy and human rights, enhancing economic progress, becoming a 
world actor, taking responsibility for European security" (Hutchinson 2003, p49). The 
debates around the enlargement issue have prompted a refining of the identity of the EU 
as an 4 actor' among other world actors, with specific traits and a 'mission'. 
The 2004 enlargement has not dismantled the backwardness representations of 
Eastern Europe: the integration has not transformed the new ten members into equal 
partners, but has perpetuated understandings of these countries as somehow 'deficient' in 
relation to the core countries and not yet deserving full membership rights. The 'catching 
up' metaphor is still alive; moreover, there is a tendency to use the EU enlargement as a 
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scapegoat in relation to "the sense of insecurity and social discontent, largely stemming 
from high unemployment" (Rehn 2005) the member states are facing. 
Definitions of the West emanate both from Western agencies and from local 
actors. To give just a few examples, The IMF and World Bank articulate 'the West' 
within a neoliberal logic and with the discourse of globalisation. The NATO introduces a 
slightly different meaning of the West in the context of security, threat and geopolitical 
configurations that depend on the creation of meaningful 'others' - another way of 
dividing and ordering the world through attribution of significance. And, most 
importantly at the moment of doing the present research, the EU institutional structure 
conveys to the accession countries what it means to be European (which is a more 
specific case of being Western) by specifying a list of criteria these countries must 
complete in order to become a member - literally what it takes to be European in the EU 
understanding. In this way powerful articulations that establish what it means to be 
Western that are communicated to the Romanian elites (and not only) through the 
multiple agents that try to reshape Eastern Europe - their official positions and 
documents, their policy recommendations, the expert advice and 'assistance' or transfer 
of expertise programmes, direct meetings at different levels, etc. 
The situation in Romania mirrors that in other Eastern European countries, and 
Russia; commenting on the position of the new leaders of Russia, Bonnett (2004, p59) 
comments: "The attributes of modernity are approached in a similar way to that found in 
most other countries, as facets of the seemingly natural and entwined processes of 
privatisation, democratization, and, increasingly, economic flexibility" - modernity and 
the West are again conflated". 
The other facet of the process through which the identity of the West as norm and 
signifier of 'proper' socio-economic arrangements is reinforced, is the impact on the 
identities of eastern European citizens and their sense of loss of pride and positive 
identity. The opening up of borders after 1990, under the circumstances of an abandoning 
of communism and readiness to 'return to Europe', and the popular discourses and policy 
moves that followed, had for effect making very visible the 'inferior' status of these 
people in relation to westerners, a humiliating situation from which official propaganda 
(and daily life under communism) had hitherto shielded them. What is under-estimated in 
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analyses of the region is the amount of resentment and humiliation fostered among post- 
communist citizens, and which was evident during my fieldwork, mainly among those 
who have not fared too well in the new capitalist order. 
The responsibility of social scientists as producers of knowledge/representations 
The process of reforrn of Eastern European countries is often directed from 
behind beneficient facades, draped under the respectability and legitimacy shroud 
provided by 'objective assessment' and scientific knowledge (such as the one behind 
economic imperatives and ineluctable laws) that define 'the only possible way' or the 
best way to effect social change. The regimes of truth and knowledge of these 
institutions, the operations of power, domination and self-serving policies under the 
fagade of neutrality and objective reasoning should be addressed, together with the 
implications of their intervention on populations. 
The points made above raise important questions around the implications of 
certain regimes of representation - and the responsibility of the ones involved in their 
production. These issues have been thoroughly addressed by post-colonial theory (that 
has for example shown how ways of representing the Other cannot be separated from 
colonial projects and their more sinister ramifications in the form of wars, slavery, 
genocide, famine, etc. ). "Regimes of representation can be analysed as places of 
encounter where identities are constructed and also where violence is originated, 
symbolized, and managed" (Escobar 1995, p I). 
This might seem unrelated to the situation of Eastern European countries, until 
one attempts to assess the impact of some policies forcefully implemented throughout the 
'transition' period: statistics in the region highlight the reduction of life expectancy for 
some countries, the worsening of health indicators, increased infant mortality, etc. 
(Cockerman 1997). Gowan (1995) points to the tens of thousands of lives cut short by 
Western policies towards the East, especially the 'shock therapy' and structural 
adjustments (involving massive unemployment combined with a drastic reduction of 
welfare programmes) while questioning the inevitability of this course of action. By 
using the image of 'inevitable social costs', of the necessity for sacrifice in the name of 
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future prosperity, the transition discourse legitimised the stunting of concrete human lives 
and pre-empted a deep questioning of the validity of its underpinning conceptualisations. 
The role and responsibility of social scientists in relation to developments in 
Eastern Europe should come under scrutiny. When the 'shock therapy' and other 
4recipes' for improving economic indicators and bringing about 'freedom' were followed 
by a rapid slump in living standards and economic output, most explanations produced by 
social scientists focused on the 'cultural legacy', or 'missing link' that 
, 
interfered with the 
proposed reforms: the local realities were blamed for the malfunctioning of strategies 
designed for ideal typical situations, rather than questioning the assumptions and 
theoretical models that these strategies embodied. In short, the way social scientists have 
described and explained the tribulations of the 'transition' period, using elements and 
understandings from the backwardness discourse, has legitimised prac tices and explained 
failures of Western-driven reforms. This exercise has constantly reinforced the 
positioning of the West and Eastern Europe as the norm versus the defective copy, 
plagued by inherited 'inadequacies' that prevent it from being truly Western (i. e. 
democratic and capitalist). The debates on the best economic arrangements (shock 
therapy vs gradual reform) and on the creation of democratic forms of government 
(democracy as 'forrn'- procedures and technicalities, as opposed to 'substance' - value- 
orientations, practices, etc. ), that have animated the intellectual and policy circles in the 
West and Eastern Europe, constantly reinforce the meanings of the 'backwardness' and 
'catching up' discourses and produce stable articulations. 
Place and identity-work 
The second part of the analysis (chapters 9 and 10) has examined the ways place of 
residence is involved in the reorganisation of the social and of identities, through creating 
boundaries and difference. As discussed, the context for this examination is a widespread 
process of re-drawing symbolic boundaries between aspects of the social and between 
people/groups, of cultural redefinition. "Symbolic boundaries separate realms, creating 
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the contexts in which meaningful thought and action can take place" (WuthnoNN- et al 
1984, p260). 
The analysis of identity-work performed in relation to the place of residence is an 
illustration of how discourses are interwoven in people's articulatory practices and how 
they intersect in constructs of 'place'. It also exposes the flexibility, and contextual nature 
of these constructs, their strategic alignment in relation to the dominant articulations that 
order the social. 
The study has drawn out the ways place of residence is 'used' by respondents in 
the study areas as an ingredient in their identity-work: place as symbolic construct 
(including physical traits and built environment, history, residents and local moral order) 
grounds identity claims through various practices of articulation; also, place as a niche of 
activity, performance and recognition in a local system of relations is entwined with 
one's identity. 
The residents of C (the old detached house neighbourbood) rely on a few major 
articulations as technique for producing the identity of their place of residence (which 
plays into their own identity). They create the block areas as an oppositional 'other', and 
articulate blocks with a variety of features. In this way, the identity of C emerges as the 
opposed of those features. 
The master- signi fier that they attach to blocks is 'communism', and the meanings 
invested in this signifier are diverse, such as: sameness, ugliness, lack of individuality, 
blurred status of private property, social control, communalism and sharing, levelling of 
social hierarchies and uncivilised, poor residents. All these traits gain negative 
connotations, mainly through their association to 'communism', as the latter is strongly 
rejected by the dominant discourses. 
This technique also allows the residents to position features of their 
neighbourhood in a favourable light, by bringing them in line with the general normative 
prescriptions endorsed by hegemonic discourses (which are largely constructed as 
anticommunist): traits such as individuality or uniqueness, social interaction as 'civilised' 
(meaning usually not of the blat-type) are valorised in the new, accepted system of 
values. A powerful articulation performed by C residents puts together private property, 
defended boundaries around it, privacy, choice, control and independence or autonomy - 
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all the above have emerged as the 'new values' in the post-communist landscape, in a 
move of rejection of what was perceived as the essence of communism. Mirroring 
Merry's (1987, p57) observation "[p]rivacy is one measure of power in American 
society", C residents constantly assert their power to defend privacy and boundaries, and 
to control social interaction, by separating themselves from social strata of different 
status - an emplacing of social polarisation. 
Another articulation through which representations of C in contrast with blocks 
were created consists of the natural-artificial divide, which relies on an essential notion of 
human nature: the appropriate or 'natural' environment for human dwelling, but also the 
(natural' social divisions and their spatial materialisation. Blocks are artificial both 
because of their physical traits, and because they contain a 'mix' of categories. As C 
residents put it, what com! non interests and reasons for communicating can those socially 
different categories of people possibly have? The only things that bring those residents 
together are matters concerning the common management of the 'block' and this is an 
artificial link, not a 'natural' one, arisen from similarity of background, interest and 
outlook on life. The 'block' through its design and functioning is seen as 'forcing' people 
to cooperate and interact. 
A different line of identity-work of C long term residents regards the 'new rich' 
buying property in C at an increased pace. "Everywhere, people own objects so deeply 
imbued with their identities that they make every effort to keep these symbolically vital 
assets to themselves, out of circulation, resisting all attempts by outsiders to acquire 
them" (Harrison 1999, p240). In the case of C residents, their own houses are such 
symbolic assets that identity largely rests on, and there is the threat of them being 
purchased by rich newcomers. 
As the newcomers impose their definition of value and worth (in line with the 
material criterion of the dominant discourse), they threaten the aspect of the local moral 
order (and identities) that values educational level, family history or lineage, continuity of 
residence in the neighbourhood, and 'respectable professions' rather than income itself. 
The influx of 'newcomers' produces a restructuring of the collective identity of the 'old 
guard', as different reactions emerge. Two main strategies seem to be employed by 'old 
guard' residents. On the one hand, the new rich are denied legitimate belonging to the 
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place, they 'do not deserve to live here' - and representation of the place are constructed 
in order to exclude them (as they are built around a certain type of lifestyle and taste, 
educational status, tradition, continuity and length of residence, certain norms and values, 
non-conspicuous consumption, etc). On the other hand, residents use the prosperous 
image of the newcomers to boost the profile of the area, and include them in an all- 
encompassing local collective image of 'privileged people', that they access for forging 
personal identities. This latter strategy dissolves the division between the 'new rich' and 
'the old guard' under a generic image of 'good quality', 'privileged' people and tends to 
be used when the reference group or audience is formed of non-residents (while the 
former strategy tends to be used 'internally', among old guard residents). 
The residents of block neighbourhoods followed similar techniques of 
representing their place in a valorising way, relying though on different aspects - good 
quality of buildings and 'decent' residents. They tend to invest more in the 'meaningful' 
aspect of local social interaction and in their position in the local system of relations. 
Although from the outside the neighbourhood might seem similar architecturally 
to other block areas, since blocks have been built according to similar specifications 
throughout Bucharest, the inhabitants stress differences that give their neighbourhood a 
distinct image in the landscape of Bucharest. Uniqueness is actively constructed and 
transmitted through descriptions and stories. Details become imbued with meaning, 
landmarks are set, boundaries drawn and streets and blocks are given 'personality' and 
described by their specific traits. This serves to counter-attack the image of sameness and 
lack of distinction projected on blocks - and the potential implications of this image on 
identity-building. 
As a Romanian saying goes, 'It is the people that make a place' and this saying is 
used frequently in block areas to 'compensate' for the shortcomings of the built 
environment: the residents themselves makes the place special, and constructions of the 
place insist on the pleasant, useful and meaningful neighbourly relations they are part of 
In what concerns social interaction, the 'block' is very flexibly articulated as allowing for 
both intense interaction and privacy. This discursive malleability means that block 
arrangements can be valorised both by respondents that adopt a more communalistic 
stance, and by the ones that support an individualistic worldview. 
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An important aspect of the representation of the place, as a dominant image of 
what sort of place this is', is encountered in the DT study area, where (mainly younger) 
residents organise their local practices around a certain image or understanding of the 
place as 'down to earth', 'friendly and open', and 'not tolerating flashy display of 
material status'. This means that, within their place of residence, they can access 
valorised subject positions (decent person, good friend, trusted neighbour) that are 
divorced from their material status -a resource for positive identity for less well-off 
residents. 
As mentioned in chapter 10, respondents in block areas have to perform identity- 
work in relation of place of residence under the conditions of an existing powerful 
discourse on blocks, with negative undertones. The intellectual and media discourses 
portray the 'block' as problem-ridden, and tend to associate it with communism (the 
intellectual discourse) and with poverty (the media discourse). Based on my fieldwork in 
two major block areas in Bucharest, the positive representations of their place of 
residence that local respondents create are very powerful. They usually ignore the 
intellectual discourse, and when faced with the media discourse, they strongly contest and 
challenge it, by bringing counter- evidence (examples of rich and famous people that live 
in blocs) and emphasise the good quality of local relations (even if there are problems, 
the emotional fulfilment is central), the quality of local services, etc. Another technique 
of deflecting the negative media representations is to symbolically distance themselves 
from 'really poor' areas, which become an inferior 'other'. 
To sum up, representations of place are relevant to identity insofar as respondents 
carry out associations between themselves and their place of residence (for example 
through narratives of belonging), or more straightforwardly, as they create subject 
positions ('the typical local resident'). 
The central technique for identity negotiation or identity work is the establishing 
of differences and boundaries, a process facilitated by 'place'. "Identity is relational and 
collective... Identity ... is always connected to a series of 
differences that help it be what it 
is. The initial tendency is to describe the differences on which you depend in a way that 
gives privilege or priority to you" (Connoly 1991, pxiv). This tendency is illustrated by 
the symbolic construction of 'place' through articulatory practices - describing, naming, 
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qualifying and explaining features of the place, always In value-laden, normative terms, 
is a process intimately intertwined with the construction of identity; by 'choosing' certain 
aspects to describe the place (thus representing place), one performs a process of self- 
definition. Articulatory practices allow the production of identity by the symbolic 
association between place and oneself- "locales are imbued with personal and social 
meanings, and ... symbolic locales can serve in turn as an important sign or locus of the 
self'(Hummon 1992, p258). 
Place as context and resource for identity-work embraces a variety of guises: 
through processes of place construction, subject positions are created (in the form of the 
meaning of being a resident of that place), which again can be used to negotiate against 
other subject positions; personal roles or identities emerge situationally, in the context of 
relations with neighbours, which can be used to mitigate a stronger subject position; the 
place of residence can act as a social circle that provides recognition and supports certain 
facets of one's identity. 
Place construction is involved in the creation of difference and boundaries, which 
are central to the construction of any identity. "Resources are expended in creating and 
maintaining them and many social activities may be understood as efforts to sharpen 
eroded boundaries, to redefine cultural distinctions, or as symptoms of ambiguous 
frameworks" (Wuthnow et al 1984, p261). 
Ultimately, place of residence can be a site where the dominant discourse can be 
"drawn upon and re-invested with meaning to mobilize a counter-hegemonic claim" 
(Bach 1993, p196). 
Some respondents use place in order to negotiate identity more that others. The 
ones that are unsuccessful socially (by the dominant criteria) tend to bring in place as a 
resource more often. For other respondents it is a marginal resource - for example young 
professionals (under 25-30 years old) invest much more in the workplace as locus of 
identity, they are formed as subjects predominantly in the context of the workplace and 
by the discourses that shape the job market. Dominant discourses shape understandings 
of social success and create a grid of 'indicators' through which achievement is assessed. 
According to this grid it is more important for young people to get a well paid job, to lead 
a certain life (eating out, drinking in expensive bars, expensive holidays) and acquire 
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status symbols such as an expensive foreign car - the house or flat and its location 
become relevant later on in their life course. For more established, older professionals, 
place of residence becomes a very important indicator of attainment, as it is part of the 
expectations around their social status: the dominant materialistic discourse, with its 
accent on material possessions and consumption, defines social success for a certain age 
group as including not only a well-paid job, but also a good quality house in a prestigious 
neighbourhood. 
In summary, for different socio-economic and age groups, place matters in 
variable degrees. Place of residence is very important for the identity work of retired 
respondents, that have been cut off from other discursive contexts, with their particular 
resources, such as the workplace. It is also a considerable resource for respondents with 
an average or below average material situation. This category usually has resided in one 
place for a lengthy period of time, and upward residential mobility is out of the question. 
These respondents devote a lot of narrative effort to the construction of the 
neighbourhood as a 'good, decent, desirable place'; not only that place is seen as 
intertwined with one's image, one's life trajectory, and with significant, meaningful 
events throughout one's life - therefore with different aspects of one's identity, but also 
one is tied to that place in the future as well, therefore the place will continue to be 
enmeshed with the subject positions a person occupies. 
The nature of identity-, forms of and limits to aj! ency in identily-work 
The analysis also contributes to the debate on the nature of identity. It has shown how the 
production of difference is essential to identity, and it supports the claim that identities 
are not essential, but strategic and positional - constructed across discourses that 
sometimes can be contradictory: this is why identities are heterogeneous, and can 
accommodate contradictory ideas, practices, and statements. Persons enter different 
relations, different contexts in which they perform their identity, meaning they access 
different subject positions. The 'fractured self is a result of the proliferation of 
discourses and modes of thinking and being a person is immersed into. 
235 
This is not to say that subject positions all have an equal 'weight' - the existence 
of dominant or hegemonic discourses means that some potential subject positions are 
eliminated altogether, and others are made more difficult to access, or they are out of 
reach. The power of dominant discourses consists in locking individuals into subject 
positions, in making their navigation across positions more difficult. A perfect locking is 
never fully achieved though, because of the impossibility of total closure, as detailed in 
chapter 2. 
The question that arises at this point refers to the extent to which individuals can 
4unlock' themselves from strong subject positions, and under what circumstances - in 
other words, what are the limitations and conditions of possibility for the exercising of 
agency through identity-work? 
As asserted throughout this thesis, the reconfiguration of the social in Romania 
after 1989 is driven by discourses which establish new criteria for social worth and new 
subject positions, new lines of division, especially between 'winners' and 'losers' - rich 
and poor respectively. This means that individuals are assigned to socially recognised 
positions that try to fix their identity. Under these circumstances, for some social actors 
identity-work involves identification - and this tends to be the case of the 'winners', who 
through their practices attempt to attach themselves to the subject position they are 
assigned to; for others though - and they form the majority - identity-work involves 
trying to negotiate across the gradations of subject positions in various discourses, with 
the goal of accessing more valorised positions. 
Identity-work is a crucial issue for a large part of the population. What pours forth 
in interviews is resentment over the less 'advantageous' positions people have been 
allocated to. In contemporary Romania, a widespread narrative of injustice and 
humiliation testifies the deep frustration and rancour many individuals feel towards the 
new social arrangements and the rejection (or devaluation) of identities they have been 
tied to (while also pointing to the tear in the social fabric). As Honneth (2001, p39) puts 
it, "in the self-description of those who see themselves as having been wrongly treated by 
others, the moral categories that play a dominant role are those - such as 'insult' or 
'humiliation' - that refer to forms of disrespect, that is, to the 
denial of recognition. 
Negative concepts of this kind are used to designate behaviour that represents an 
236 
injustice 
... because it injures them with regard to the positive understanding of 
themselves that they have acquired intersubjectively". For this category of people, it is 
essential to be able to perform some form of negotiation across subject positions. 
In addressing the nature of the practices of identity-work, the analysis is engaging 
with the sociological debates on the possibilities and forms of agency within a discursive 
understanding of the social, as presented in chapter 2. It is evident that the dominant 
articulations can not close identities, suture perfectly the subject: there are possibilities 
left for the social actor to negotiate across positions by using discourses in a situated 
manner, as exemplified by the analysis of the study-areas C, DT and T. Through the 
articulatory practices they carry out, many of the respondents that were positioned in less 
advantageous positions (the retired, the not-so-rich, etc. ) have managed - to different 
degrees - to access more valorised positions, for example by producing representations of 
their place of residence that are positively sanctioned by the dominant or hegemonic 
discourses, combined with identification with place. The other form of identity-work 
discussed, which refers to taking up 'roles' in the local system of relations, can also be 
seen as an expression of agency - which is context-dependent. 
The empirical investigation makes also evident the limitations of agency in the 
form of identity-work using place of residence. The difficulties of creating a valorised 
identity position for the ones assigned to less prestigious locations by the dominant 
discourse can be mitigated only to a certain extent by manoeuvres of moral positioning; 
the pain and frustration coming from the denial of recognition of certain identity aspects 
features as a major theme throughout interviews. 
The analysis has made visible the central role of 'resources' in negotiating 
identity. Certain features of the place become 'resources' only if social actors are able to 
place them in discursive contexts where they are recognised as 'valuable' or 'positive' 
traits. If social actors do not have access to a dominant (or even alternative) system of 
values in which to place successfully features of their area, it is impossible to create any 
valorising representations. In this way, the 'freedom' to use place of residence is 
constricted by the discursive contexts in which social actors operate. 
A related aspect of the limits of agency is the performance aspect of identity in 
the local moral and interactional order: "the question of identity ... becomes inseparable 
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from the discrete, socially- situated events within which the performative struggle occurs" 
(Freeman 2001, p290). This occupying of subject positions in the local setting is 
dependent on recognition from the local 'audience'. In this way, there are limits on the 
use of local, situated performances for identity-work; their reception by the audience is 
critical, as the audience can validate and support or sanction, reject and refuse to uphold 
certain identities put forward by the actor. 
The general claim that these findings support refers to the context-bound nature of 
identity-work (more general discursive contexts and local moral and interactional orders, 
including the 'audience') - which is translated as a clear limit of agency. Tactics and 
forms of identity negotiation often cannot be transferred from one context to another, a 




This thesis has used the analysis of fieldwork material from Bucharest, Romania in order 
to critically engage with theoretical debates in a number of fields. Concepts of 'discourse' 
and place' have been interwoven throughout the analysis, in various guises. 
This research has used notions of discourse, power and subjectivity, and has been 
informed by the various conceptualisations of agency presented in chapter 2- an 
approach that integrates the enabling and constricting nature of discourses, their 
productive character (in creating the normative and conceptual parameters for 
understanding aspects of the social world and in creating subjectivities) with a range of 
methods, strategies, tactics employed by actors and groups that inevitably enter and 'use' 
discourses as they go about their daily activities. 
"Discourses provide persons with coherent interpretive frameworks and 
discursive practices for constructing different social realities within which particular 
kinds of people reside, relationships prevail, and opportunities are likely to emerge... The 
discourses are conditions of possibility that provide us with the resources for constructing 
a limited array of social realities, and make other possibilities less available to us" (Miller 
and Fox 2004, p42-43). It follows that efforts of interpreting social processes and of self- 
creation always take place in discursive practical contexts, not outside them. Different 
social agents are differently positioned in relation to access and possibilities to shape 
discourses. 
The negotiation of identity takes place within contexts shaped by discourses, 
including the hierarchies of relations that constitute subjectivities. 'Agency' does not 
mean operating outside discourses; social actors can be seen as being located at an 
intersection of discourses and ideas of agency imply the possibility of a degree of choice 
among them or negotiation across them; "each individual is a locus in which an 
incoherent (and often contradictory) plurality of such relational determinations interact" 
(de Certeau 1984, pXI), which renders problematic a deterministic notion of complete 
domination through (a dominant) discourse and permits an exploration of this space of 
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- freedom or agency at the intersection of discourses, or the 'room for manoeuvring' actors 
have. 
'Place' is featuring prominently in the present analysis, from the notion of space 
or location as intertwined with representation and implicated in knowledge production, to 
the social space of Romania and the processes through which it gains the present shape, 
and to place as locus of identity or resource for identity formation. 
Issues of knowledge production as power- and value- laden have been highlighted 
through the example of the West as privileged producer of knowledge, and Eastern 
Europe as the object of knowledge and representation. A discursive approach has been 
proposed in order to grasp the nature of the hierarchical relationship between these two 
locations: their positioning is effected through a discourse of backwardness of Eastern 
Europe vis-a-vis the West, which has been detailed in chapter 6. 
The same processes of knowledge production that positions Eastern Europe as 
backward and the West as an ideal to strive for, a blueprint for social transfonnation in 
post-communist societies, has partly fixed the identity of Eastern Europe and of the West 
(including the shaping of subjectivities in relation to place). Representations within 
knowledge production processes are inseparable from the production of the social (by 
production of the social I mean the working of discourses that construct the concepts, 
objects and identities forming the social - and it includes practices and institutions as sets 
of practices). This is why the production of the social in post-communist Romania has to 
be understood in the context of these discursively created larger positionings in relation 
to the West. 
Chapter 5 puts forward an understanding of the post-communist condition as 
characterised by social dislocation and highlights the 'loss of meaning' confronting these 
societies, as systems of signification associated with the communist order have 
disappeared. The analysis captures the project of reconstitution of society (and economy, 
polity) in the form of a mythical space destined to suture the generalised dislocation. The 
particular form that this mythical space has taken, it has been asserted, can be understood 
in the context of the positioning mentioned above: the meanings invested in the West by 
dominant articulations has resulted in Eastern European social actors adopting a 'return to 
Europe' or 'need to catch up with the West' societal slogan (as a mythical space) -a 
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process detailed in chapter 6. The structuring of the 'social space' of Romanian society 
was examined by looking at the mythical space suturing the dislocation after the fall of 
the communist regime, and its consequences in terms of enabling further articulations 
(which are producing the social). To sum up, the West has a heavy impact on the 
constitution of societal meaning systems in Eastern Europe, a situation that reflects the 
power relations associated with representation and knowledge production, with 
articulatory practices that constitute meanings and identities in the field of the social. 
Chapter 7 examines the subsequent process of investing with a literal content the 
signifiers of the mythical space (e. g. democracy and free market, the nodal points around 
which societal projects are forged). It looks at another level of production of the social, 
represented by a less formalised process of discursive production and articulations in 
which ordinary people engage while going about their daily business. In the sites of 
everyday life, discourses and practices intersect in an unregulated way, as social actors 
use (discursively produced) concepts and objects in a situational, strategic manner; they 
also bring their contribution to the widespread re-articulation through which the social is 
produced: they create and take up, circulate, comment on representations of the social - 
as Jager (2001) puts it, 'knit along' in the production of discourses. This production of 
the social 'from below', through struggle over the meanings of the main signifiers of the 
dominant discourse of 'catching up' shows how people place concepts and objects in 
systems of relations and contribute to the shaping of their identity - through techniques 
such as comparison with the past and contextualisation. Chapter 7 emphasises the 
element of struggle over the ways in which meanings get fixed, and highlights some of 
the difficulties in fixing the meanings of signifiers such as democracy, freedom, 
capitalism and market, meritocracy or work under capitalism. 
Across social actors' accounts the deployment of some large-scale articulations 
was detected: the production of the social condenses into hegemonic articulations (and 
associated subject positions) and resistance ones, as discussed in chapter 8, that orient 
actors' understandings of the social world and of themselves. These hegemonic 
articulations claim what Mumby (1993, p2) calls "a monopoly over the rules for what 
counts as legitimate knowledge" and have the power to marginalise "social groups who 
have been largely disenfranchised in terms of their ability to shape our understanding of 
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the world". It has been asserted that intense processes of re-stratification are rife in post- 
communist societies: the production of the social through the adoption of practices 
associated with 'capitalism' and the free market and of values and non-ns shaped by 
dominant discourses has resulted in the creation of new lines of division, new positions 
characterised by both different resources and different symbolic meanings, The main 
development in post-communist Romania in terms of production of the social has been 
the 'polarisation' of society (through the workings of the free market) and the embracing 
of an individualistic, materialistic, consumerist stance - as evident in the fieldwork 
material. People have been assigned to different positions and they acutely feel the ways 
in which they are being 'pulled apart'. 
The comment of Baudrillard (1994, p29) rings true throughout Eastern Europe: 
"Perhaps defrosted liberty is not so attractive as all that. And what if it turned out to be 
intent in just one thing: bartering itself off in a binge of cars and electrical goods, not to 
mention mind-bending drugs and pornography; that is, immediately trading itself off 
against Western liquid assets". 
One of the main impacts of social dislocation and social change have been on 
local identities: new discourses have rooted out old subject positions and rendered self- 
understandings obsolete; new articulations have created new subject positions, have 
attached them valuative undertones and have interwoven them into the new societal 
moral order. A very strong criterion for creating subject positions, that seems to 
supersede in importance other lines of stratification, refers to material status. It is around 
this signifier that most identity-work is performed, and chapters 9 and 10 have used 
another dimension of 'place' in order to investigate the ways that place of residence is 
used by social actors to negotiate identity - in relation to the aforementioned subject 
positions allocated through the dominant discourses in Romanian society. Place of 
residence has emerged as a relevant and flexible resource that social actors can use, with 
different degrees of success, in order to mitigate dominant positions. 
The analysis chapters have detailed various forms of identity work. Through 
subjectivation, people are given subject positions in discourses from which they can 
speak meaningfully; also, they are active in taking on these positions and making 
themselves into subjects (techniques of the self). Alternatively, they are involved in the 
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negotiation of positions through strategies of redefining identity (which emerge at the 
intersection of a multitude of discourses), in the context of a dominant background 
discourse structuring social hierarchies (with clear criteria for designating winners and 
losers): social actors draw on alternative discourses to contest and de-legitimise the 
dominant one (an attempt to play discourses against each other that entails moral 
positioning); they 'highlight' other positions in other discourses that might compensate 
for the position in the dominant one; they also perform acts of disidentification, 
recognising the position assigned within discourses and rejecting it. Most of these 
strategies are dependent on the (significant) others' acceptance of one's 'performance': 
some identities are not sustainable in any locales, but are circumscribes to specific ones. 
The local social system of relations that areas of residence displays can represent an 
environment where certain forms of identity-work are supported - while the 'outside' 
does not provide such a 'benevolent' audience. 
To sum up, the analysis has shown some of the ways social actors 'manoeuvre' 
among discourses, or the way they 'negotiate, 'subvert' them and the subject positions 
they are assigned within them. 
The discussion chapter (chapter 11) raises the issue of production of the social in 
post-communist societies as struggle over meaning and the missed opportunity of local 
forms of knowledge to challenge modes of thought, conceptualisation of the social, to 
'de-naturalise' the established articulations through which the West makes sense of the 
world. The chapter highlights the problematic way in which these articulations are 
imposed as universals (disembedded from specific conditions of existence) on other 
'locations', through operations of power - and some of the consequences of this situation. 
The voice of some Romanian social actors (the ones that challenge the 'goodness' of 
Western forms of social, economic and political organisation) could have acted as Cpetits 
recits' (Lyotard 1984) challenging dominant systems of knowledge, destabilising 
metanarratives (e. g. capitalism and development), but the power of the West to dismiss 
and silence such voices cannot be overlooked. 
In the process the identity of the West as normative model is reinforced and 
Eastern Europe is further tied to its marginal, cflawed carbon copy' position, a recipient 
of knowledge, rather than an actor with 'voice'. 
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Limitations of the data 
This analysis was mainly based on fieldwork performed over a total period of 6 months 
in Bucharest, Romania, that involved interviews with 78 respondents and various forms 
of observation. The interviews have been supplemented with forms of fieldwork 
(resulting in extensive fieldnotes) that have tried to capture more general processes - 
discourses and articulations - as a form of control of the validity of inferences from my 
sample. Interviews have been interpreted so as to reveal the intersections of the social, 
cultural, personal and political. 
The sample, as mentioned in chapter 4, contains predominantly respondents that 
are coping financially, therefore one of the dimensions missing in this research is the 
voice of the truly destitute and marginalised. Also, in the sample middle-aged and older 
respondents are over-represented (in comparison to their statistical societal distribution), 
but for the purposes of this research I consider this not to be a flaw: as the analysis has 
tried to capture how social change has affected identities, this category of respondents are 
a valuable source of information - they are the ones deepest affected by the discursive 
shift, and the ensuing societal reorganisation. Moreover, as identity in relation to place of 
residence was investigated, older residents that are retired, or middle aged respondents 
that have lost their job or experience an unstable position on the job market tend to 
provide more relevant data: place of residence is a resource for identity negotiation and a 
locus of symbolic investment to an extent that is not matched by the younger 
respondents, who tend to tie their identity to the workplace. 
Finally, this analysis is a snapshot of the situation in 2002-2003 in Romania, and 
does not cover further developments. But this limitation of the claims in relation to what 
the analysis has captured is in line with an understanding of the social in flux, 
continuously reshaped through hegemonic struggles - what one can seize through this 
type of research is a moment in this struggle, and the analysis 'freezes' a process that 
continues beyond any attempt to capture the deployment of discursive articulations. 
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